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Abstract 
This study is primarily concerned with answering several important questions 
surrounding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1950-1951 which have remained 
unanswered. What were the detailed origins of the disputes between the Iranian 
Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company? Why was such a favourable oil 
concession granted to a British citizen? What was the impact of the occupation 
of Iran on the Iranian people's way of political thinking and how did oil become 
an issue for public debate? Why was there an oil crisis in 1951 ? What were the 
motivations of the parties to the oil dispute? Was the crisis mainly over economic 
grievances ? What was the role of nationalism ? 
These are answered within a framework that highlights the salient variables 
such as politics, economy, international relations and diplomacy. The methodology 
adopted is a descriptive analysis of archival material and literature on the related 
subjects. The emphasis is on the Iranian view of the crisis for the reason that, 
although it received international attention and was in many ways an international 
crisis, it originated in Iran. There were features unique to it which were Iranian. 
Given the nature of Iranian society with its strong oral traditions, the past 
is important to an explanation of the crisis. It is alive in Iranian mind in a way 
not apparent to western society. Conceptions of the past and an awareness of 
the weakness of Iranian autonomy are important in the context of the 1950 crisis. 
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Consequently, it is necessary to examine the concept of history prevalent in Iran. 
This takes the staring point of the thesis to the D'Arcy oil concession. 
In 1900, Iran was bankrupt in Western terms, the Shah needed immediate 
cash payment,I authorities were financially corrupt and politics was riddled with 
foreign intrigue. Oil had been sought in Iran since 1878 without much success. By 
1900, the demand for Iranian oil was supported by the British Legation. D'Arcy, 
an English financier, managed to obtain, through connections with a string of in-
dividuals, an oil concession for 60 years. The Iranian authorities had every reason 
to believe that this oil concession, like all other oil concessions would eventually 
lapse. However, D' Arcy worked the concession to the point of bankruptcy and 
his engineer, to the point of exhaustion. As a result an oil industry was estab-
lished which "was to see the Royal Navy through two world wars, and to cause 
Persia more trouble than all the political manoeuvrings of the great powers put to-
gether".2The world oil rivalry, compounded with the British government's desire 
for oil independence, turned the Iranian oil industry into the largest oil industry 
of the time and an important source of income for the British Treasury. 
The exploitation of the oil reserves of Iran by an industrial power soon became 
a matter of great controversy as disputes developed between two parties which 
extended over several decades. Iran received some funds in revenues. However, 
the revenues did not improve the Iranian standard of life considerably although 
they affected the balance of payments, currency reserves and purchase of arms. 
Iranian society was in the process of transition from a traditional society to a 
modern one. The Constitutional Movement of 1906 had an impact on the public's 
1 Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 99. 
2 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 19-20. 
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political way of thinking. Reza Shah suppressed the society but the desire for a 
democratic system continued to exist. During the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), 
a large portion of the rural population moved to urban areas. The industrialisation 
of Iran helped in developing a new class of urban middle class and artisans. It 
was obvious that the relationship between Iran and the oil company needed re-
adjusting. However, the oil company officiIs did not show much interest in this 
until it was too late. 
The occupation of Iran in 1941 helped several political forces appear on the 
political scene. The released communist prisoners quickly formed the Tudeh Party. 
The communists were assisted by the Soviet forces in the North to the extent that 
the Tudeh, a communist party, became one of the main political parties of this 
period in an Islamic society. However, several factors helped monarchists overcome 
the communists. One such factor was an increasing American involvement in Iran 
after Pearl Harbour which functioned as a third power to reduce the dominance 
of the others. The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 regularised the presence of American 
troops. The Tehran Declaration of 1943 provided for economic aid at the end 
of the war. In 1947, the ideological basis for American involvement in Iran was 
provided by Truman Doctrine. The final blow to the Tudeh Party was delivered 
in 1949. The attempt on the Shah's life gave the monarchists an excuse to outlaw 
the Tudeh. 
Contrary to their ideology, Moscow provoked discontented Iranian minorities 
rather than encouraging class struggle ! Moscow menaced Iran several times. At 
least at two occasions Moscow demanded an oil concession. They also threatened 
Iranian integrity and caused a great deal of public anxiety which directed pub-
lic attention to Iranain problems. The Azarbaijan crisis of 1945-1946 turned 
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Iranian problem into an international one. Moscow's pressure on Greece and 
Turkey threatened Western interests in the Near and Middle East and caused 
inter-Allied friction. In 1941, Iran appeared to have become a model for Allied 
cooperation. By 1944, however, the first post-war oil crisis seemed to haye turned 
Iran into a battleground between foreign powers ; the early stages of the cold war. 
On the Iranian side, at least since 1944 there was a demand for oil nationali-
sation. The idea developed first into a law forbidding negotiating or granting new 
oil concessions to foreign powers until Iran was occupied. Mosaddegh was mainly 
responsible for this. Then in 1947, an overwhelming majority of Majles deputies 
rejected a Soviet proposal for an oil concession in the North. The Majles instructed 
the government to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for better terms. 
This set in motion a chain of events which resulted in a proposal to supplement 
the 1933 oil concession which had replaced the D' Arcy concession. In 1949, a small 
group of nationalists fiercely fought the proposals. The press criticisms, the Majles 
debates and public gatherings helped ordinary people understand the oil issue. 
However, despite strong opposition, the monarchists were III favour of the 
Supplementary Agreement and attempted to resolve the issue by appointing a 
strong military man, General Razmara, as prime minister in June 1950. The idea, 
however, backfired as public desire for the removal of foreign influence was now 
strong. The Majles opposition, the press and the public appeared to be united. 
Nationalist feelings were fuelled by long-term resentment over the oil company's 
handling of the oil issue. By early 1951 nationalist sentiment was too strong to be 
curtailed. By this time Razmara had become a threat both to the Shah and to the 
nationalists and acted like an obstacle on the way to the oil nationalisation. His 
assassination, in March 1951, removed this obstacle. 
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By this time the support for the movement, the demand for oil nationalisation 
and respect for Mosaddegh covered far-right to the far-left as both clergy and 
communists supported the nationalists. The communists were represented by the 
banned Tudeh Party. The political activities of the clergy was mainly associated 
with Kashani. His role in the movement and relationship with Mosaddegh were 
vital to the existence of the movement. However, Mosaddegh and Kashani were on 
a collision course. The Western-educated Mosaddegh was secular. Kashani, on the 
other hand, was in favour of an Islamic state. The same definition applied to their 
supporters. However, although they differed in their outlook, the unifying figure of 
Mosaddegh brought them together over the oil issue; a process which was reversed 
after 1951. Kashani and some nationalists weakened Mosaddegh and assisted in 
his downfall. 
Mosaddegh initiated the first petrodiplomacy in Iranian history. He dedicated 
his life to fight foreign domination and the nation trusted him. Without him 
it would be impossible for the nationalists to acquire a political standing strong 
enough to nationalise the oil. Regrettably, his downfall in 1953 brought an end to 
his efforts to remove foreign influence from Iran. 
Iran has been a centre of major political events for over 2000 years. In recent 
history, the development of two superpowers, Russian and British empires, on 
either side of Iran changed Iran's geopolitical situation to the extent that they 
fought within Iran for the dominance of Asia. As a result Iran's independence was 
weakened, its integrity was threatened, domestic feud was encouraged, corruption 
and intrigue were promoted, and self-interest and low morality became a feature 
of life. 
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Whether a victim of international power politics, or a victim of internal strife. 
low political culture, and short-sightedness of Iranian politicians, the super powers 
could not tolerate the upset of the oil control in the ?vliddle East. The country-by-
country flare-up effect of such an achievement would be disastrous for the "'estern 
economy. In their view, the nationalist movement of Iran had to be defeated. 
Indeed, no other oil-producing country considered oil nationalisation for many 
years to come. 
Copyright © 1998 by Hesamedin Navabi 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should 
be published without Hesamedin Navabi's prior written consent and information 
derived from it should be acknowledged. 
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Chapter I 
Introd uction 
In the last few years of the nineteenth century Britain expected an enormous 
increase in oil consumption. Domestic and industrial consumption had increased 
and Britain, due to the emergence of a German naval power, needed to mod-
ernise battleships by converting the coal-powered ships into oil-fuelled ones, an 
idea which had originally been suggested by John Fisher as early as 1882.3 Indeed, 
it was not too long before two British vessels were experimentally tested for oil-
firing in 1903. In addition, there were other facts to be taken into consideration. 
Britain was heavily dependent on American oil which was mainly supplied by two 
major companies, Exxon and Shell. The world-wide American price-cutting of 
1896 which was a matter of life or death for many European Oil Companies, had 
not been forgotten. 4 In recognising the importance of oil for Britain in the twen-
tieth century the oilmen were 20 years ahead of politicians. This was so evident 
that one could take almost any year during 1890's as the starting point for British 
oil independence. 
At about this time, oil was mainly an American industry and had grown rapidly 
for the past four decades. American domestic consumption which was only a few 
thousand barrels in 1859, reached 500,000 barrels in 1860 and 64,000,000 barrels 
in 1900.5 In 1890, Exxon established companies in France, Britain and Germany 
3 Elwell-Sutton, Oil Diplomacy, pp 16. 
4 Deterdinge's statement quoted in Hewins pp 62. 
5 Petroleum Handbook, Appendix. McBeth, pp 1. 
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and seven years later Shell was registered in London with a capital of 42.000.000 
pounds. The extent of their control on oil market was such that even in 1919 Sir 
Wilfred Stokes commented that all aspects of industry were controlled by these 
two companies. 6 British authorities had considered over-dependence on American 
oil unsafe. The oil independence was in the process of becoming a policy. 
The British Empire was at this time in charge of large portions of the world but 
surprisingly, there was little oil to be found within the empire. 7 British capitalists 
had taken part in oil exploration as early as 1886 when they formed Burmah Oil 
Company to explore oil in upper Burmah but the oil reserves there did not appear 
to be sufficient. Attention had to be paid to investing in areas where there was 
possibility of oil discovery in larger quantities. One such area was Iran where 
existence of natural oil ponds had been reported and at least at two occasions, 
possibility of oil discovery in large quantities had been indicated by Westerners. 
In 1890, Sir Henry Wolff, British Ambassador to Iran submitted a report to Lord 
Salisbury claiming that Baku oil fields were in the process of exhaustion whereas 
oil fields of Iran promised a good future. 8 
The urge for oil search in Iran had also been intensified through political rivalry 
between Britain and Germany. In 1888, Germany was most anxious to obtain 
mining concessions for the Anatolian Railway. It was not unusual of those days 
to obtain mining rights each side of the track. In 1866, when a 6-mile railway 
was constructed from Tehran to Ray, the builder was granted mining rights, which 
included oil, 4 miles either side of the track. 9 In 1891, Gulbenkian published 
6 Nahai, pp 25. 
7 Moghari, pp 43. 
8 PRO FO 60 511 30 June 1890. Baku oil fields carried on producing until after the Second World 
War! 
9 Amuzegar quoted in Mangone, pp 290. 
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a report on the possibility of oil discovery in Mesopotamia. The report was so 
favourable that Soltan of Ottomani transferred tracks of land from the :\linistry 
of Mines to his Civil List. The Anglo-German rivalry reached its peak in 1898 
when Kaiser paid a state visit to Constantinople. The pro-German sentiment was 
high and Soltan of Ottomani, like Iranian statesmen, played the game of using one 
great power as a foil against another in order to prevent partition of his empire. 
However, the main point, as far as Britain was concerned, was Baghdad-Berlin 
Railway with oil rights 20 km each side of it. The threat to communications with 
British India, the Far East and Australia awoke Britain to the real meaning of 
German penetration in the Middle East. Indeed, it was growing Anglo-German 
rivalry which resulted in the First World War and it was the importance of the oil 
for great powers which was the reasons for Hitler's adc towards Baku oil fields in 
1941. 
It is not, therefore, surprising to learn that in 1900 Sir Henry Wollf, former 
British Ambassador in Tehran (minister as known at that time) had encouraged 
William Knox D'Arcy, an English financier involved in gold mining in Australia, 
to purchase a concession in Iran. D' Arcy, in turn, asked geologists for advice who 
confirmed that the geology suggested possibility of potential petroleum discovery 
and eventually, on 28 May 1901, D'Arcy's agent managed to obtain a concession 
from the Shah of Iran for sixty years. In those days, it was not much difficult 
to obtain a concession from the Shah as all natural resources and uncultivated 
land theoretically belonged to him, but such a favourable concession obtained 
from a king unmindful of country's welfare and surrounded by corrupt politicians 
which granted exclusive right of exploring and exporting petroleum in much of the 
countr:v, was to be the basis of a long-term dispute between Iranian and British 
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Governments which lasted for nearly fifty years and ended in nationalisation of the 
oldest oil industry in the Middle East in 1951. 
This research will attempt to present a detailed and impartial study of this 
bitter and frustrating dispute which focuses on the 1951 oil crisis and will also 
consider aspects of historical, social and political life in Iran between 1901 and 
1951. It will also attempt to answer questions such as : Why was the oil concession 
granted? Why was it granted to a British citizen? Why was Iran occupied during 
the Second World War? How did the oil crisis of 1944 began? How did Moscow 
threaten Iranian territorial integrity and attempted to obtain an oil concession? 
How was the Azarbaijan crisis resolved and what was the impact of these crises 
on Western attitude towards Moscow in the developing cold war? But the central 
focus of this thesis is to answer the question that why was there a crisis and how 
did oil become an issue for public debate and the process through which it was 
nationalised. 
The circumstances of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis reflect some of the character-
istics of most international crises. The apparent urgency of negotiations, the rapid 
pace of events, the apparent intransigence of the various institutional and national 
positions, the involvement of the media, and manipulation of citizens, fictional 
infighting as groups seek to maintain or improve their position, and the imminence 
of violence are all common features of such crises. However, this thesis is not about 
international crises in general or about this specific crisis. It is concerned with the 
major question of how this situation came about within Iran and focuses on the 
Iranian dimension. The emphasis is on the specific conditions within Iran which 
contributed to the creation of a situation of confrontation between the British and 
the Iranian governments. 
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There were features peculiar to Iran not found in other international crises. In 
particular, the modern aspects of secularism combined with the conservatism of a 
predominantly illiterate and deeply religious society created a novel and temporary 
coalition united on a single issue. These were to separate and conflict in a later 
crisis producing a political revolution but the elements were first \'isible in the oil 
CrISIS. 
No general crisis theory either of the inception of the crisis or of its develop-
ment seems appropriate given the conditions peculiar to Iran in 1951. There were 
specific features which fall outside the generalisation of theory. The purpose of this 
thesis is to explain them and their significance. The method chosen therefore is 
interpretative and analytic, seeking to identify the relevant factors and conditions 
and to relate these to the final confrontation. Considerable attention has been 
given to the historical dimension given the importance of the oral tradition in Iran 
and of the historical perspective adopted by a highly conservative society. 
The religious dimension, with its own traditions is also important. In partic-
ular one unique feature of the crisis was the dominance, albeit temporary, of one 
man- Mosaddegh. This enquiry thus places considerable emphasis on his person-
ality and ideas together with the peculiar status he had in Iranian politics. The 
methodology thus reflects that of methodological individualism with its emphasis 
on intention and social context as understood by the participators. It does not 
seek to generalise or employ general and determining concepts such as structure 
or process. Individuals act in a context not of their making but of which they 
are cognisant and to which they contribute. In the case of Iran this was a unique 
environment and individuals were uniquely important. 
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Chapter Two presents a history of oil search and granting oil concessions in 
Iran. As the struggle took place in Iran, it is essential to explain the Iranian 
setting to trace the background to offering foreign concessions. Such background 
information is necessary because it explains why such favourable concessions were 
granted at all. Also, to investigate the impact of oil on Iranian society one has 
to know the pre-oil Iranian society. A description of the growing penetration 
of Iranian economy by foreign powers, the pattern of exploitation. the desire to 
possess as much oil resources as possible, to derive the rivals out of the oil race, to 
establish exclusive supply sources, the division between exploiters and character 
of the string of individuals involved is given. The gradual transition from the 
traditional to modern Iranian society due to communications with the West is 
considered and the process of "enlightening" people and its subsequent effect on 
the public awareness is analysed. The Iranian society's contact with the West had 
accelerated when a Western style polytechnic was established in Iran in the 18th 
century and some leading families sent their sons to Europe to study. 
The character of Iranian politics in the 1940's is investigated in Chapter Three. 
The economic and social problems caused by the war, the separatist movements, 
the communist influence in the north, the growth of constitutional establishments, 
the Iranian obsession with the past history and the expansion of the Iranian nation-
alism are explained. A biography of Mosaddegh is included as it was respect for 
Mosaddegh which brought factions together and prevented an early split amongst 
them. Lack of independence of the Iranian foreign policy and the application of the 
traditional policy of "movazeneh" which eventually led to a confrontation between 
East and West over Azarbaijan and the early stages of the cold war during the oil 
crisis of 1944 are analysed. Political parties are described and it is explained how 
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Tudeh, communist in an Islamic background, became one of the main political par-
ties. An important political event of the 1940's was Kavtaradze's demand for an 
oil concession in 1944 which caused inter-allied friction before the war coalition was 
ended. It also stirred up public sentiment. Premier Ghavam rigged the 15th ~lajles 
election to serve his purpose but he rendered a great service to Iran in seizing the 
opportunity to secure the Soviet withdrawal. In 1947, Moscow again pressurised 
Iran for the ratification of Irano-Soviet Oil Concession which drew public attention 
to Iranian problems. 
Iran in the international setting of 1940's is the theme of Chapter Four. The 
German invasion of the Soviet Union and their offensive against Egypt justified 
the Allied occupation of Iran. The Allieds agreed to leave Iran after the war but 
Moscow's intrigue menaced Iran, Greece and Turkey. It looked as if Stalin intended 
to use Iran as a base for domination of the Middle East. Kavtaradze demanded 
an oil concession in 1944. Moscow supported two separatist movements in the 
North and refused to leave the area after the war. Iran made complaints to the 
Security Council. Washington's support and Moscow's considerations in Eastern 
Europe coupled with the world opinion and Ghavam's agreement to offer Moscow 
an oil concession brought about their withdrawal in May 1946. Moscow's pressure, 
however, continued in 1946 and 1947 to obtain an oil concession in the North but 
Majles rejected the proposal. 
It is essential to study Moscow's aggression in details as their open activities 
in Iran helped the process of developing the people's thinking and directing their 
attention to Iranian problems in particular the oil issue. The international conse-
quences of the occupation, the growth of American interest in Iran, the reluctance 
on the Soviet side to withdraw troops from the North, Ghavam's tactics to secure 
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the withdrawal and the role played by the Security Council in 1946~ are anal~·sed. 
The separatists movements in the North are described and it is explained why the 
oil concession promised to Moscow was rejected in 1947. 
Chapter Five describes the Iranian desire to have a share in the oil exploitation 
and explains how oil became an issue for public debate in the 1940's. In October 
1947, when the Irano-Soviet Oil Concession was rejected, l\Iajles instructed the 
government to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for better terms. 
This instruction may have been considered as a gesture to Moscow that the Anglo-
Iranian oil company was also subject to the same treatment by the Iranian Gov-
ernment. However, it set into motion a chain of events which eventually led 
to the oil nationalisation. Moscow's aggression against Iran helped in raising 
Iranian public awareness. The growth of the Majles, the heated debates over the 
rejection of Kavtaradze in 1944, the role of clergy, the role of monarchists in re-
solving the issue in the late 1940's, and nationalist's parliamentary activities to foil 
monarchists, are studied. Early 1950, clergy and nationalists superficially united, 
a process which was reversed after the nationalisation of the oil industry. The 
outrageous behaviour of the oil company officials and their lack of interest in ne-
gotiation, Mosaddegh's popularity and the election of nationalists to the Majles 
which resulted in the nationalisation of the oil industry are evaluated. 
Conclusions drawn from this study are summarised in Chapter six. 10 
10 Throughout these writings the name Iran has been used instead of Persia except where Persia 
appears in quotations. The name Russia has also been used instead of Soviet Union up to 1917. 
As for transliteration, spelling and pronunciation of Farsi names has always been a problem in 
Western writings. As Shuster commented" half a dozen people are apt to write a Persian name in 
six different ways" (Shuster, pp xvi). With few exceptions, all Farsi words have been spelt as they 
are pronounced in Farsi. For instance, names such as Kitabgi, Ketabgi or Ketabji have no meaning 
in Farsi but Ketabchi makes sense ! 
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Chapter II 
Historical Background to the Crisis 
This chapter presents the history of oil search in Iran. granting oil concessions 
to foreign and Iranian nationals, the growing penetration of Iranian economy by 
foreign intervention, and presents a description of Iranian society shortly before 
D'Arcy concession was granted. It is essential to explain the Iranian setting to 
understand why such favourable concessions were granted to foreigners. First. 
a history of oil search in Iran is presented. Then, D'Arc~"s concession and the 
disputes related to it is evaluated. The period covered begins on 28 l\Iay 1901, 
when a concession was granted by Mozafar-eddin Shah and ends on 1 l\Iay 1951, 
when Mohamad Reza Shah approved the Iranian Oil I\ ationalisation Act, b~' virtue 
of which all fixed assets of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were transferred to the 
Iranian National Oil Company. 
2.1 Iran: a brief history 
Iran has a very long and sometimes glorious histor~' during which it was ruled 
by a number of dynasties. The monarch was known as the Shah, a Farsi word 
meaning king, and some as Soltan, an Arabic name which has the same meaning 
in Farsi. In recent history, almost all monarchs enjoyed the title of Shahanshah, 
King of Kings, a title which was normally given to an absolute monarch who ruled 
over the entire plateau of Iran. A mere public figure like Ahmad Shah, the last shah 
of Qajar dynasty and a king like Mohammad Reza Shah Pahla\'i. both enjoyed the 
title which would be given to kings like Shah Abbas the Great. who after almost 
20 
~ <fl::b TAOR" U .'J-<", 
'. 
C' 
• KAZVIN 
~ 
Iran at about the time of oil discovery, 1908. ~ 
; 
;-" 
I 
.' 
p-~ 
p.V 
TEHRAt-J 
p 
--9 U SS / A OF 
~ 
ME5HE~~~ 
SARAoKMS 
.>..j : p.... ' 
t30u";!?,',' tJ 
• ZULFIC"'R~ \'it_/;iJ1S-rJl N SPHERe 
KA!:>R - EL'SHERIN :. 
'. ...A.., .... OAN ~ : 
NIKIN -,., KE~~~.NSHA~.: R A K 
., " . 
... j'-. I', " '-:'." SULT":;'NAElAD 
<f':'.... ....... ..... (.RAK) 
KU,,", 
-1-
INFLUEN 
- A. .J A. IYI 
./( '~~~r J'-:-" rl 
K H 0 ./' u!i ~f 
R " 5 5 A.., /,--:AR<Z' n,f h ~'-.. 
"7/ . \ 
C.;'E 
TUR8AT-I-
HAlOARI • 
TABA~ TU"'~· 
. /."" . ., 
V __ '" ~/j ". IS.,. _, 
-4 N .:~, 
KASHAN 
'I-.AI'" 
/' 
OAZIK 
() Br~.JANO--'---·-
/ 
.... ". ", '''N.,/ 
'. ISPAHAN • /. 
.... ,., /' 
., . 
-y 6 / 
£, r< \S< / 
.p .. 0--.... '\- /1 
., .. "'" >v 
: .. ' oJ .•...... I' 
/ .... ." I ...... 
/ ( 
I c.. 
(KERMAN 
" ./ 
',./ 
··· ...... · ...... · ....... yEZD 
..... 
N 
N) 
p. l..-
,-v...r .......... ~ .: 
/'J,'-c u -r R 
F R 
SHAH~-I-eA8At< A s --' 
/ ",\ 
~ . ". 
''''-. "- , 
\, \ 
"1 
" 
.... 
;' 
_/ 
...E.R.I ....... T- -- ---( 
J 
( 
, 
/ 
I 
,( 
/' 
.I 
" 
.-1--------_ ........ 
SHIRAZ· ~. I ~ P- ROt ... ;,. 
\ 
. , 
. 
.JAHRUI,4 
...... 
" 
. ...... . 
1 A 
\<. I 'f- \:l 
/ 
I 
/ 
-' I 
N/ 
\2-' 
0' I 
0/1 
aAM'~ 
\ 
-\ 
~ 
o 
dr 
......... ~.~' ... ' 
0~ 
(J 
yV 
\~ 
, ~ 
~lJ 
o ~ ",-
./-' 
/ 
1000 years since Arab invasion, gained political unity for Iran. 
During Safavi Dynasty (1500-1736)~ the Iranians had to be united against the 
Ottomani Empire and the best way of achieving this was considered by the ruling 
system to be through religion. Moslems had long been divided into two main sects 
of Sunni and Shia. The Shia was only a tiny minority in Iran until then and had 
always been persecuted by Sunni rulers. The ancestors of Safavis never claimed to 
be Shia but during the reign of Shah Esmail I (1-187-152-1), a fake biography was 
written relating them to the Shia Emams and Shiaism became the official religion. 3 
A long and bitter conflict was initiated which lasted until the disintegration of the 
Ottomani Empire in 1921. 
The Iranian society continued to be mainly dominated b~' shia thoughts until 
mid-nineteenth century, and it has been rightly claimed by some Iranian researchers 
that the main reason for Iranians falling behind Western technical advances was 
the existence of a political barrier between Iran and the \\Testern Europe~ i.e.) the 
Ottomani Empire. Iranians have never, it has been claimed, been reluctant to learn 
from foreigners and that is why, the interest in Western culture and civilisation 
continued to increase in the eighteenth century.4 To this, one has to add the 
British policy of maintaining integrity of Ottomani Empire to keep France and 
Russia away from the Middle East and India. 5 
Before 1906, the ruling system was absolute monarchism in which the Shah 
or Soltan practically had unlimited power and was responsible to no one. The 
Shah was not the only despot in that governors of provinces appointed by the 
3 Lockhart, pp 18 . 
. , Young, Problem of ... , pp 48. 
5 Shwadran, pp 7. 
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monarch and all members of the Royal descent would behave in the same manner 
within their jurisdiction. It is not, therefore~ difficult to imagine that almost every 
insignificant landlord would entitle himself to exercise the same practice on his own 
land. The only exception to this was nomadic life, who counted for one quarter 
of the population at about 1900. Tribesmen had enjoyed living in the openness of 
the mountains and deserts of Iran enjoying a sense of independence and freedom 
unseen in urban areas. 
The monarch was not traditionally held accountable and as a matter of fact 
the question never came across anybody's mind. It was only in the early 1900's 
and due to the communications with the West which resulted in what has been 
known as " enlightening" people, that Iranians eventually demanded constitutional 
monarchy. However, despite their absolute power, since the defeat of Iran in two 
wars with Russia in 1813 and 1828, all Iranian monarchs have been subject to 
foreign influence and political restrictions. Unlike their predecessors, they had to 
take into account hostility when granting concessions, signing treaties or applying 
for foreign loans. An example is the D' Arcy's Concession in which five northern 
provinces were excluded to avoid Russian resentment. 
Between 1811 and 1815 and for the first time in Iranian history, a limited 
number of students were sent to France.6 In 1851, a European style college, Darol-
funun (polytechnic) was established in Tehran and for the first time a newspaper, 
although mainly containing the Court news, was published. But after the attempt 
on the Shah's life by some members of the Babi communit:\', the Shah banned 
sending students to Europe for they would return with subversive ideas! Some 
members of the Royal Family, however, managed to obtain permission to send t hpir 
6 Armajani, pp 118. 
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sons to Europe. Foreign military and financial adyisers were inyited from Belgium. 
Sweden and France to reform the administration. 
Approaching the end of the nineteenth century, ,,'estern educated Iranians 
had sufficiently transmitted into the Iranian society western culture and methods 
to challenge the traditional way of governing the society. The \Yestern-inspired 
nationalism could be seen in the opposition to the monopoly of tobacco in 1891 
and the idea of Western constitutionalism which created the reaction to absolutism. 
The Western-originated desire of Iranian people to have a say in public affairs took 
a practical form during the last few years of the reign of N aser-eddin Shah. The 
Iranians had remained loyal to the Shah during his reign of nearl~' .J5 years. but 
the wholesale selling of people's rights and industries and the despotic behaviour 
of the Royal officials could not have been tolerated all~' longer. 
The wrongdoings of the Shah had long been criticised by a j\Iojtahed, Se~'~'ed 
Jamal-eddin, who had also advocated his idea of a uniyersal Islamic Government 
throughout Moslem countries. He encouraged one of his followers, an ordinary 
man, to assassinate the Shah. The assassination took place in J\Iay 1896 and 
ended nearly 50 years of the Shah's absolute reign. The end of Naser-eddin Shah 
opened the way for the introduction of a new ruling system which materialised 
through the Constitutional Movement of 1906. Although the s~'st('m promised did 
not last long, the idea of a pluralistic political system continued to exist. 
The situation in Iran few years after the establishment of the Constitutional 
Government has been described by Morgan Shuster and it will, to some extent, 
resemble the situation in 1900.7 Shuster, an American llationaL had been inyited 
to Iran to regularise the national finances which was in chaos. He pyentually left 
7 Shuster, pp 35-48. 
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Iran in 1912 because of Russian opposition. Shuster commented that the country 
was being ruled by a professional ruling class and that the future of millions of 
people depended on the line of action that they took from time to time the results 
of which was misfortune and misery for millions of people. Eyery member of 
the ruling class, whose main intention was to satisfy his own financial needs had 
a title which was normally bought from the Shah. Titles such as Amirol-Omara 
(Marshal of Marshals), Momtazol-Molk (Unique of the Kingdom) or Nasserol-l\Iolk 
(The Helper of the Kingdom) were common and sold to the highest bidder! 
The ruling class, who were also landlords, was the most substantial and inftu-
ential class in Iran, but they had not yet developed a s~'stem to curb the Shah's 
power. Indeed, as Edward Brown commented the Iranians were so obedient that 
he could not believe that they had demanded constitutional monarchy.8 Ordinary 
Iranians are described by Shuster as tyrannised and corrupt b~' the aristocrac~' of 
selfish landowners. The people are described as kind and hospitable and capable 
of rapid development in Western ways as thousands have travelled or educated 
abroad. Among the educated French was generally spoken but English was being 
learnt by youngsters. 
Sir Percy Sykes has also expressed similar views about Iranians around 1900. 
He wrote "Persians possess remarkable political acumen... I have reason to con-
sider Persians to be the finest and most gifted race in Western Asia. . .. Almost 
all over China a whiteman is liable to insult .... whereas in Persia apart from a few 
fanatical centres, a European is generally welcomed by all classes, especially if he 
speaks the language".9 In 1942, General Greely described Iran as a "fine country 
8 Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 15, 22. 
~) Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, pp 457-458. 
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with a virile people) and more could be done with it than lUcArthur did with the 
Philippines)) .10 
Sykes states that the chief social and economic groups are peasants, landown-
ers, nomadic tribes, religious heirachy and merchants. Nomadic tribes count for 
one quarter of a 10 million population of which 85 per cent are illiterate. Of almost 
7.5 million non-nomadic population, 90 per cent work on the land normally be-
longing to an absentee landlord. They are free to leave but are practically bound 
to the land as no other khan is prepared to take them on. Thus, they have no 
other alternative except to live in small mud villages under minimum standard of 
life. Their contributions make 80 to 90 per cent of GNp ll which is estimated to be 
70,000,000 pounds. Sykes estimates the total government revenue for 1900 to be 
only 1,300,000 pounds. The Iranian Government desperately needed foreign loans 
for which they had to offer either customs or fisheries of the Caspian Sea, and it is 
true to say that in 1900, Iran was actually bankrupt. The power of the religious 
hierarchy at about 1900 should not be neglected as it was approaching its peak 
during the Qajar rule. In 1890's, clergy tested its power against that of the Shah 
and won. They again used their power against the Prime Minister, Aminos-Soltan, 
about his alleged dishonesty over Russian loans of 1899-1900 and 1902, and forced 
him into exile in 1903. 
The first formal commercial contacts between Britain and Iran appears to 
have been made by Antony Jenkinson in 1562. Sherley brothers arrived in 1598 
proposing European alliance to confront Ottomani Empire and were offered jobs 
to build cannons and introduce firearms into the Iranian army12 and by the early 
10 Motter, pp167. 
11 Defined as the total value of all final goods and services produced annually by a nation. 
12 Details of their adventure has been given by Ross in his book Sir Anthony Shirley 
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1600's, trade in the Persian Gulf had emerged as a by-product of trade with India 
through East Indian Company.13 The relationship between Iran and Britain was 
mainly commercial. 
Not much difficulties with Iran were encountered until 1850's when Iranian 
troops invaded Western Afghanistan in 1856. Britain. in turn. occupied the island 
of Kharg, Bushehr and Mohamareh (later on Khoramshahr) forcing the Iranian 
Government to withdraw from Afghanistan. Britain did not experience an~' major 
conflict with Iran after 1856 but was concerned about the security of India in 1870's 
when Russia advanced towards Afghanistan borders by occupying areas nominall~' 
under the Iranian rule. The internal security of Iran was of paramount importance 
to Britain as a buffer state for India. Lord Salisburis comments in 1889 that had 
it not been for the security of India, Britain would not have troubled itself in Iran 
is evidence of this.14 
The main commercial concern of Britain in Iran towards the end of the 19th 
century was to obtain concessions such as De Reuter (1872), Lottery (1889) and 
Tobacco (1891), and politically to protect Iran against Russia. It is important to 
be conscious of the fact that the Anglo-Iranian relationship which was originally 
trade between two nations, soon changed nature when the Iranian Army was de-
feated in two wars with Russia. The war resulted in the loss of seventeen cities 
in the Caucasus area and a continuous decline in the political power of Iran. The 
political weakness of the Iranian Government and British interest in using Iran and 
Afghanistan as buffer states against Russia and France, marks the beginning of a 
new era in the Anglo-Iranian relationship. Iran was no longer a mighty nation and 
13 McBeth, pp 34. 
14 PRO FO 60/506, Indian Office to Foreign Office, 22 t-.lay 1889. 
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the relationship was not based on commercial interests either. From this moment 
onward every intervention of Britain in Iran, regardless of its nature, is associated 
with political consequences. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century~ the political influence of Brit ain had 
become, at least in Tehran and Southern Iran, an obvious fact of life. Resorting to 
British influence became so common that in 1906 and for the first time in Iranian 
history, some 16,000 people sought sanctuary in the British Legation to demand 
changes in absolute monarchy. Britain had been identified with the Constitutional 
Movement. The understanding of British influence, their secret contacts "'ith 
influential ministers, religious leaders and Bazar, will help to understand wh~r 
concessions so valuable were so easily granted to British subjects and not to other 
Europeans. 
With regard to the oil concessions, oil had been known in Iran for many ('('n-
turies. Ancient Iranians appear not only to have had a basic knowledge of crude 
oil which seeped out of natural shallow wells but also to have adopted a primitive 
refining process to separate bitumen and lighting oil. Natural gases had also been 
known to the locals who used them in fire-temples of the ancient Zoroastrians in 
the North West of Iran. The Iranian knowledge of crude oil, however, does not 
appear to have changed over a period of more than two thousand years for in 
1901, when D'Arcy's concession was granted, there were three natural petroleum 
mines in private hands operating on the same basis as mentioned above. l5 The 
Iranian Government's annual revenue of the these mines has been mentioned as 
2000 Tomans in the Article 4. 16 
1.5 Shwadran, pp 14. 
16 Approximately 500 pounds. The Sterling exchange rate increased after the Second World War to 
68 Rials and then to 148 Rials. After 1978 uprising, it rose sharply and currently stands at S500 
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In modern history, Western travellers have made many references to oil seep-
ages around Baku (under Iranian rule until 1806) and in the South \\'est. The 
seepages normally belonged to the landowner. In 1902. for instance. two local 
khans in the province of Kermanshah, Aziz Khan and Ivlohamad Karim Khan. 
owned two seepages near Sareh-poleh-zahab. The inability to develop oil reseryes 
made Iran a profitable market for the Russian oil which appeared in Tehran in 
1876. The oil imported from Baku was dense and had to be processed in a refinery 
in the Iranian port of Rasht. The refined oil contained about 50 per cent kerosene 
or in a homely term, lamp oil. The remainder which could yield gasoline, benzine. 
fuel and lubricating oil, was treated as waste! Iran was Iv1oscow's exclusiyE' oil 
market until 1923 and even in 1929, 70 per cent of oil was imported from the 
Soviet Union. It was only in 1933 that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company acquired 
oil monopoly in the domestic market.17 A large number of Iranian labourers had 
spent some time in Baku oil fields. Entner, in his study of commercial relationship 
between Iran and Russia, states that there were very few Iranian labourers in the 
North who had not spent a year in Baku. 18 
2.2 D'Arcy and Iranian Oil 
The possibility of oil discovery in Iran had first been scientifically indicated 
in August 1855 by W.K. Loftus, an English geologist who had pinpointed areas 
of interest on the geological map. In 1891, Governor of the province of Kerman-
shah requested a French archaeologist, Jacque de Morgan, to search for oil in his 
province. The existence of a natural petroleum mine near Qasre-Shirin close to 
the Ottomani border, had apparently convinced the governor about the existence 
Rials. 
1-
I NIoe, pp 12. 
18 Entner, pp 60. 
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of oil in his area. De Morgan published his findings in Les A nnales des Mines in 
1892 but it did not interest French capitalists to explore oil in Iran. Even attempts 
by Ketabchi Khan, the Iranian Commissioner at Paris Exposition of 1900~ did not 
change their mind. 
Ketabchi Khan, an Iranian Arminian who was once Director-General of Cus-
toms Administrations and a close confident of the Prime l\Iinister, Aminos-soltan, 
probably had no intention of securing any profit for the Iranian Government but 
only to sell, to Westerners, an oil concession granted to Sepah-Salar in 1896 for 
15,000 pounds. 19 He had contacted Serkis Golbenkian, a leading figure in Baku 
oil affairs, who turned his offer down. He, therefore, turned to Sir Henry Wolff, 
a competent diplomat and the former British ambassador in Tehran to encourage 
British capitalists to look for oil in Iran. 
The intervention by Sir Henry cost Iran heavily in that proposals by Ketabchi 
Khan interested a 51 year old millionaire, Willian Knox D 'Arcy. and eventually 
resulted in obtaining an oil concession, which unlike other concessions granted to 
British subjects, coincided with the British desire for oil independence. Oil in Iran 
had been sought as early as 1878 through a concession granted to Amin-Madan, 
an Iranian national. Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation obtained a right 
to search for oil through De Reuter's second concession of 30 January 1889. A 
series of drillings had been carried out in Qeshm, the South West and the North 
during 1891 to 1893 with no results. This forced the Corporation to abandon the 
search for oil in 1893. By this time Admiralty had become interested in British 
oil independence. Britain was relying on imports from America through American 
19 H' 6"" eWlllS, PP I. 
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companies which supplied two third of British oil imports. 2o 
The prospect of finding oil in Iran was bleak. D' Arcy had to form acorn pany 
within two years of the date the concession had been granted or he would haw' for-
feited it. Drillings had already started near Sareh-Poleh-Zahab in \'"ovember 1902 
and oil had been found but not in large quantities. Despite numerous efforts and 
contacts with his associates, D'Arcy had not succeeded in obtaining financial back-
ing for his concession. After taking legal advice, the First Exploitation Company 
was registered in London on 21 May 1903, by which time he had already invested 
some 250,000 pounds of his own money, perhaps today's equivalent of 2,500,000 
pounds. In return for transferring his concession to the compan~', D'Arcy would 
receive 350,000 shares of 1 pound fully paid. D'Arc}' had certain commitments to 
fulfil. He paid the Iranian Government 20,000 pounds in cash and 20,000 pounds 
in shares as well as his personal debts of honour of 19,000 pounds and 30,000 shares 
to those who secured the concession.21 
As far as operations were concerned drillings had to be shifted near Shushtar 
where there were oil seepages. Drillings went on for almost two years at different 
sites without much success. In 1905, D'Arcy was 55 years old and concerned about 
his health. He had depleted his own financial resources, had a large overdraft at 
Lloyds Bank in London and was about to place the concession itself with the bank 
as surety for further overdrawing but since the bank was reluctant to assist, he 
decided to sell the concession to foreigners. The Admiralty, in an attempt to avoid 
20 McBeth, pp 3. 
21 There are a number of stories as to how D'Arcy's agent, Ketabchi Khan, managed to s('cure 
the grant of the concession. According to Elwell-Sutton, Ketabchi Khan paid 10,000 pounds t() 
Aminos-Soltan, the Prime Minister. Aminos-Soltan had turned Russophobe but managed t() keep 
the Russian Legation unaware by sending them a note in so crabbed a hand (known in Iran as 
Shekasteh script) that the Embassy's clerk could not read it (Persian OiL pp 14). Stocking, PI> 9. 
BP H 15/117, pp 185, 13 July 1903. 
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foreign intervention, intervened by asking Burma Oil Company to assist. ~~ 
The British authorities had considered oil independence yital for the future of 
the British industries. However, the search for oil in large quantities in Iran had 
been unsuccessful for the past 25 years and Burma had to be conyinced about the 
prospect of oil discovery in large quantities. The interventions by Lord Strathcona 
and promising reports by geologists eventually conyinced the Directors of Burma 
and on 5 May 1905, Concessions Syndicate ltd, was formed in London. D ~ .-\.rc~· 
maintained his concession and if oil was discovered, Burma would form a subsidiary 
with 2,000,000 pound capital. The Syndicate itself was a subsidiary of Burma with 
a capital of 100,000 pound in which 95 per cent of shares belonged to Burma. The 
Syndicate owned the First Exploitation Co as well. 
After the unsuccessful drillings in Chah Sorkh and Qasre-Shirin, the Exploita-
tion Company decided to move to the province of Khuzestan. The operation 
started in 1905 in the area of Meidan-Naftun (later on l\1asjed-Soleyman), where 
the existence of petroleum was evident as rock ,"vas saturated with oil. It soon 
became clear that without cooperation of the Khans23 drillings were impossible. 
Ketabchi had already suggested that the operation should haye started in Shushtar 
where he could secure the cooperation of locals through his relationship with the 
local Mojtahed. 24 In 1905, the desire for a Constitutional Government in Iran had 
intensified and the local Bakhtiaris would not recognise the Shah~s authoritv. The 
Syndicate neither had the political experience nor knowledge of Iran to deal with 
this problem. D'Arcy requested political assistance and with the permission of 
the Foreign Office, J R Preece, British Consul-General in Esfehall. who was home 
.).) 
-- Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 16. 
2:1 Khan here means feudal. Khan can also be used for respect as in Khalil Khan. 
24 
chief mollah. 
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on leave, was advised to assist when he returned to Iran. PreecE' negotiated with 
khans on his return and made an agreement to offer them 3 per cent sharE's of 
all companies working in their area. The agreement with the khans is releyant 
to this study for later on, both the central government and the khans themselyes 
denounced it, but the oil company carried on with the 3 per cent payments until 
1924 when the Iranian Government finally denounced the agreement. 25 
It is also relevant to study this agreement to find out who was responsible 
for the payment of compensation to the companis property in Bakhtiari area. 
Another relevance of Bakhtiaris to this study is their political role in the Constitu-
tional Movement which resulted in the occupation of Tehran and the premiership 
of their Ilkhan, Sam-Samos-Saltaneh in 1909. The main points of the agreement 
were the appointment of guards by khans, at Company's expense, whose role was 
to protect staff as well as property and the payment of compensation b:v khans 
in case of robbery or damage to property. The Iranian Government had declined 
to pay any compensation. This was in view of their bad experience with Regie 
Corporation in 1891 when they had to borrow 500,000 pounds to pay to the Cor-
poration. 
However, in January 1906, the Iranian Government denounced the agreement 
with Khans. The signing of this agreement is an obvious E'yidence of the weakness 
of the central government for one can clearly see that firstl~' there is no mention 
of the central government in this agreement, and secondly, a foreign government 
negotiated and signed an agreement with the subjects of another government with-
out the knowledge or consent of that government. The khans themselves soon 
realised that they should not have signed the agreement. In ~Iay 1906, Sardar-
2:; Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 17. 
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Asad, claimed that khans were tribesmen and unacquainted with business matters 
and that the agreement was only signed out of respect for the British General-
Consul! The influence of the British Government in Iran ,,,as not restricted to 
politics only. At the end of 1907, the Indian Government. dispatched a detach-
ment of soldiers to Shushtar area to protect the drillers. The mission was formally 
to guard the British Consulate in Ahwaz. Troops were again dispatched to the 
province of Khuzestan some 40 years later during the riots and strikes of Jul~' 1946 
which were provoked by the Tudeh Party.26 
In reviewing the events of the early years of the oil search by D'Arcy, it is 
surprising to learn that the parties entered into disputes over almost every thing. 
Under the Article 4 of the concession, the concessionaire was to pay 2000 Tomans 
(500 pound) on a yearly basis to compensate for the revenue of the three existing 
petroleum mines in 1901. By 1909, the concessionaire was eight years in arrears. 
When the Iranian Government demanded the payment. the concessionaire refused 
by disputing that Iran never had any revenue from oil mines and that Article 4 was 
invalid. In January 1911, the oil company eventuall~' agreed to pay 2000 pounds 
in settlement of the arrears and undertook to maintain payments. 
Between 1909 and 1917 Iran went through turmoil. The llew constitutional 
Government was under Russian pressure to close down the Majles. The Majles 
was eventually closed down in 1911 to reopen in 1917 but the Iranian Government 
pursued the payment of the oil revenues although the oil compallY~s policy was to 
pay in arrears. The agreement of 1920 was made in conclusion of the negotiations 
which had started in 1917. This was the first serious dispute between the Iranian 
Government and the Oil Company. As mentioned earlier, Iranians had failed to 
26 Lencowzski, Russia and ... , pp 303. 
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understand the consequences of granting oil concessions and this had been reflected 
in the draft of the concession. According to the Article 10, for instance, Iran was 
entitled to 16 per cent net profit of any company to work the concession~ but it 
was not clear whether the article would cover companies operating outside Iran as 
well. 
Another problem arose out of the fear of the Iranians of having to pay com-
pensation for damages to the property. In 1891, over the monopoly of tobacco to 
the Regie Corporation, the Iranian Government had to borrow 500,000 pounds 
to pay for compensation for cancellation of the concession due to the public 
non-cooperation. 27 The money was borrowed from the British-owned Imperial 
Bank at the rate of 6 per cent for 40 years secured on Iranian Cost urns at Persian 
Gulf! As commented by Edward Browne" all this for the enrichment of few greedy 
English speculators and a handful of traitorous Persian courtiers".28 It appeared 
that Article 14 had been drafted to exempt Iran from paying compensation for 
damages. Nevertheless Iran was still under obligation to protect the Compan~r's 
property. 
In 1915 and during the First World War, some disgruntled Bakhtiari Khans 
damaged pipelines in their area encouraged to do so by German and Ottomani 
agents. Some 144,000 tons of oil was lost and the production was interrupted for 
five months. Under the 1905 Agreement with Khans, the Khans were obliged to 
pay compensation, but now the company held the central government responsible 
and refused to pay royalties. 
In March 1917, Iran formally requested arbitration under the Article 17 of the 
27 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 55. 
:28 Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 57. 
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concession and it is interesting to notice that some two months later. the British 
Ambassador and not the oil company replied that they would submit to arbitration 
on the condition that only the amount of payment would be considered and not the 
Company's right to damages or to withholding royalty payments. The arbitration 
never took place and in 1919, Britain and the new Iranian Government signed a 
treaty which would turn Iran into a British Protectorate. This treaty was rejected 
by the Majles in February 1921, but some of its provisions were put into effect 
such as the employment of foreign financial advisers. 
In 1919, the Shah left for Europe accompanied by his Foreign l\1inister who in 
London decided to discuss the issue with the company. After original meetings. the 
Iranian Foreign Minister invited Sydney Armitage-Smith, the Assistant Secretary 
of the British Treasury, as financial adviser to the government under the 1919 
Anglo-Persian Treaty. He suggested that an accountant should be invited to look 
into the Company's records. The amount of the dispute was originally 614,489 
pounds. The accountant commissioned by the Iranian Government, W McLintock, 
estimated the amount not to be more than 20,000 pounds. Not surprisingly, the 
Company's Report of the Directors and Balance Sheets in 1916, showed the loss 
as 160,000 pounds! 
McLintock commented that the damage had been done by British enemIes 
while the pipeline was being used for the British Navy. Furthermore, the delay in 
production, as the Company's chairman stated at the annual meeting in December 
1915, was because" Nearly the whole of the craft··. normally available on the River 
K arun .... has been requisitioned for the purposes of the military operations on the 
Tigris" and had nothing to do with Iran. 29 
29 BP H 16/161, McLintock to APOC, 23 December 1919. 
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The interesting point to notice is the impartiality of the English accountant 
who also commented that in the original concession, there was nothing to stop the 
Iranian Government sharing the net profit of all subsidiaries of the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company. It was he who discovered errors and irregularities of accounting 
which had resulted in underpayment of royalties. The company:s accountants. 
however, rejected McLintock's opinion by saying that nearly every article of the 
concession spoke about the boundaries of the Iranian territory! If Iran could share 
the profit of subsidiaries, they had to share the losses too !30 
This dispute ended when the claim for damages was dropped and the company 
agreed not to deduct 3 per cent profit for Khans from the government royalties. 
This agreement, known as Armitage-Smith Agreement, was rejected by the Iranian 
Government in 1928 but the company respected it until 1932. The Iranian Govern-
ment claimed that Armitage-Smith had no authority to negotiate because neither 
the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 nor this agreement had ever been approved by 
the Majles. 
In 1916, Akiki Khoshtaria obtained a concession which had been granted to 
Sepahdar-Azam in 1896 to cover the North. This concession was unsuccessfully 
offered to D'Arcy in 1906 and to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. The 
company refused to obtain the concession because in their view the North "would 
be locked off by us from the Persian Gulf. "31 However, after the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution, both the Soviet and the Iranian Governments pronounced the conces-
sion invalid but their decision was not made public. Despite this, the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company obtained from Khoshtaria his concession for 100,000 pounds and on 
30 BP H 16/161, 30 March 1920. 
31 BP H 10/80, Memorandum on the North Persian Oil Company, pp 3---1 
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20 ~la:v 1920, formed a subsidiary, I\orth Persian Oils Company ltd, ,yith 3.000.000 
pounds capital, but the Iranian Government refused to recognise the compan~·. 
At the same time certain American companies showed interest in searching for 
oil in the North. Despite enormous pressure by the British Government as well 
as representations to the U.S. Department of State to discourage American com-
panies, the Majles eventually announced the concession invalid and yoted unan-
imously to offer the Standard Oil Company of New Jerse~' (later on Exxon) a 
concession to cover the North. This was a serious blow to British influence in Iran 
for the reason that if cancellation of concessions was so eas~', then the D' Arcy con-
cession itself would be at risk! The Anglo-Persian Oil Company also emphasised 
that the only way to transport oil to a sea port was across southern Iran for which 
Anglo-Persian had the exclusive rights. 
In 1924, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company entered into another dispute. The 
Iranian Government had confirmed the old concession of 1878 in the names of 
two Iranians. 32 which would only cover the Semnan area about 60 miles east 
of Tehran. The Oil Company protested that Semnan was not included in the 
Northern provinces and that the concession was invalid. The Iranian Government, 
however, rejected the protest on the basis that in 1901, Semnan was a part of the 
five Northern provinces and was, therefore, outside the area covered by D'Arcy's 
conceSSIOn. 
The fear of Oil Company proved to be true for in 1925, an Iranian corporation, 
Kavir-Khurian Company acquired 25 per cent rights of the concession and the 
Soviet Government did what the British Government did in 1914. They acquired 
65 per cent shares in the company but operations were stopped after sinking two 
32 They were Abdol-Hosein Amin-Madan and Ali Akbar Sotudeh. 
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oil wells. This became another source of dispute for the Iranian Government. 
Only 5 days after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 19-11. ~loscc)\\' demanded that Iran 
should facilitate developing oil resources of Semnan. 33 The~" renewed their demand 
once again when Kavtaradze, deputy Soviet Foreign ;"1inister, arri\"ed in 194-1 to 
negotiate an oil concession in the North which was under the Soviet occupation. 
The rejection of the 1920 Agreement by the Iranian Government and their 
repeated complaints, since 1924, about inadequacy of royalties. was compounded 
with another problem in 1930. In this year, income tax la,," was passed b~" the 
Majles and the oil company was requested to conform. The company declined b~" 
arguing that under the Article 7 of the original concession. they were exempted 
from paying taxes. In the concession there was no mention of pa~'ing income taxes 
but the concessionaire had been exempt from import and export taxes. 34 This 
dispute was rejected by the Iranian Government on the basis that the Article 7 
only covered custom duties and not the income. At the same time the oil compan~T 
was paying income taxes to the British Government. The Iranian Government 
had been disappointed by the Company's attitude and by the fact that the Iranian 
Officials had been denied access to the company accounts and books. 
2.3 Characters Involved 
To understand why D'Arcy was successful in obtaining the oil concession, find-
ing oil and obtaining political backing, one has to first investigate his character and 
that of the string of individuals involved. William Knox D' Arcy should certainl~" 
be known as the luckiest man in the history of oil concessions in Iran. This is not 
only because he managed to obtain a favourable oil concession, but because lw 
33 Lencowzsky, Russia and ... ,pp 170. 
34 See Appendix A 
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obtained it at a time when British Government was seeking oil independence and 
was prepared to offer assistance to British capitalists who were searching for oil. 
The conversion of coal-fuelled to oil-fuelled ships had been suggested as earl~' as 
1882 when John Fisher, Captain of Admiralty stated that general adoption of oil 
instead of coal would immediately increase fighting capacity of every fleet at 50 
per cent, but political interest in Iranian oil dates back to 1890 when, Sir Henr~' 
submitted a report to Lord Salisbury, claiming that Russian oil fields were getting 
exhausted, whereas the virgin oil fields of Iran promised a good future. 35 The 
unique political position of Britain in the South YVest of Iran provided the best 
opportunity for D' Arcy to operate in that area without much trouble. It is true 
that some thirty years before a much more favourable concession had been granted 
to another British subject, de Reuter, but due to the lack of a proper oil POli('~'l 
de Reuter did not receive sufficient backing. 
D' Arcy, on the other hand, received substantial financial as well as political 
and military assistance. The speculative nature of D'Arcy also played its own role. 
Ketabchi Khan had already approached Russian and French capitalists, without 
success, asking for only 15,000 pounds for his oil concession. The following com-
ments made by Serkis Golbenkian is of interest "I submitted this business to my 
friend Lane, also I believe to Deterding, but we all thought it was a wild cat scheme 
and it looked so speculative that we thought it was a business for a gambler and 
not at all for our trio".36 It was D'Arcy who was prepared to risk 250,000 pounds 
of his own money, an enormous sum for an individual, in a country in which there 
was no proper road for transportation, not much commercial morality or security. 
35 This was a misleading report. Baku oil fields peaked in 1901 and more oil was discovered in Grozny 
and Maikop. 
36 Hewins, pp 67. 
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By the early 1900's, the importance of oil for Britain had been well recognised 
by both the oilmen and the politicians. Iran was weak and Britain was in a unique 
political position to aquifer the concession, an interested in\'estor was needed and 
a string of individuals to assist. The most important of all characters is D'.-\.rcy 
himself whose dareness, enthusiasm and courage in obtaining and working the 
concession to the point of bankruptcy, was of paramount importance. 
Born in Newton Abbot in 1849, D'Arcy emigrated to Queensland. Australia. 
with his father at the age of seventeen and likewise became a solicitor. Consid-
ered locally as an enterprising youngman who had a good head for business. he 
helped Thomas and Edwin Morgan in 1882, to set up IVlount j'\lorgan Gold Mining 
Company in which he had a substantial share. By 1886, the 1 pound share was 
worth 17 pounds. D'Arcy was a rich man when he returned to England in 1889. 
It is wrong of Golbenkian to call D'Arcy a gambler or wildcatter. It is true that 
D' Arcy never set foot in Iran but he had experience of gold mining and did not 
sign the concession until he received the results of the geological surve~·.37 He was 
cautious enough to ask for Ketabchi Khan's concession to be re-drafted for better 
terms such as exclusive right of pipelaying. 
The literature review also indicates that the role played l)\' Ketabchi Khan 
and his three sons in obtaining the concession and assisting drilling groups was of 
paramount importance to British oil interests. The reluctance of Iranian moslems 
to deal closely with European non-moslems, had created an opportunity for reli-
gious minorities to involve themselves in foreign trade in which Armenians had the 
largest part to play. Their knowledge of European trade had been handed down 
throughout generations. It is with this knowledge that Ketabchi Khan assisted De 
37 Elwell-Sutton, Oil Diplomacy, pp 14. 
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Reuter in 1872 to obtain his concession and it is because of his capability of dealing 
with Europeans that he became a close confident of the Iranian Prime ~Iinister. 
Aminos-Soltan. His role in foreign trade became so important that Sir Henry com-
mented that the European element of the Iranian Government was represented b~' 
Ketabchi Khan "for he was well versed with Western matters:·.:l~ This explains 
why Ketabchi Khan accompanied the Shah on his trip to England in 1890. 
The efforts of Ketabchi Khan in securing the concession were remarkable. He 
made the best of his knowledge of influential politicians and their intrigues with 
foreign legations. It was he who informed the British Ambassador in Tehran about 
Russia's plan to lay pipeline from Baku to the Persian Gulf which explains wh~' ex-
clusive right of pipe laying was given to D' Arcy. The comments made by Sir Arthur 
Hardinge, the British Ambassador in Tehran, best describes Ketabchi Khan's ef-
forts to secure the grant of the concession. Hardinge wrote nHe (Ketabchi) secured 
in a very thorough manner the support of all the Shah 's principle ministers, .... not 
even forgetting the personal servant who brings His Majesty his pipe and morning 
cofJee".39 The Britishs also did well to reward him. Article 11 of the concession 
regarding the appointment of the Imperial Commissioner. with a salary of 1000 
pounds a year, appears to have been drafted for Ketabchi Khan himself! 
Once the concession was granted, Ketabchi Khan's assistance was vital to 
start the original drillings. His knowledge of Iran was more political than geo-
logical. From the very beginning, he insisted on drillings in Shushtar rather than 
Qasre-Shirin. He had contacts with the local Mojtahed and knew ver~' well that 
without the cooperation of locals, drilling team would not be able to carr~' OIl. 
38 Wolf, pp 329. 
39 PRO FO 60/640, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 12 May 1901. 
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Ketabchi Khan died in 1902 and D'Arcy~ in extending his sympathies, wrote to 
his son Vincent "I have lost a kind and sincere friend and a valuable and able col-
league".40 His sons continued playing their own part. The ~'oungest one Edward 
was with the first drilling team operating 100 miles north of Baghdad. PauL the 
second son, was D'Arcy's representative in Tehran and agent to the Concessions 
Syndicate until 1907. The eldest son, Vincent, worked in London as the Imperial 
Commissioner and was involved in the financial affairs of the Syndicate. 41 
Technical assistance was mainly provided by G B Reynolds. A graduate of the 
Royal Indian Engineering College, he had acquired experience of oil search in the oil 
fields of Sumatra. He worked in Iran for several years searching for oil and moying 
from place to place. He set up camps, employed local labourers and supervised 
drillings. Despite hot summer when temperature rose to 120 F and muddy winters 
of the south-west of Iran, he worked hard to the point of exhaustion. The tribal 
chiefs were constantly engaged in petty feuds and local disturbances were frequent. 
On his return from home leave in February 1904, he found travelling dangerous 
because of feuding between two local tribes of Sagwand and Daraghwand. His 
being a competent horseman and a loner may have helped him last so long in Iran. 
He struck oil in May 1908.42 
The next important actor involved was the Shah who granted the concession. 
Mozafar-eddin Shah has been known in Iranian history as a man of weak personal-
40 BP H 15/117, pp 166, D'Arcy to Vincent Ketabchi, 23 December 1902. 
41 In Iranian writings, Ketabchi Khan has been mentioned as a broker. In western writings, however, 
he is even known as General Ketabchi Khan, Director General of the Iranian Customs at Paris 
Exposition in 1900 ! 
42 Wilson has given an account of his difficulties in Iran. The early chairmen of the oil company 
also played a prominent role in the company's progress. An example i~ Lord Starchona. All 
extraordinary man of 89 years old, he invested 1,000,000 pound of his own mouey in the oil compauy. 
He was hard working and died in office at the age of 94 shortly before the outbreak of the Fir~t 
World War. 
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ity and low intelligence. He was a crown prince for 43 years until the assassination 
of his father and had lived almost the entire 43 years away from his fathers court. 
It was common in those days to appoint the crown prince as the governor of the 
North West province of Azarbayjan. During this long period of absence from the 
capital, he grew up and lived in an entirely different atmosphere created b~' a tiny 
number of individuals holding Royal titles and clustered around him who were in a 
position to easily influence him. He had no technical talent nor an~' political con-
fidence to tackle political problems. There are even stories about his superstitious 
character, and it has been reported that at the time of thunder. he hid under the 
gown of his trusted molla !43 
Like his father, he made three trips to Europe and was impressed with Western 
technical advances but likewise failed to understand the significance and political 
consequences of this for the Middle East. However, it is not right to hold him 
as solely accountable for what went wrong. His father ,,,ho was a much stronger 
monarch had offered a better concession to de Reuter in 1872. Iran was riddled 
with political intrigues and he was only a weak king. Furthermore. there was not 
much prospect for oil discovery in Iran either. Oil in exportable quantities had not 
been found in Iran for the past 25 years and only 2 years before, the mineral rights 
on the de Reuter's second concession had lapsed without success. There was no 
guarantee that D'Arcy's concession would be worth the paper it was written on. 
The oil industry owed its early success to Sheikh Khazal, the chief of man~r 
Arab tribes of Bani Lam and Bani Kab who had emigrated from Najd to Khuzestan 
during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. After 1788, over 17,000 families 
43 More on Mozafar-eddin Shah's character can be found in Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 98. A.b(), 
in Nimruz, Autumn issues, 1376 (1997). 
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of Bani Lam migrated to Iran. 44 Khazal was a brutal man who had reportedly 
murdered his brother, Sheikh ~Iazal on 2 June 1897, in order to succeed him.-l°) 
Being originally an Arab, Khazal was unable to identify himself as an Iranian 
and for the same reason, he could not turn to Ottomani Empire either. He had 
no choice except to turn to the British Empire which was in an unchallenged 
position in the Persian Gulf. Britain had signed several truces with Arab Shiekhs 
of the Arabia peninsula and was in a unique position in Khuzestan. the South 
West of Iran. The Iranian central Government was aware of Kazal's intentions 
but, because of political weakness, had no choice except to appoint him as the 
Governor of Mohamareh in 1898, otherwise he would ha\"e declared independence. 
Khazal remained in power until 1924 when he surrendered to Reza Khan and spent 
the rest of his life under house arrest in Tehran. He was neyer allowed to lea\"(-> 
Iran even for medical treatment. He lost the sight of one e~"e with the other one's 
vision greatly impaired. He died on 30 May 1936 alone at the age of 75. 
Khazal was practically in charge of the province of KllUzestan and was known 
as the Sheikh of Mohamareh when Sir Percy Cox negotiated with him on behalf 
of the company. Britain had already penetrated Khuzestan through projects such 
as Karun irrigation scheme. The oil wells were producing in Meidan Naftun and 
Khazal agreed to offer the company 1 Sq mile land in the island of Abadan for the 
construction of a refinery in return for an annual rent of 650 pounds for 10 ~'ears 
in advance. The British Government, in return, guaranteed the autonomous right 
of Khazal and his successors to Mohamareh. He was to receive another bonus. a 
10,000 pounds loan from the oil Company ! This happened at a time when t hp 
500 pounds a year royalties to the Iranian Government had not been paid \'d ! 
44 C ottrell, pp 37. 
45 McDouall to Fagan, Mohamarah, 4 June 1897, FO 640/1. 
Indeed it was this type of interferences in the Iranian affairs which gaye rise to the 
extreme nationalism of 1940's and nationalisation of the oil industry.46 
In 1916, Sepahdar disposed his concession of 1891 to Khoshtaria. a Russian 
subject. This Concession was for seventy years to cover the :\"orthern proyinces of 
Gilan, Mazandaran and Estarabad. In 1919, the Anglo-Persian Treaty proyoked 
violent opposition by the nationalists. The parliament had no fear of granting 
concessions to Americans, although the concession area could only cover the :\ orth 
of Iran for D' Arcy had exclusive right outside the north. The I\Iajles adopted a 
new policy of finding a rival for the Anglo-Persian Oil company. On 22 \Tmoember 
1921, the Majles voted unanimously to grant the Standard Oil of l\ew Jerse~o a 50 
year concession for the return of 15 per cent gross profit. The interesting point to 
notice is the insertion of gross profit instead of net profit, an indication that by this 
time, Iranian politicians had realised the deficiencies of the D~ Arcy 's concessiOll. 
In 1922 another American company, Sinclair, was granted a concession for 40 
to 50 years in 4 out of the 5 northern provinces hoping that the company would 
be able to transport oil to the Black Sea via Caucasus as tlH'~o had the agency to 
sell Soviet oil as well as a concession to exploit oil in Sakhalin but a murder in 
Tehran of an American Colonel Imbrey, made the company think twice and t h('~o 
eventually dropped the concession. The fifth province, Gilan, was left open so that 
Soviets could entertain their hope of obtaining a concession there.-l7 
The Sinclair's concession was granted to foil a joint attempt h~o the Stan-
dard Oil and Anglo-Persian Oil Company to share the north of Iran. The Allglo-
46 Khuzestan received pan-Arab attention after Naser's victory in Egypt. The attempt to change the 
name of Persian Gulf began then. 
H This is another example of how Iranian statesmen had to use one foreign power against another. 
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Persian Oil Company had obtained, in 1920~ Khoshtaria's concession for 100.000 
pounds and formed a subsidiary~ but the Iranain government always maintained 
that Khoshtaria's concession had never been ratified, The same faith was awaiting 
Frenchs who obtained the oil concession of 1927. They had to drop the concession 
for the reason that even if oil had been discovered, it would haye cost a fortune to 
carry it to the sea by truck for D'Arcy had exclusiye right of pipe laying, 
In pursuance of their policy of reducing British influence. Iranian Gm"ern-
ment decided to set up an Iranian oil company. In 1925, Iran formed a company. 
Kavir-Khurian, with a capital of 50,000,000 Rials48 divided into 100,000 shares and 
obtained 25 per cent rights of Amin-Madan's concession of 1878. This concession 
had been re-confirmed by the Government in 1924. Khoshtaria, purchased 65 per 
cent stock in the company for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Two wells ",pre 
drilled but no oil was found. 
The activities in the north were revived in 1930 when Societe Franco-Persane 
de Recherches was formed with 10,000,000 franks capital, but ceased operation after 
1932. The main reason for the failure was the cost of pipelaying, high production of 
Arab countries and political instability of late 1930's. Another American company 
which managed to obtain a concession is reported to be Amiranian. a subsidiar~' of 
the Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware in 1937, but concession was abandoned b~' 
the company itself in 1938. The Standard Oil of New Jersey tried again in 1939, but 
Iran gave up negotiations in 1940 under the Soviet pressure. The difficulties faced 
the companies operating in the North could be seen again ",hen a Dutch company 
which was granted a concession in 1939 lost it in 1944 because of non-performance. 
The oil company officials refused to allow Iran to examine their books. Reza 
48 Ri 1 The exchange rate for pound was 40 a s. 
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Shah was annoyed at the Company:s stubbornness and had practicall~' shown his 
anger. In his journey to the province of Khuzestan in 1932 when he was trayellillg 
between Abadan and Ahwaz, he sat with his back to the oil installations. and on 
his return to Tehran, he shocked the ministers in a cabinet meeting when he threw 
the oil file into the fire place, an incident which resulted in the cancellation of the 
concession in November 1932. The case was taken to the League of \"ations which 
eventually suggested that parties should negotiate. The negotiations resulted in the 
Agreement of 29 April 1933 which consisted of 37 articles. 49 The new agreemellt 
was actually the subject of criticisms by Mosaddegh in 1940's when he accused 
Reza Shah of being on the British side, arguing that if he had the power to callcd 
the concession, why did he renew it ? He believed that Reza Shah acted OIl British 
instructions by throwing the oil documents into the fire so that no trace of it could 
be found and a new concession had to be drafted ! 
According to Mosaddegh, the first role was played by the Shah b~' cancelling 
the concession. The second was played by the oil compan~r b~' reducing Iran's 1971 
royalties by 25 per cent which angered the Shah. The third rolc was played b~r 
the Shah who destroyed the oil file and the fourth by Dr Benes, the Czeck Foreign 
Minister, who suggested that the case should be taken to the League of Nations so 
that a new concession could be drafted, and the last role was plaved by Taghi-zade. 
the Iranian Finance Minister, who fearing public anger. did not publish the ll('W 
concession so that it could be passed by the Majles in one sitting. 
This allegation is typical of Mosaddegh's wa~' of thinking. Reza Shah could 
49 Britain was informed that cancellation was based on the following facts; obtaining the conces-
sion by deception, dishonest calculation of royalties, denying Iranians access to .compam books, 
non-payment of royalties between 1909 and 1920, extravagance of co~paIlY. outsld.e .Iran was not 
conducive to Iranian interests, company's refusal to pay income tax. high pnce of 011 III Iran, COIIl-
pany's failure to exploit Iranian oil outside Khuzestan, company's non-compliance Wit h t lIP t('rlll:-; 
of the original concession. 
not have been such an obedient agent for he turned to ::'\azi German~' in 1936.50 
The correspondence between the Iranian Government and the company regarding 
a new concession had actually begun in 1929 and the reduction in Iran's revenue 
was due to the financial difficulties of 1930's for \Vestern Europe was suffering from 
an economic recession in the late 1920's and the stock market crash of October 
1929. The proposal to allow two parties to negotiate was nothing new. Iran had 
a long history of appeal to the International bodies. The League of Nations had 
made the same proposals to Iran and the Soviet Union in 1920 to negotiate their 
differences over Soviet occupation of Gilan. 51 Mosaddegh must ha\'e exaggerated 
to provoke sentiment against the oil company. 
However, once the agreement of 1933 was signed, the area of oil exploration 
by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was reduced to 100,000 Sq miles at t h(' Com-
pany's desecration and the company had no choice except to choose the provillce 
of Khuzestan for the bulk of the oil industry had been established there. The oil 
company no longer had exclusive right of pipe laying outside this area and the Ira-
nian Government was at liberty to grant new concessions outside their area. but 
one has to remember that the government still had to consider opposition from 
Moscow in view of Soviet sensitivity to granting concessions in the I\orth.52 
50 For details see Chapter 4. 
51 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 220. 
52 The main differences between this agreement and that of D'ArT\' were as follows; reductioll of 
area from 500,000 to 100,000 square miles, non-exclusive right to refine, non-exclusiw right of 
pipe laying, precise defining of procedures to obtain land, exploitation o~ ='J ~ft-~hah field. Ilear 
Kermanshah increase of revenues to 4 shillings per ton plus 20 per cent of dlstrrbutlOn to ordmary 
share holder~ of Anglo-Persian Oil Company in excess of 671,250 pounds, government's right to 
check the returns on the production of oil, complete exemption from taxation for the first 30 years 
of its operation in Iran on certain conditions, annual grant of 10,000 pounds for tralIllllg Iraman 
students in Britain, concession could not be annulled in future . 
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2.4 Oil Concessions 
The history of oil concessions in Iran granted before the Constitutional ~Ioye­
ment of 1906, is the story of political weakness of Qajar statesmen and the skil-
fulness of a group of Western concession-hunters who knew how to take adyantage 
of the situation to achieve their well-calculated demands. This is best reflected in 
the first oil concession of 25 July 1872 granted to a British-naturalised German. 
Baron Julius de Reuter,53 giving him exclusive right to explore all mines in Iran 
except gold, silver and precious stones for a period of 70 ~·ears. It was granted 
thirteen years after the first discovery of oil in Tituseville. Pensylvania, and at a 
time when the American oil industry was growing fast. Lord Curzon, known at 
his time as an expert in Iranian politics, has commented on this concession.54 
This concession was cancelled a year later under Russian as well as internal 
pressure by religious factions compounded with the non-performance of the con-
cession itself, but the failure, on the Iranian side, to understand the consequences 
of what was being granted to Westerners can be seen from all concessions granted 
up to the Constitutional Movement of 1906. An obvious example of this is the 
mentioning of "net profit" instead of "gross profit" in D'Arcy's concession which 
enabled the company to deduct income tax paid to the British government. As 
a result, as was pointed out earlier, taxes paid to British government in the four 
years preceding nationalisation exceeded the Iranian revenue in fifty years !55 A11-
other example, which will be discussed later on, is the failure of Iranians to equat(' 
the amount of 20,000 pounds paid in shares against an~' percentage ownership of 
53 Also known as von Reuter, the founder of the Reuter Press Agency. 
54 Persia and Persian Question, pp 48. When published to the world, it wa.s found to. contain. the 
most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources .of ~ Kmgdom mto 
foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamt of, much less accompilsli('d m history. 
;)5 Moghari, pp 78. 
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future companies to work the same concession. It will also be discussed how The oil 
company managed to sell oil at low prices to the British): ayy and the Air Force 
at a discount of 55 to 90 per cent to lower net profit. 
Concessions were continued to be granted to a \"ariet~" of nationalities. III 
1878, Amin-madan, an Iranian national obtained a concession to look for oil in 
Semnan area. The search was unsuccessful but this concession became subject of 
a long dispute because his descendants did not register it in their names. The 
dispute was eventually resolved in 1924 when the Iranian Government confirmed 
the concession. Oil concessions were occasionally granted for a small area. In 188-L 
M Hotz a Dutch national resident in Bushehr, acquired an oil concession in the 
area of Daleki, where as mentioned before, there was alread~" an oil seepage. One 
shallow well was drilled without any results. 
Britain had refused to recognise the cancellation of De Reuter's first cow'('S-
sion of 1872 which encouraged De Reuter, despite his invoh"ellwnt with his l\('WS 
Agency, to obtain a second concession in 1889 for exploring petroleum as well as 
banking,56 The amount of 40,000 pounds deposit in addition to 16 per cent net 
profit seems to have encouraged the Shah who needed mOIle~" for his third trip 
to Europe. The Imperial Bank was formed and in 1890, Persian Bank Mining 
Rights Corporation was organised and obtained a right to search for oil through 
this concession. As no scientific method of locating oil deposits was knO\\Tn, the 
Corporation had to search for oil by drilling near existing oil ponds around Daleki 
near Bushehr between 1891 and 1893. 
In 1899, the mineral rights lapsed and the Corporation itself \\"as liquidated in 
56 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 12. 
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1901.57 In 1894, D."". Torrence, an American national, was granted a concession 
for sinking artesian wells for certain minerals and oil priyileges for 25 years. but he 
forfeited it after a year because of non-compliance. Iranian nationals also took an 
interest in oil discovery. In January 1891, Sepahdar-Azam was granted a concession 
for the province of Mazandaran only. In 1896, Russo-Persian :'\aphta Company 
won a restricted oil right through this concession. 58 In 1916, Sepahdar disposed 
of his rights to Khoshtaria, a Russian subject of doubtful Iranian nationality, but 
this concession was never ratified and became subject of a long dispute. In 1894. 
Khalatbary, this time a real Iranian subject, obtained an oil concession with no 
success. Governor-General of the province of Gilan has also been reported to haye 
had a concession to drill near Caspian Sea in 1900.59 
However, it is not right to assume that all foreign investors were keen on Iranian 
petroleum. British-educated Arminian, Serkis Golbenkian. a figure in Baku oil 
industry and involved in Ottomani oil affairs, declined to take up a concession in 
Iran. 60 Years later he commented that "between 1895 and 1900, the concession 
which afterwards came into the possession of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was 
a drag in the market".61 Golbenkian (1896-1955) was one of the well-known oil 
experts of this century. He established Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) which 
developed into an international business. After the conclusion of the First World 
War and under the Sam Remo Oil Convention of 1920, the 25 per cent German 
share in TPC was given to France. Anglo-Persian Oil Company received 50 per cent 
and Anglo-Saxon Oil Company (Royal Dutch-Shell) 25 per cent. Anglo-Persian 
57 Ibid, pp 13. 
58 Ibid, pp 36. 
59 For a brief history of oil concessions in Iran see Nahai and Kimbell. 
60 Ferrier, pp 29. 
61 BP H 17/1, Memoirs of Golbenkian, 16 September 1945. 
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and Anglo-Saxon each gave up 2.5 per cent in favour of Golbenkian with yoting 
power as he had established the company. He became known as ~Ir FiYe per cent. 
Mr Five per cent or Mystery Millionaire, as he did not like fame. was the 
Iranian Honorary Commercial Attache at the Iranian Embassy for many years. 
He acquired British citizenship but whilst residing in \"ichy France, in 1940. he 
was declared" An Enemy Under the Act" and his five per cent ,,'as confiscated by 
the Custodian for Enemy Property. He assumed Iranian citizenship and moved to 
Portugal which had access to America. He remained there until his death. 62 
Returning to granting concessions, no more oil conceSSIOns are reported to 
have been granted by the Shah until 1906 when Constitutionalism became official. 
Between 1906 and 1909, Iran went through political turmoil, and there was no 
time for granting concessions. Mozafar-eddin Shah who granted Constitutionalism 
died in 1907 but his son, the new Shah, did not agree with Constitutionalism and 
with the cooperation of the Russian Cossacks closed the ?\1ajles down. His reign, 
however, did not last long. He was deposed in 1909. Indeed. had concessions been 
granted, they would not have been recognised by the future governments. After 
the re-establishment of the Constitutional Government, Majles which was willing 
to grant oil concessions to American companies to involve a third party into the 
rivalry between Russia and Britain, but governments lasted only for a short time 
and Iran had no Majles for six years between 1911 and 1917.63 
62 Hewins, pp xii. 
63 For details of oil concessions see Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil. Stocking, :\liddle East Oil Histor)'. 
Shwadran Middle East Oil and Great Powers and Hamilton, American and Oil in the Middle , , 
East. 
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.5 Economy and Oil Revenues 
The oil revenues became vital for Iran once modernisation started after 192;). 
The first official payment to the Iranian Government was a sum of 20,000 pounds 
in cash. A further 20,000 pounds in shares was to be paid upon the formation of 
the First Exploitation Company. Other payments such as a sum of 2000 Tomans 
a year but this was never paid until 1909. Up to 1919, payments were always in 
arrears and subject to dispute and it is true to say that they had. ,vith exception 
of local employment and expenditure, no effect on the Iranian economy for yer~' 
little royalties reached the Iranian treasury.64 
In 1920 and after interventions by Armitage-Smith, the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company paid 1,000,000 pounds to the government which was spent on debt re-
payments and salaries65 and by 1926 another 5,000,000 pounds had been paid. 
Iran's revenues increased significantly during the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941) 
and reached 35,000,000 pounds and for the first time the~' were allocated to the 
National Reserve Account, the Army, ordinary expenses and backing the new 
notes. During this period the only project to require capital was construction of 
the 865-mile Trans-Iranian Railway which was partly financed by the revenues. It 
took seven years to build and cost 40,000,000 pounds. During the war the rev-
enues increased again as the production had shot up and Iran received 20,000,000 
pounds, but it was only after the war when the Government invested the payments 
in economic improvement. 
64 An interesting account of the Iranian economy in the early 1910's has been given by Jamal-zadeh 
in 1918 in Ganje Shaigan. His book was not re-printed for 64 vears. an indication of the Iranian's 
lack interest in literature. 
65 NIOC, pp 5. National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was a government agency organised in 1947 
to hold petroleum rights outside area covered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Hamilton, pp 
259) 
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The Second World War changed the economic situation completely. Since the 
occupation in 1941 inflation existed in Iran. The cost of li\-ing was rising before the 
occupation. The occupation, however, worsened the situation. The .\llies had to 
convert currency for their domestic use. N afisi, legal adyiser to t he Oil Compan~­
pressed the Iranian Finance Minister to raise the Sterling exchange rate from 68 
Rials to 90 Rials! When Nafisi was appointed Finance ~Iinister. he raised the 
exchange rate to 140 Rials. Iranian merchants now had to pay more to import 
foreign goods. This was compounded with a decrease in domestic production and 
the activities of racketeers.66 Only between July 1946 and August 1949 cost of 
living rose 36 per cent. Iran needed economic aid. In 1946, Ambassador Allen was 
in favour of aid, believing that Iran should remain in the \\'estern camp, an idea 
which was supported by Acheson and Henderson who were. in view of confrontation 
in Azarbaijan, concerned that Iran might fall into the Soviet camp,67 but crisis 
in Azarbaijan ended in December 1946 and after the congressional elections of 
November 1946 the new administration at the State Department showed little 
interest in economic aid. Large sums of money had been considered for the re-
construction of certain Western European countries, Greece and Turkey, but Iran 
had oil revenues. 
The basic economic problem of Iran was productivity for it had to be increased 
to provide a stable economy. A seven year plan was decided early 1947 calling 
for the expenditure of 650,000,000 dollar in seven years to develop the economic, 
cultural health and administrative sectors. This was a part of the monarchisfs , 
policy to involve a third power into the politics of Iran and was based on the 
66 See for instance, Setareh, 11 Esfand 1321 (2 March 1942), and Radeh Emruz, 4 Mehr 1322 (26 
September 1944). 
67 FRUS 1946 Vol 7 pp 520 521 523-525. 
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Tehran Declaration of December 1943 that .... any economic problems confronting 
Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration. 68 That is how the 
term economic plan first appeared in the Iranian political yocabular~·. 
Iran had accumulated substantial reserves of foreign exchange during the war. 
but these were inadequate to finance the plan. In 1947. Iran applied to the 
American-controlled International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD. 
for a loan of 250,000,000 dollars. The American specialists, ~Iorrison-Knudsen 
Co., Idaho, were engaged to make the surveys and recommendations. Ghayam. 
the Prime Minister who initiated the Plan resigned in December 1947. The new 
government appointed an Iranian economist to work on the plan. The idea was to 
show that the plan was Iranian rather than foreign. The Iranian Government drew 
up the First Plan. The Plan was in part inspired b~' the fact that a worldwide 
economic crisis had been anticipated after the end of the war. Another factor to 
be considered was the Soviet planning and the idea of state intervention which 
emerged in Western countries. 
The Plan Organisation was founded in 1948 and the American Industrial Con-
sultant, Max Thornburg was commissioned to advise the government. Max Thorn-
burg, in turn, suggested an advisory contract for technical assistance with a con-
sortium of American engineering firms, Overseas Consultants Incorporated, OCI, 
who were engaged in August 1948 at approximately 650,000 dollars a year. The 
OCI however lacked international character so a British firm, Alexander Gibb and , , 
Co., with experience in the region was added! The idea in practice was for the 
government to determine the manner in which oil revenues, market mechanism and 
the administration was used. The market mechanism and administration wpre con-
68 For the text see FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 414. 
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sidered as instruments to increase the contribution of oil revenues to development. 
The economic and social development was to be achieved through the combination 
of these three elements. 
Planning went ahead for several years but it ,vas not contained within an~' 
specific political philosophy or economic doctrine. The plans ,vere concei,"ed from 
the economic point of view as a mixture of free enterprise and public inten"ention. 
The plan was a list of projects investigated at prefeasibility level and endorsed by 
, . 
the engineering firm. The ultimate objective of planning was not defined nor the 
social and political framework within which planning decisions were to be made 
as little consultation had been made with officials. The plans never achieved any 
long-run perspective. The Majles, however, ratified the Plan in February 1949 and 
the Shah's brother, Abdol Reza, assumed the honorary chairmanship of the Plan. 
In October 1949, the OCI submitted to the Iranian Government a 1250-page 
report and like the original plan called for the expenditure of 656,000,000 dollars in 
seven years to be financed from oil royalties, a foreign loan and issuing notes. The 
Shah paid a state visit to Washington in November to secure the loan but returned 
empty-handed. The reason was most probably Washington not being enthusiastic 
about economic aid outside Europe at that time. Besides there were other reasons. 
The administrative inefficiency and corruption of the government would waste the 
loan, an example of which was the defeat of the Kumintang regime in China in 
1949 and the diversion of American funds into personal accounts ! 
By the end of 1949, the International Bank, in view of Iran~s financial situation. 
considered Iran a bad credit risk and refused the loan. The Plan, however. WPllt on 
although under-funded. In October 1950, Washington offered :20.000,000 dollars 
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through Export-Import Bank but the Majles, in retaliation, refused to ratify the 
loan. Under the First Seven Year Development Plan Law. the Plan Organisation 
was to receive 37 per cent of the oil revenues for the ~'ears 1948 to 1955. The rev-
enues were 65,000,000 pounds but in practice the Plan Organisation only received 
? ,000,000 pounds because of the closure of the oil industry for 3 years between 1951 
and 1954 and the reduction in total payments. In the postwar years budgetary 
deficit did not exceed 5 per cent up to 1949, at the same time 11 to 15 per cellt 
of the total budget were oil revenues. The effects of these factors were practicall~' 
offset by increasing imports and industrial production. 
In summary, the effect of oil revenues on the economy was paramount after 
1925 when modernisation of Iran began. Significant contributions were made to 
the economy in terms of value added to GNP. The oil industr~' was the largest 
employer, next to the government, and provided paid employment for 30,000 Ira-
nians in 1951. Up to 1943, oil revenues were a major source of foreign currenc.\' 
and financed up to approximately 60 per cent of the imports between 1946 and 
1950.69 The revenues were the largest source of foreign exchange and this placed 
the government in a dependent position, the consequence of which became clear 
after the nationalisation. In 1952, government had to cut spending in general due 
to financial difficulties. The expenditure of the army was vast as a matter of pres-
tige as the Shah wanted to have a large army to bolster his power. The choice 
of the Minister of War was traditionally that of the Shah and government had 
practically not much control over the army. The dependence of the economy on 
the oil revenues put Mosaddegh under great pressure as he now had to resort to 
an oil-free economy to which a balanced budget and revised tax laws, were the 
69 Bharier, pp 159. 
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answer. Iran managed to increase its traditional exports by 13 per cent and reduce 
imports by 50 per cent during the period 1951 to 1953. 
During the years 1908 to 1951, total revenues of Iran were 125.000,000 pounds 
for the total export of 300,000,000 ton of products. that is less than 5 pence a 
barrel !70 To this one has to add the domestic consumption of the Oil Company 
as well as the alleged illegal exports of oil. It is not: therefore. surprising to learn 
that the total taxes paid to the British Government for the years 1947-1951 were 
higher than the total oil revenues paid to Iran in 50 years. 71 
2.6 Oil Rivalry 
The oil politics and blocking rivals could not be separated from oil search. As 
explained in page 6, the importance of the oil for the British industries had become 
clear by the turn of the century. Britain had to search for oil and once it had been 
found to protect it. Several countries around the world had been known to possess 
oil reserves with Iran and Mesopotamia having special places amongst them. The 
German influence in Mesopotamia was too strong to allow British capitalists to 
intervene. Americans had no share in oil exploration in the Middle East and France 
was out of the oil race. Britain's rival in Iran was onl~' Russia which had made 
Iran its exclusive oil market. 
In reviewing the events of the early years of the twentieth century one ("all 
clearly see the importance of oil independence for Britain. The desire to possess 
as much oil reserves as possible, to drive the rivals out of the race and to establish 
rxcIusive supply sources, had become too obvious. Control oy('r oil for Britain 
70 Nahai, pp 17. 
71 Moghari, pp 78. 
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was so vital that after the First World War Lord Curzon commented that the 
Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil. It also explains that his real motiYes for 
his attempts to turn Iran into a British Protectorate in 1919 was oil. Churchill 
also recognised the importance of the oil many years before "'hen in June 1912. 
he asked the retired Admiral Fisher to preside over the Royal Commission on 
Oil Supply. The formation and the future operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company which covered 500,000 Sq. miles of Iran, had been recognised to be of 
paramount importance to Britain. 
In 1907, Britain signed an agreement with the Russian Empire to diyide Iran 
into two zones of influence.72 The Russian zone was large and extended into central 
Iran while British zone only covered Baluchestan. An agreement was reached not 
to seek concessions in the zone allocated to the other side. It was the dis('oyn~' 
of oil in the neutral zone in 1908 which changed the balance forcing Britain to 
give Russia a free hand in Dardenelles and to divide, in a secret agreement ill 
1915, the neutral zone with Russia. As a part of the manOeU\Te. in 1916, Britain 
assisted Khoshtari, a Russian subject, to aquifer an oil concession from a pro-
Russian politician, Sepahdar, to cover the North. The l\Iajles had been dissolved. 
The concession could not have been ratified and indeed, in 1918, the next cabinet 
declared it null and void. 
A new era appeared to have started after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 
when the Revolutionary Government cancelled all Czarist concessions and restored 
them to Iran. Realising the situation, Khoshtaria sold his concession in a hUlT~' 
to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for the sum of 100,000 pounds resulting in 
7'2 Avery, pp 158. Taylor, in his book Struggle for Mastery in Europe pp 239, makes an illt.('rf'~tlIlg 
comment on this agreement. He believed that the Anglo-Saxons and perhaps tIl(' Frenchs bellp\'(' III 
buffer states and the Germans and perhaps Russians believe in partition as the be~t way to ))(',1«' 
between the great powers. 
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the subsequent formation, in J\lay 1920, of a subsidiar:,>'. the \"orth Persian Oil 
Company with a capital of 3,000,000 pounds. This was a calculated move hy 
Britain to take advantage of the political situation in the Soviet C nion and to 
acquire control over the entire Iran. It was British bad reputation in Iran for being 
an imperialistic power, which resulted in the subsequent decline of the validit~, 
of Khoshtaria's concession by Iran and that of the Aorth Persian Oil Compan~'. 
Furthermore, it was this British move to aquifer control over entire Iran and the 
resentment over Lord Curzon's attempts to turn Iran into a British Protectorate 
which forced the Iranian nationalists to look for a replacement for Britain. 
This was the beginning of a new era in which American interests in Iran flour-
ished. Iran considered America as a distant and disinterested countr~' and invited 
American oil companies to invest in Iran, an invitation which was resented b~' both 
Britain and the Soviet Union. A year later, Iran negotiated with Standard Oil of 
New Jersey but joint Soviet and British opposition defeated the move. Allglo-
Persian Oil Company, reminding the Standard Oil Company of the fact that th('~' 
had the exclusive right of pipelaying in the south, offered to share the North with 
Standard Oil and give them a say in the Company's board of directors! This 
met with fierce Iranian opposition and as a result, Iran entered into negotiations 
with another American company, Sinclaire Consolidated Oil Company. In 1923. 
Sinclair was granted a concession in the north but again it was Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company which refused pipelaying in the south and Ivloscow, in turn, refused ac-
cess through the Caucasus area to the Black Sea! The murder of an American 
official, Major Imbrie in Tehran, has also been attributed to British undercover 
agents who allegedly had the mission of sabotaging the AIlH'rican oil explorations. 
In July 1924, Imbrie attempted to photograph a religious gathering. A senior 
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official of the Oil Company was with him giving credence to the rumours that 
rivals of Sinclair were involved. 73 The fury of the British officials in the wake of 
the invalidation of the North Persian Oil Company was reflected in the comment 
made by G P Churchill of the Eastern Department at the Foreign Office. He wrote 
"The present Persian Government contemplate throwing Persia entirely into the 
hands of the Americans"74 and another British official commented with confidence 
that the North "would be locked off by us from the Persian Gulf".7~) It was not 
economical for American Oil Companies to carry oil to a sea port by any means 
other than a pipeline. The oil explorations in the north was abandoned early 1920's 
and America was out of the race. 
A question might arise as to the position of the French oil companies. Up to 
1920, France had no share in any oil wells in the Middle East and was dependent 
on American oil. The reason was perhaps the decline of the French influenc(, in 
Eastern Mediterranean since the defeat of Napoleon in Eg~·pt. In those days, a 
concession was not worth the paper it was written on unless backed by a powerful 
foreign legation. The British position in Egypt and Sudan was strong and in Iran, 
it was pre-dominant. France had only appeared in the oil race of the Middle East 
after the First World War when they were given GermaIlY's 25 per cent share in the 
Turkish Petroleum Company. The Germans themselves were no riyal for Britain in 
Iran either. Their oil exploration was confined to Mesopotamia due to the political 
rivalries between Britain and the Ottomani in the last fe,v years of the nineteenth 
century. 
73 Malek, pp 308. 
74 PRO FO 371 6448 30 August 1921. 
75 BP H 10 80, memorandum on the North Persia Oil Concession, pp 3- .. 1 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a background to the oil concessions 
and discuss the growing penetration of the Iranian economy by foreign interyention 
and the consequences of such interventions. The Iranian society was influenced by 
. . 
Western ways since at least 1800's. After the defeat by the Russian Tsarist army. 
Iranian kings found themselves subject of pressure and restriction by the growing 
Russian and British influence. They had to resort to pmver games. lose territory 
and offer concessions to satisfy foreign greed. Their policy, known in Farsi as 
movazeneh (balance), was actually effective as it turned foreign militar~' advance 
into commercial rivalry. This, after many years, ended in economic weakness and 
corruption, which eventually resulted in virtual bankruptc~' and the need to bor-
row foreign loans or offer concessions to raise cash. One such concession was that 
of Tobacco in 1891 offered to fill the Shah's empty purse. The other one was 
D'Arcy's obtained again by offering cash to the Shah and bribes to corrupt politi-
cians surrounding him.76 The Tobacco concession quickly ended in cancellation 
and compensation by the Iranian authorities. The consequences of the D'An'<s 
concession were much different. 
The gusher at Masjed Soleiman on 26 May 1908 marked the beginning of a llPW 
epoch in the history of Iran if not that of the Middle East. For industrial countries 
of the West, it brought material benefit. For Iran, however, its consequences 
were different. Iranian statesmen may have offered an oil concession for the sake 
of few thousand pounds believing that like others D' Arcy would have also been 
unsuccessful in finding oil. This concession, however, caused a bitter dispute which 
76 Bribing appears to have been an obvious feature of Iranian way of life. To the Sha~ and the 
influential officials, it was called pishkesh (donation) and was quite common to pay a plshkesh to 
receive a title or to be appointed to certain jobs. To ordinary Iranian~. it was more like tea mOlI!:'Y 
than anything else. 
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lasted for decades. The role the Iranian oil assumed in international power politics 
became so dominant that it may well be compared with the importance of ib 
discovery. Just as it did in industry~ it lubricated the wheels of policies advocated 
by Percy Cox, British Resident in Bushehr, Anthony Harding, British ~IiIlister 
in Tehran, and Lord John Fisher, the "oil maniac" who started the battle of oil 
against steam. 
Although people like Percy Cox were elated by the oil strike, t hey could hardly 
afford to commit themselves solely to the Concessions S~'ndicate as a much larger 
enterprise was needed to develop the oil reserves. This ("all be seen from the 
chain of companies formed later on. The Syndicate owned the First Exploitation 
Company. Burma Oil Company owned the Syndicate and for obvious reasons 
British authorities acquired a large stake in the oil company to have a firm foothold 
in the newly-established Iranian oil industry. The Shah was perhaps only interested 
in oil royalty but the concession-hunter wanted better terms and longer time. A.ll 
the concessions granted by the late 19th century had their own social and political 
implications. One such example was that of Tobbaco and Lottery. By 19:)0, 
oil was a factor vital for the economic growth and the increase in living standard 
exerted much greater emphasis on the national sovereignty of the country's natural 
resources. 
The importance of this vital factor in Iran of 1940's together with the nature 
of policy and the personalities involved will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter III 
Domestic Iranian Politics and the Importance of Oil 
This chapter presents an analysis of the Iranian setting in the 1940's. describes 
the Majles and the press, and the influential characters involved in the power game. 
It seeks to evaluate the role the political forces played in shaping the en'nts of the 
1940's. Two dominant features are East-West conflict and the oil rivalry. Iran 
suffered from both. The relevance of the oil factor and foreign attempts to acquire 
a better position in Iran are analysed. 
3.1 Reza Shah and the Allies 
Although he was brought to power by Britain in 1921, towards the end of 
his rule, Reza Shah had become dissatisfied with the Britishs and expressed pro-
German sentiment. In 1941, he refused to expel German subjects from Iran. Reza 
Shah's non-cooperation with the allies and the strong German sentiment in Iran 
compounded with the German advance towards the Caucasus justified the oc-
cupation of Iran. The 1941 Anglo-Soviet occupation resulted in the immediate 
disintegration of the Iranian Army which outnumbered the Allied Forces 4 to 1. 
and the subsequent exile of Reza Shah. The invasion marked the end of a period 
of personal rule during which all the democratic institutions which had been ('s-
tablished between 1909 and 1921 were destroyed. The reign of Reza Shah was a 
period of rule by a dictator who recognised almost no limit to his power. Reza 
Shah had come to power in a coup in February 1921 when he moved the Cossack 
Brigade to the suburbs of Tehran to exert pressure on the Celltral Gm·prnment. 
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The Cossack Brigade had been established by a Russian officer who had left III 
1917. Reza Khan then assumed the command of the brigade. 
The Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 to turn Iran into a British protectorate had 
been rejected by the Majles. The British Government was after an opportunity 
to improve its position in Iran. A senior British officer. General Ironside. serying 
with the British Embassy in Tehran approached senior Cossack officer to bring the 
Brigade near Tehran to put pressure on the Iranian Government. ::\0 one agreed to 
cooperate. Perhaps prompted by Ataturk and the Republic of Turkey. Reza Khan 
occupied Tehran, threatened the Government and acquired the post of ~Iinister of 
War. I He was a shrewd and ruthless man with a commanding sense of allthorit~· 
who rose rapidly through the Iranian ranks. He carried Ollt the coup with the 
help of a 30 year old journalist, Seyed Zia, who became the prime minister. Seyed 
Zia paid Reza Khan 2000 Tomans and 20,000 Tomans for his 2000 men. 2 It has 
been claimed that Seyed Zia himself had been bribed b~' the British Embass~' to 
assist the passage of the 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty through the T\Iajles. Reza 
Khan soon became the Prime Minister, ousted the Qajar Shah and planned to 
establish a republic. Shia clergy, fearfull of what had happened in Turkey aftpr 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, persuaded him to abolish his plan and accept 
monarchy. He was enthroned as Reza Shah in 1925. Only one molla, Modarres, 
isolated himself by opposing Reza Khan. Another Molla, Kashani who became the 
most politically active molla of 1940's, gave Reza Khan full support. 
After a period of constitutional government following the defeat of absolutislll 
in 1909, government functioned on authoritarian centralised and nationalistic lines. 
I The post of the Minister of War effectively remained with Reza Khan and his son, the following 
Shah, until the collapse of Pahlavi Dynasty in 1978 ! 
2 Makki, Tarikh ... vol 1. 
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Under Reza Shah, the budget reached 30,000,000 pounds
1 
government controlled 
33 per cent of imports and 44 per cent of all exports. 3 The process of e,ooho-
ing towards unification and modernisation turned Iran from a feudalistic country 
into a well-conducted state. Examples of changes were emancipation of women. 
restriction of clerical influence and the vast development of education.4 The mi-
gration of some landowners to cities under Reza Shah resulted in a new middle 
class. The urban attraction which was the consequence of centralising power in 
Tehran resulted in a middle class which emerged amongst urban population which 
included the Western-educated and students. Bazaar elements could be considered 
as traditional middle class. The class of artisans of 1940 1s which did not exist in 
1901, changed the traditional way of thinking as a new social order was needed to 
accommodate them. The demand for labour legislation was high. 5 Thl' traditional 
desire to end foreign influence and a growing nationalism were shared b~' all of 
them but they did not always cooperate. 6 The long-time oppression of the masses 
by government together with the xenophobic nature of Iranians when foreign com-
mercial abuse was concerned, fired by religious emotions, appears to have given 
cause for extreme nationalism of 1940's. 
The reign of Reza Shah was a period of terror during which very few of his 
opponents survived. Modarres, for instance, suffered years of detention before be-
ing strangled. Khazal was under house arrest in Tehran until 1936. In the early 
years of Reza Shah's reign, a famous writer and poet, Eshghi, was assassinated. 
Socially this period was marked with superficial westernisation. 'Yestern gear and 
French hat was introduced to a traditional societ~· in which women wore Chador 
3 Wilbur, pp 130. 
4 For a detailed account of Iran under Reza Shah see Wilbur. 
5 ILO, pp 31. 
6 Cottam, pp 33-50. 
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for centuries, but poverty and decease continued in its traditional way. Railwa~.s 
and other ambitious public works were completed but dictatorial rule removed r lit' 
democratic institutions which existed after the re-establishment of the Constitu-
tional Government of 1909. 
It was perhaps Reza Shah's anger against Britain which led him to establish 
friendly relationships with Nazi Germany in 1935. Germany like America had a 
good reputation in Iran for not being an imperialistic power. in particular Germany 
was an ally of the Ottoman Empire in the First \\'orId war. Iranian nationalists 
had adopted the policy of movazeneh in 1920's by attempting to bring \Yashington 
into Iranian politics. The employment of Millispaugh or involvement of American 
oil companies in Iran are examples of this policy. German influence grew strong in 
Iran. It originally began under the Weimar Republic, then under Hitler with their 
Swastika, a symbol of Aryan brotherhood. German actiyitirs ranged from giying 
parties to lecturing and organising Boy Scouts. Towards the late 1930's a. large 
number of Germans, amongst them Nazi intelligentsia, lived in Iran. 
Perhaps prompted by the German Government Reza Shah changed the name of 
the country from Persia to Iran and allowed Germany to develop Iranian industry.7 
Consequently, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company also changed its title to Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. 8 Germany scrapped the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in June 
1941 and attacked the Soviet Union. Iran declared neutralit~· but refused to comply' 
7 Iranians have known their country as Iran for at least a thousand years. The name Persia is Illost 
probably a version of Pars, the ancient name of the province of Fars. For details of Germany's 
activities in Iran see Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, pp 1--15, 152. 
8 It once again changed name to British Petroleum in 1954 when operation began after the coup. 
British Petroleum was originally a subsidiary of the European Petroleum C Ilion of Bremen dis-
tributing Shell products in Britain. At the outbreak of the First World War, the British government 
announced it an enemy concern because of its German connections which put the Anglo-PerSian 
Oil Company in a position to buy it for 2,000,000 pounds. Iranians made a joke about the letters 
Band P on the petrol pumps. According to them, they stood for Benzineh Pars (petrol of Persia) 
than for British Petroleum! In Sweden. however, these letters stand for Blue Pumps. 
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with the Allied demand to expel German citizens. :\Iotiyated b~" Reza Shah's non-
cooperation the Allieds soon invaded Iran. );"ational unit~· established by Reza 
Shah proved to be a facade only. The army disintegrated in :2 days. Reza Shah 
abdicated and was sent to exile in South Africa. He died in 19-1-1. 
3.2 A New Political Scene 
The Anglo-Soviet invasion of 25 August 1941 marked the beginning of a period 
of unrest in the modern history of Iran. The Central Government was faced with 
several serious problems. These included Allied demands. the ,"acuum of power 
created by the abdication of Reza Shah, the collapse of the army in only two 
days and the internal power struggle which started almost immediatt>l~' after the 
invasion. As shown in Appendix A, in the first few ~'ears of the invasion tlwre 
were four government changes. Besides, Iran did not haye independence in foreign 
policy and had to resort to the policy of involving a third power to weaken the other 
two. In view of the Allied cooperation, this did not seem to be as easy as before. 
In the North, communist influence was progressing under thp Soviet occupation. 
In the South, certain tribes had assumed rule taking the advantage of the British 
occupation and the Trans-Iranian Railway was under American control. :\ new 
political environment had resulted from the invasion unknown in the histor~" of 
Iran. 
This new situation resulted in the formation of new political forces which 
continued until the collapse of Mosaddegh in 1953. The 19-12 Tri-partite Treaty 
regulated the Allied occupation and there was soon to be elections, although rigged, 
which eventually dragged Iranians into a unique period of pluralistic politics for 
which they had no experience as democracy had no background in Iran. \\"ith 
68 
few exceptions, Iran had always been ruled by despots who recognised almost no 
limits to their power. An example of weakness of democrac~' is the short period 
of parliamentary rule following the Constitutional ~IO\'ement of 1906 which was 
suppressed by Reza Shah. 
The structure of power under Reza Shah did not change considerably because 
the 13th Majles elected under Reza Shah was controlled by pro-Shah deputies. It 
was only in January 1946 when the Majles acquired a say in electing the prime 
minister. Even in the 14th Majles faction rather than part~· dominated with the 
exception of the Tudeh deputies who voted as a unit. A glance at Appendix ~-\. 
shows that like early 1910's prime ministers came from a traditional ruling class 
who took turns in office. The government did not appear to have much meaning 
to the nomads or peasants who would have benefited from reforms. To them 
government was a nuisance demanding tax and soldiers .9 
In the 1940's Iran faced several serious problems and crises which had resulted 
from the occupation. In this category are parliamentar~' rule, the collapse of the 
economy, the 1944 oil crisis, confrontation in Azarbaijan which turned all Iranian 
problem into an international one, the progress of communism and the Tudeh 
Party, domestic struggle between forces which appeared in the political scene of 
Iran, the application of the policy of "movazeneh" b~' monarchists, rebellion of the 
tribes in Fars, and the struggle between Shia clergy and secularists. The economic 
problem worsened at the end of the war. Industry had received more attention than 
agriculture. The state-run factories were inefficient and less than 1 per cent of the 
population was employed in manufacturing. The Tudeh Party had taken advant age 
9 Lambton, pp 224. Lencowzski, Russia and ... , pp 167-192. 
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of the situation and made inroads among workers.10 ~Ian~' villagers migrated to 
cities especially to Tehran. They had benefited little from the industrialisation 
and their standard of life had declined. ll The public was dissatisfied over the low 
standard of living. 
The 1940's also witnessed continuous Soviet threat to Iranian integrity. ~Ios('ow 
had no troops in Iran after May 1946 and unlike Eastern Europe. the Iranian Com-
munist Party was weak. From the constitutional point of view. the 1940's was a 
period when the country passed from early 1920's into earl~' 1950's without direc-
tion. 
3.3 Mosaddegh and Kashani 
There were a number of politicians who shaped the t'Y('llts of the 1940·s. One 
such politician was Mosaddegh, whose strong anti-British feelings stirred up public 
sentiment to the extent that it may be claimed that the oil nationalisation was an 
expansion of his nationalism. In the 1940's personalities could not be separated 
from the political events. It is, therefore, important to study the character of 
Mosaddegh in details as it was the trust and support placed on him by the nation, 
which enabled the nationalists to acquire a political standing of such importance 
to allow oil nationalisation to take place. Born in 1882 in a wealthy family with 
blood ties with Qajar Dynasty, Mosaddegh enjoyed a life of privileges denied to 
the majority of ordinary Iranians. He was twelve when his father who was in 
charge of the Finances of the province of Khorasan died. He received the title of 
Mosaddeghos-Saltaneh from Naser-eddin Shah and. according to Qajar customs. 
was given his father's job in 1896 which he held for the next 10 ~·ears. He eventuall~' 
10 Bharier, pp 49 67 170-178. 
11 Wilber, pp 100. 
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had to give up his title in 1925 when Qajar titles were abolished in fayour of family 
surnames. 12 
During this period of 10 years, Mosaddegh looked after his easy-gained fortune 
which he had inherited from his father, but in 1902 and because of his interest in 
politics, he enrolled at the School of Political Sciences in Tehran and since he "'as 
busy daytime, took lessons in the evenings. He was politicall~' acti\"e in the 1900's 
through the membership of political groups which had formed through gatherings 
of local people and was for a time deputy leader of "Majma Ensaniat" (Humanist 
Society). In 1906 and according to the first Constitution. the six different classes 
of the society were given a right to elect their deputies to the First ~Iajles, he was 
elected by the aristocracy as their deputy from Esfehan. He had chosen Esfehan 
because his wife owned land there and he was well aquatinted with the people of 
Esfehan. At about this time it has also been reported that he became a freemason. 13 
The young Mosaddeghos-Saltaneh was, however, unable to take up his seat 
because he did not satisfy the minimum age requirements of 30. His credentials 
were rejected because another deputy proved that only 26 ~"pars had lapsed since 
the death of the first husband of Mosaddegh's mother! The controY('rsy surounding 
his age came to his help some 43 years later when during the 16th Nlajles elections, 
opponents attempted to exclude him by arguing that he was over 70. 
The Constitutional Government did not last very long for Majles was raided 
by pro-Shah cossacks in 1908. The newly elected parliament collapsed. Not being 
able to have an active part in politics, Mosaddegh then went to France for furt her 
12 The next few pages containing Mosaddegh's biography have been mainly translated from Afshar, 
Mosaddegh's Memoir. 
13 Keddie (1983), pp 104. 
71 
education but had to return to Iran a year later. because he had been afflicted 
with a nervous disorder, which remained with him to the end of his life and ,,"as 
the cause of his fainting and occasional abrupt behaviour. He returned to Europe 
in 1911 to study law at Neuchatel in Switzerland and obtained a doctorate in 
Law writing his thesis on the subject of Ie testament en droit musulman. He also 
obtained Swiss nationality to enable him to work, but after few months working 
as a lawyer, decided to return to Iran and coincidentally arrived in Tehran only 
< • 
one day before the First World War was declared! 
Between 1914 and 1919, Dr Mosaddeghos-Saltaneh lived an ordinary life and 
kept himself busy with farming as well as teaching law at the School of Political 
Sciences in Tehran. He wrote a textbook Procedural Order in Civil Courts and 
Capitulation and Iran which was resented by the British Legation. In 1922, when 
Mosaddegh was the Governor of Azarbaijan, Soviet Consulate requested the release 
of a Soviet citizen disputing that he could not have been arrested without the 
consent of the Consulate. Mosaddegh was appalled at the idea of capitulation and 
opposed the Consul. The capitulation had actually been cancelled under the 1921 
Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship. During this period, i\losaddegh was politicall~' 
active and joined Etedal Party (Moderates) and later on Democrates through which 
he fought the forces of anti-constitutionalism. His first political job was in 1915, 
during the premiership of Einod-dowleh, when he was elected by the 3rd Majles as 
a member of the Finance Committee to supervise the affairs of the Ministry. Later 
on, in 1917, he was actually made the Deputy Minister of Finance and went so far 
as prosecuting prominent individuals for corrupt practices. He held this post for 
14 months and resigned. 14 
14 Mosaddegh, Mosaddegh's Memoir, pp 182. 
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Britain took advantage of Russia's political weakness during the 1917 Reyolu-
tion by making the proposal known as the 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty to turn Iran 
into a British Protectorate. Mosaddegh had noticed that Britain's main concern 
was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company whose role in supplying British :\ a\'y during 
the war was evident. This was the first time that ~Iosaddegh came across the 
oil issue and together with a number of Iranians, decided to hold a meeting in a 
mosque. They were dispersed by the authority and some leading individuals were 
sent to exile. 15 When the pro-British cabinet ofVusugh came to power in July 1918. 
Mosaddegh took the opportunity to return to Switzerland to visit his children and 
with the help of Iranians, established Comite de la Resistance propagating against 
the treaty. In September 1926, when Mosaddegh was a depllt~· in the 6th l\Iajles. 
he made a historic speech against the treaty and accused politicians involved of 
corruption and incompetence. One such politician was l\osratod-Dm:vleh, l\Iosad-
degh's brother-in-law, but it did not stop Mosaddegh from mentioning him hy 
name. 
In 1920, Mosaddegh was still in Switzerland when the cabinet changed and he 
was offered the post of the Minister of Justice but the British Legation, aware of 
his nationalist feelings, criticised him by asking if a degree in law was enough for 
the post. In October 1920, Mosaddegh returned to Iran by sea and on the way 
to Tehran, in Shiraz, he was made the Governor of Fars instead of the Minister 
of Justice. This was not unusual at this period of Iranian history. Mosaddegh ac-
quired a good reputation in Fars for providing secc16 Nlajor Meade, British Consul 
in Shiraz described him as a "scrupulously honest" man. Mosaddegh was friendly , 
with the commander of the South Persian Rifles, Colonel Fraser, a friendship which 
15 Mosaddegh, Historic Speeches, pp 60. 
16 Mosaddegh, Mosaddegh's Memoir, pp 209. 
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was taken as evidence by the Shah. some 40 years lateL for him being a British 
agent. 17 
In February 1921, Britain, unsuccessful with its 1919 proposal, arranged for 
a coup which brought Reza Khan to power. Mosaddegh refused to recognise the 
new cabinet and resigned in March 1921. It is not clear whether he opposed the 
new prime minister or the person of Reza Khan. If the latter is true it is inter-
esting to know that in June 1921, he accepted the post of the :\Iinister of Finance 
in Ghavam's cabinet in which Reza Khan was the ?\Iinister of \Var. Hmvever. 
the Russians congratulated Mosaddegh for his opposition to the British-supported 
COUp.18 
There are two interesting events during Mosaddegh's post of the Minister of 
Finance. First, he refused to take office until Armitage-Smith, Assistant Secret ;U~· 
of the British Treasury who had been employed by Iran under the 1919 Anglo-
Persian Treaty, was removed from the Ministry of Finance. Armitage-Smith was 
a powerful man who screened the staff of Anglo-Persian Oil Company and nego-
tiated loans to the Government from the special Oil Companis funds through 
the Imperial Bank of Persia. The removal of Armitage-Smith in October 1921. 
is an indication of Mosaddegh's nationalist feelings and his opposition to foreign 
dominion. Secondly, for the first time in Iranian history, Mosaddegh proposed a 
balanced budget to the Majles which was an important measure to reduce foreign 
influence by reducing the Government's dependence on borrowing. 
Mosaddegh's clean up of the Ministry of Finance and his opposition to an 
increase of the Shah's income without ratification by the Majles was noticed hy 
17 Pahlavi, Mission for my Country, pp 65. 
18 Lenczowski, Russia and ... , pp 65. 
Sir Percy Loraine who wrote to Lord Curzon that he could not be accused "of eeer 
having taken a penny"19 which was very unusual of Iranian politicians at that time. 
His clash with Reza Khan who had demanded further paYments for the ~Iinistrv 
- -
of War is also another example. Mosaddegh:s refusal to work under Reza Khan 
continued even after Reza Khan was enthroned in 1925. He personally offered 
Mosaddegh a cabinet post but Mosaddegh declined. suspecting that the offer "'as 
to discredit him. He had the same suspicion in June 1944 when the new Shah 
offered him premiership and even later on, when after his historic speech on the 29 
October 1944, deputies gave a "straw vote" for his premiership. Again, he declined 
fearing that that was a plot to oust him from politics. 
Mosaddegh did not have a ministerial post for about a ~'ear until the next 
prime minister appointed him as Foreign Minister in June 1923 during which he 
collided with the British Legation over British occupation of the islands of Abu 
Musa and Shaikh Shoaib in the Persian Gulf. In December, cabinet fell and Rpza 
Khan became prime minister. Mosaddegh was not prepared to work under him 
and resigned. This resignation was the end of Mosaddegh's political career in the 
Government which had begun in 1920. Mosaddegh was never again to hold office 
until 1951 when the 16th Majles elected him as the prime minister. 
In 1924, Mosaddegh was elected to the 5th Majles and for the next four years 
won the reputation of an independent speaker. His peak performance was his 
speech against the Trans-Iranian Railway being constructed from the south to 
the north, arguing that this was a British attempt to prepare a plan for military 
advance towards the Soviet Union. He believed that a railway from Turkey to 
19 PRO FO 371 E6588 Loraine to Curzon 7 May 1922. 
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British India, was more to the benefit of Iranian trade. 20 ~losaddegh was once 
again elected to the Majles in 1926 when elections were relatively free in Tehran 
and the regime was tolerant of the few opposition deputies such as ~losaddegh and 
Modarres. In 1928, the election rigging was so complete that no opposition figure 
was elected. Mosaddegh and many others such as Kashani. Dashti. Ghayam alld 
Bahar chose to quit politics. He kept himself busy with farming in his village of 
Ahmad-abad in Savaj-bolagh about 70 miles to the "Test of Tehran. He did not 
mix with many people and only left the country once in 1936 when he travelled to 
Germany for medical treatment. 
Mosaddegh was an ageing man of 58 when in June 1940 and apparentl~' for no 
good reason, he was arrested and remained in exile. 21 The onl~' explanation for 
his arrest has been presented by the Shah who claimed that he was arrested for 
espionage. 22 Whilst in detention, he several times attempted suicide and because 
of his medical condition, in December 1940, was allowed to spend the rest of his 
detention under house arrest in Ahmad-abad to be released in 19--11 when Iran was 
invaded by the Allied Forces. He was reluctant to return to politics and sta~'('d 
in Ahmad-abad until 1943 when people of Tehran elected him, in his absence, 
as their First Deputy to the 14th Majles. The Shah delayed the opening of the 
M:ajles hoping that he could get Mosaddegh out of the f\Iajles by offering him the 
premiership. Mosaddegh accepted the offer on the condition that he would return 
to Majles if cabinet fell, but since this was not agreed upon, he declined. 
20 Mosaddegh, Historic Speeches, pp 150. Perhaps so but it provided vital means to assist the Sm'id 
Union against the Nazi Germany. 
21 On the morning of Mosadegh's arrest his 19 year old daughter, Khadijeh, arose in a trallce and r~n 
to the door to see her father. She never recovered from the trance and spent the rest of her hft' III 
nursing homes in Iran and Switzerland. 
22 Pahlavi, Answer to History, pp 71. 
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The 14th Majles was the first relatively freely-elected ~Iajles for oyer 20 yt'ar~. 
Mosaddegh was out of politics for about 15 years. ~ow it was time to make an 
impact on the Majles. Mosaddegh did very well when he made a speech on :29 
October 1944 against granting oil concessions. Deputies gave a ··straw votF·· for 
his premiership. It happened again over his bill of 2 December 19-1-1 forbidding 
negotiation or granting oil concessions until the end of the war and the policy of 
"passive balance". 23 
However, Ghavam's rigging of the next election was so complete that ~losad-
degh was excluded from the 15th Majles. Nevertheless, he was practically leading 
the nationalists since the oil crisis of 1944 and had a basis of power that no other 
Iranian leader had in the 1940's. An example of this is l\Iosaddegh·s guidance of 
his supporters in the 15th Majles and his control over parliamentar.\" procedures, 
and although a man in his 60's, he was loved b~· young intellectuals. The~r admired 
him for his long-standing campaign against inherited privilege, although he was 
privileged, and his determination to rid the countr~' from foreign influence. 
The Tehran elections for the 16th Majles had been rigged. l\losaddegh and a 
number of national front supporters made a complaint to the Shah. It was this 
complaint which marked the beginning of the rise of ~lasaddegh as a nationalist 
leader and prepared the way for the nationalisation of the oil industry. A. group of 
400 nationalists took refuge in the Shah's Palace in protest at election rigging but 
they dispersed as their complaint got nowhere. On 14 October 1949, a group of:20 
leading nationalists including Mosaddegh, took refuge in the Palace and demanded 
an inquiry. This was in accordance with the Iranian custom of bast. This group of 
2:~ Policy of movazeneh was based on granting concessions to both sides t~ satisfy t.heir greed. Passiw 
balance, however, forbid granting concessions to either side. This pollC~· had first been presented 
to the 5th Majles of 1926 by Modarres. 
, , 
nationalists are the ones who formed the National Front. They dispersed when the 
Shah promised to make an inquiry.24 In countries like Iran public expectation ,"as 
that the inquiry was to be a whitewash, for the man behind the scene was Hazhir. 
Minister of Court, but politics in Iran has always been full of surprises. Hazhir 
was assassinated by Fadayian Eslam (Devotees of Islam) on the -1 ); ovember 19-19 
and died a day later. 
Subsequently, the election in Tehran was announced invalid. The main issue 
at the new election was oil and settlement of negotiations for better terms for 
Iran. As usual elections took some time but by February 1950 when the 16th 
Majles opened, seven leading figures had been elected amongst them !\Iosaddegh 
and Kashani who was the most active moll a of 1940~s. The results were \'er~' 
obvious. The Shah had made the same mistake that !\ aser-eddin Shah made in 
the late 1880's by inviting Seyyed Jamal-eddin to Iran. 2c, \Yhether pro-Shah people 
thought a minor victory for opposition would not endanger his rule as the majorit~· 
of deputies were pro-regime, or he had to put his house in order to secure American 
loans (for he made a trip to Washington and London in November 19-19) made no 
difference. Nationalists now had a forum in the Majles to seek the leadership of 
the urban middle class.26 
Another important character of 1940's was Kashani whose relationship with 
Mosaddegh is of great relevance to this study. In studying the political events of 
the 1940's especially those in direct relation to the oil nationalisation, it is also 
24 The interpretation of the British Embassy officials is of interest. \'alentine Lawford, the Charge 
d' Affaires, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office saying that the r~al reason was that :'-.losaddegh 
was afraid of not being elected and complained in advance (The TImes, 17 ()ctober 1949). 
25 In his last trip to Europe, Naser-eddin Shah was fascinated by Jamal-eddin's ideas for reform and 
invited him to Iran. However, the Shah resented the speeches made by .1amal-eddm and deported 
him from Iran. 
26 For an American view of Mosaddegh see Dorman, Chapter 2. 
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important to investigate the relationship between )'Iosaddegh and Kashani, it~ 
development and the causes for its break-up. Born in 1885 in a religious family. 
Kashani moved to Iraq with his father at the age of 15 and because of his father's 
activities became involved in anti-British struggle. Kashani's father eventuall~' lost 
his life during a siege to Kutol-emareh and a few years later, he himself had to flee 
to Iran because of his leading part in disturbances in the Iraqi cities which resulted 
in a death sentence being passed on him by the British authorities. The return of 
Kashani to Iran in 1921 coincided with the rise of Reza Khan to power. 
As a Majles deputy, Kashani originally had a good relationship with Reza Shah 
but preferred private life to politics by holding home gatherings and teaching his 
followers theology and discussing social and political issues. His line of thinking 
was formed around the traditional framework of the Shia thought influenced by 
new ideas imported from the West. He did not oppose monarchy and was prepared 
to cooperate if his religious demands had been met. vYhen Reza Shah fell in 19-11, 
Kashani's political life began with his cooperation with Germans. Reza Shah had 
turned to Germany in 1930's and because of that a large number of Germans lived 
in Iran when Allied Forces invaded the country. Although the~' were expelled, 
German intelligence services survived and Kashani was in touch with them. He 
was arrested on 17 June 1942 and sent to internal exile and was not released until 
the end of the war. 27 
After his release he returned to Tehran and resumed political life. In the earl~' 
months of 1945, Navab-Safavi established Fadayian Eslam. He was born in 1923 to 
a religious family who claimed to be the descendants of Safayi D~·nasty. Fadayian 
attracted young men with a religious background and it has been reported t hat in 
27 Jami, pp 69. 
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1951 their membership reached several thousands.::!" \"ayab-Safa"i was executed 
in 1956. Kashani was closely associated with Fadayian Eslam. Late 1945. Prime 
Minister Hakimi introduced the Press Bill to the ?\Iajles to restrict press freedom. 
Kashani fiercely opposed the bill which caused considerable unrest and led to the 
fall of Hakimi in January 1946 and the premiership of Ghm'am. The fall of Hakimi 
was the beginning of an era in which Majles became the focal point of the Iranian 
politics and gained control over the selection of the Prime l\Iinister. 
In summer 1946, another stage in the political life of Kashani began with 
his opposition to the idea of a Senate which had been suggested to the Shah b~' 
Ghavam. Kashani staged a campaign against Ghavam and was subsequently sent 
to internal exile until the fall of Ghavam in December 1947. He was elected in 
1947 as a deputy and whilst in the Majles he was associated with Fadaian-Eslam 
(Devotees of Islam) under the leadership of Ghanat-abadi. 29 but an attempt on the 
Shah's life by Fadaian on 4 February 1949 gave the Government the opportunity to 
outlaw Fadaian Eslam and arrest Kashani who was exiled to Turkey. Kashani was 
lucky when his plane, on the way to Ankara, stopped at Beirut and he managed 
to acquire political asylum! 
New elections for the 16th Majles were held in autumn 1949. Kashani was 
in exile but his popularity amongst mollas was such that in the new elections, he 
was elected as a deputy for Tehran. Massive demonstrations for his return wpre 
arranged by his supporters. National Front welcomed his return and Mosaddegh 
and a cleric, Behbehani, prepared the public for his return. Kashani returned to 
28 Khandaniha, 20 Ordibehesht 1330, (10 May 1951), 24 Ordibehesht 1330 (1-1 i\Iay 1951). 
29 Also known as tattoo Shams. He was a street fighter but wore cleric robes too and wa~ the leader 
of the Jamiate Mosalmanane Mojahed (Association of Moslem l\Iojaheds). He had contacts with 
monarchists and was appointed a Majles deputy' after the coup of 1953. 
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Tehran in June 1950 and was warmly received by the clergy as well as nationali~ts. 
All Tehran had been mobilised on the day he returned. The clergy called on the 
public to liberate Iran from foreign influence and corruption.30 
The coalition of clergy and nationalists in the 16th :\lajles was remarkable as 
clergy provided them with religious justification. Khonsari. another molla, issued 
a decree to the effect that nationalisation of oil was in full harmony with principles 
of Islam. Others asked people to join Kashani. It is explained in Chapter 5 that 
the Court and the Prime Minister Razmara were, however: against the idea and 
it was obvious that nationalisation would not be possible as long as Razmara 
was in power. The Fadayian found an easy solution to this. 1\ m"ab-SafaYi, their 
leader, told United Press correspondent on 20 May 1951 that ~'it took two ounces 
of gunpowder to force patriotism out of our Chamber of Deputies". 31 Razmara was 
assassinated on 7 March by Fadayian and Majles ratified the bill, but the Shah 
appointed a pro-Western politician, Hosein Ala, as the Prime I\Iinister and the 
government did not respond to oil nationalisation as expected. 32 
The National Front composed of traditional and modern middle class. The 
traditionals were clergy and Bazari elements. The modern ones were secular and 
socialists. Obviously, traditionals were scattered around the countr~" in urball 
areas but the moderns were mainly in Tehran, Tabriz, Esfehan and Mashad. The 
opposition to the Government was small but intense. In the 16th Majles, there 
were only eight National Front deputies. Ala resigned on 2, April. The Shah was 
about to appoint Seyyed Zia as the Prime Minister, when both the J'dajles and the 
30 Bakhtareh-Emruz, 15 Khordad 1329 (5 June 1950). 
31 Payne, pp 18. 
32 Kashani personally received the assassin and called him the Saviour of the Kation (Nimruz. 23 
Khordad 1376, (13 June 1997). 
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Senate chose Mosaddegh as their candidate. 
It has to be appreciated that the premiership of ~vIosaddegh and en'll hi~ 
election to the 16th Majles would not have been possible without the support of 
Kashani who was leading the clergy. Certain parts of the societ~' were more willing 
to follow their beloved molla than a Western-educated leader who was dressed like 
a European. The support of Kashani for Mosaddegh had begun in 19-19 during 
the elections for the 16th Majles and was of paramount importance. In April 
1950, for instance, the Tudeh Party was about to take advantage of the situation 
by staging oil strikes but Kashani intervened and invited the nation to cooperate 
with Mosaddegh. 
However, minor differences between Mosaddegh and Kashani df'\'eloped and led 
to open confrontation. The confrontation was not unexpected. Kashani considered 
himself a follower of Seyyed Jamal-eddin, the author of the idea of "taghrib~' or Pan-
Islamism and believed in an Islamic government. On the other hand, Mosaddegh's 
Western education gave him the idea of secularism and parliamentar~' rule. It \\'as 
obvious from the beginning that they were on a collision course. But both men 
were aware of the sensitivity of the situation. Oil revenues had been stopped and 
Iranian economy began to feel the effects. The Government had taken measures 
to increase the traditional exports and decrease the imports but eventually they 
had to issue bonds and appeal to people for help. Kashani once again assisted 
Mosaddegh by inviting people to support the government. 
The elections for the 17th Majles were held in April 1952 and not surpns-
ingly 50 out of 70 deputies turned out to be from clerical groups. The efforts of 
Kashani had resulted in the growth of the power of clergy. In Jul~'. T\Iosaddegh 
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was appointed as the Prime Minister but this time he demanded the :'Iinistr~· of 
War whose choice was that of the Shah. The Shah's refusal resulted in :\Iosad-
degh's resignation and again it was Kashani who came to help and organised mob 
demonstrations in his support. The efforts of Kashani was once again rewarded. 
Mosaddegh returned as the Prime Minister and Kashani became the Speaker of 
the Majles early August 1952. 
3.4 Parties an Factions 
The 1940's also witnessed the formation of many political parties. \\"ith the fall 
of Reza Shah and the political openness created b~' the invasion, the urge towards 
political expression was strong. After some 15 years of non-party rule there was 
a flood of new parties. 33 The formation of political parties in Iran dates back 
to early 1900's when political and social groups were formed through gatherings 
of local people. The activities of the political groups intensified after the 1906 
Constitutional Revolution but with the enthronement of Reza Khan in 1925, this 
phase of the Iranian democracy ended. The sudden formation of parties in the 
early 1940's, therefore, did not have a tradition to rel~' on. 
Most political parties were unimportant, but one well-organised party. the 
Tudeh Party, emerged at the very early stage in September 19--11, onl~' one month 
after the invasion. The Tudeh Party was formed b~' a group of political prisoners 
known as the fifty-three who were imprisoned in 1937 for communist activities. 
Some of them were communists but most were liberal intellectuals. 34 The proper-
tied class refused to support them as revolutionaries who would destro~' propert~· 
33 For a description of political openness of this period of the Iranian history see Eilweil-Suttoll. 
political ... , pp 45-62. 
34 Etelat, 23 Mehr 1321 (15 October 1941). The most prominent member of this group \V,L" Arani. 
Thdeh propagandists must have exaggerated about the importance of the others. 
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rights. The peasants also showed apathy for religious reasons. Consequent l~·. 
they came to rely upon Moscow and the cover provided by the Red Arm,' in the 
~ . 
North. 35 The Tudeh was popular in the beginning and several of their candidates 
were elected to the 14th Majles. The actiyities of the Tudeh Part~· is of importance 
with regard to the confrontation in Azarbaijan as it was the only part~· allowed to 
operate in the north under the Soviet occupation. 
The Democrats of Azarbaijan Party founded III 1945 could not haye been 
separated from the Tudeh Party. In 1944, the Tudeh Party supported Kaytaradze 
strongly, an obvious example of their obedience to r"lloscow. In 1946 and in an 
attempt to appease Stalin, Premier Ghavam lifted some restrictions on Tudeh 
and formed a coalition cabinet with them. The Party suffered a split in 1948 
followed by a formal ban in February 1949 when they were accused of involvement 
in the attempt on the Shah's life. According to the Tudeh, the oil nationalisation 
was the same as replacing British interest with that of America. In 1950, the~' 
called Mosaddegh's National Front created by imperialism to decei"e people. JG 
The formation of parties in 1943 was intense due to the fact that the 13th Majles, 
which had been elected under Reza Shah, expired. The elections for the 14th 
Majles in autumn 1943 was an opportunity to get rid of the old gangs, but in 194-1 
many parties either ceased or suspended activity. 
A year later, Mellun Iran Party (Nationalists) was formed and had the Shah's 
backing perhaps because it was largely made up of lumpens or in Iranian terms 
chaghu-kesh meaning knife stabber ! The most important parties of this year were 
Tudeh (masses), Mardom (people), Mihan (motherland), Iran. Edalat (justice) and 
35 Kirk, pp 469. 
36 Besuye Ayandeh, 12 Dei 1328 (2 January 1950). 
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Eradeh-Melli. 37 Only two parties were known to haye a faction in the ~Iajles. The 
Tudeh, which proved by late 1944 to be a Soviet toy. and Eradeh-~Ielli which had 
close connections with Britain. Iranian students trained in the "'est returned to 
Iran to enter the administration but they were not prepared to keep out of politics. 
A group of them set up the Iran Party which was mainly composed of technocrats. 
The party, like many others, was opposed to foreign influence but was sympathetic 
towards the Soviet Union! Amongst prominent leaders ,,,ere Saleh, Sanjabi and 
Hasibi. Hasibi was an engineer whose career until 1944 was purely professional. 
He was a·top student in the Darol-funun and studied mining in Paris. He spent 
two years travelling in Europe after graduation expanding his knowledge of mining 
and petroleum engineering. He became an oil expert for Iran Part," and took actiye 
part in the process of oil nationalisation. In 1952. he was elected a T\Iajles deput~·. 
Another prominent leader Saleh became Minister of Justice when Iran Part~· joined 
Ghavam's coalition cabinet with the Tudeh Party in 1946. 
Zahmatkeshan Party (Toilers) was set up when Baghai, a leading nationalist, 
joined Maleki and the bulk of the Tudeh splinters in 1948. A large number of 
workers and students joined the party. Baghai became their public political figure 
and Maleki, the theorist. Zahmatkeshan became the only party, before formation 
of the National Front in 1950, which could compete with the Tudeh. The party 
became known as the Third Force when Baghai left in 1952. 
However, not all the groups were cooperative with the Tudeh. A youth anti-
37 The word melli or mellium appears to have been introduced into the politics of Iran towards 
the end of the 19th century. Before that in Iranian literature mellat meant sect. At about the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906, it appears that mellat meant the nation as oppose t~ dowlat 
meaning the state or government. The problem still exists in translating such words as natlOna,hsm 
into Farsi. As an example, in Bank Melli Iran, melli has been used to mean natiOn~1 as oppose to 
the Imperial Bank although the bank is owned by the state ! The same problem ~s encounte~ed 
in English when we come across names such as the National Grid which has nothmg to do With 
nationalism. 
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Tudeh movement during the occupation called itself Pan-Iranist Party. It ,ya~ 
established in 1949 by Furuhar, a high school student, and Pezeshkpur, an under-
graduate! They denounced capitalists, mollas and ~larxists and demanded the 
return of Bahrain and the Caucasus. They continued activit~· until Furuhar split 
to form the Iranian People's Party, but the remainder supported the Shah even 
until 1978 ! Iranian Nazis also took part in the political activities through their 
National Socialist Workers Party of Iran, SUMKA. Thev ceased activitv after the v , 
American coup of August 1953. 
Edalat Party had a large representation of officials in its ranks but the fact 
that no political party of the early 1940's represented a real mass movement should 
be attributed to the fact that about 80 per cent of the Iranian population were 
peasants and politically passive. It is true that ideologically parties were not differ-
entiated and none on its own had much political influence but their existence proved 
that the Iranian educated were concerned to see democracy flourish although they 
themselves had not yet developed much comprehension of the principles of democ-
racy and its subsequent responsibilities. Political parties were an important part of 
the development of the Iranian democracy and encouraged independent thinking 
as most were nationalistic and many were hostile to foreign interference. 38 
3.5 The Iranian Press 
In the 1940's, the growth of the press was more intense than the formation 
of political parties. In the first two years of the invasion. 150 newspapers and 
periodicals appeared many of which were liquidated for lack of funds and many 
38 Formation of political parties and the role played by them took an ~candalou5 form tafter 1953. 
Mardom (People) Party was introduced to perform the role of a~ official .. opposition " After the 
riot of 5 June 1963, a new party, Iran Novin (New Iran) was estabhshed. \\ lth the Shah s approval 
Hasan Ali Mansour, leader of Iran Novin, became prime minister on 7 l\larch 1964. 
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suspended by the Government. The role of the press was important for the main 
reason that journalists came from a literate class and that the only other media. the 
radio was not widely used. Not surprisingly, Tehran had t he largest number of the 
press and in 1944-45 when political activities intensified. there were 50 newspapers 
and periodicals circulated in Tehran many of them were organs of political parties 
but the majority had no political affiliation. Running the papers was expensiye 
and needed revenues from advertising. In those da~'s merchants were not minded 
to advertise and publishers who could not afford to run their papers indepelldelltl~' 
had to resort to special practices such as blackmail and secret dealings. 39 
Papers normally accused individuals or groups of treason. The law was lenieIlt 
and libel suits would take several years to come to a hearing and longer for judge-
ment. A strange aspect of the Iranian press in those years was that although the 
government had the power to suspend them~ they would re-appear the yery next 
day under a different name. There were even "papers of convenience n for sale to 
the owners of those which had been suspended.40 The interest in the press and 
their large number eventually resulted in anarchy and on 24 December 1942, the 
Majles passed a law setting certain conditions for publication: llamel~' a universit~· 
degree and high moral qualifications for prospective editors. \Yith regard to the 
language, most papers were published in Farsi but there were papers in Arminian, 
Turkish and even Polish as there was a large Polish refugee community in Tehran. 
Foreign Legations had their own publications. The Soviets published Novosti 
Dnia and the British had their Tehran Daily News. In addition, the~' issned 
, 
l't' 11 I' sTIle ElIlbass.y bulletins and distributed them amongst po I lca y-aware ralllan . . 
39 For an account of Iranian press in the 1940's see Elwell-Sutton, Iranian Prl'~~ 
40 Elwell-Sutton, Iranian Press, pp 66. 
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publications were special for they were free from the Gm'ernment censorship and 
played an important role as a truthful source of information with regard to inter-
national developments. 
There is another interesting fact about the Iranian press of the 19--10·s. l~lltil 
late 1943, with the exception of communist press, political alignment amongst 
the press was not yet defined but by January 19--1--1 when the 1--1th ~lajles was 
opened and specially throughout the oil crisis of 19--14. a greater understanding 
of the oil issue was achieved. The growth of the Iranian press continued after 
the end of the war. In February 1946, Iran had 270 licensed publications with 
Tehran still having the largest number of 216. Howe\,er, t he problem of limi t ed 
and irregular circulation still existed. 41 Etelat was the largest. the oldest and the 
most prestigious paper of this period with a circulation of up to 30.000. In generaL 
one might comment that the majority of papers became mouthpi('ces for political 
groups to attack their opponents and were used as a means of retaliation although 
they were all critical of government too. Young who spent several years in Iran 
commented that "a considerable section of it is substantial and serious ... sinc(' 
papers are read in groups and opinions passed on by readers to illiterate friends". ·12 
3.6 The Majles 
The Iranian Majles was another political establishment which is of great rel-
evance to this study. In its traditional form, Majles has always existed in Iran as 
kings used to hold court in public. In its modern form: l\Iajles was established 
in 1906 when absolutism was replaced with Constitutionalism. Howe\,er, ~Ia.iles 
did not last very long as the new Shah raided the parliament with the backing 
41 Ibid, pp 65. 
4') . 0 
- Young, The Social Support ... , pp 13 . 
88 
of the Russian Cossacks. The Cossack Brigade had been established during the 
reign of Naser-eddin Shah with the help of the Russian officers. In one of his trips 
to Europe, Naser-eddin Shah was impressed with the discipline of the Russian 
Cossack and asked the Tsar if the Russian Government would est a blish a Cossack 
division in Iran. In future years the Cossacks became an instrument of aggression 
in Iran. The new Shah who was enthroned in 1906 had a good relationship "'ith 
the Russian Commander, Colonel Liakhov, and with his aid raided the ~Iajles. an 
event which resulted in the death of a number of deputies. but his reign did not 
last long. Azarbaijanis resisted the pro-Shah troops in Tabriz. freed the city and 
moved towards Tehran. 
It is important to notice the strong sense of nationalism amongst the .-1.zarbai-
janis as they did not declare independence nor they turned to the Ottoman Empire 
who were, like Azarbaijanis, of Turkish origin. A year later, Tehran was surrounded 
by Azarbaijanis and Bakhtiaris who had come to their help. The Shah abdicat <'d 
and sought refuge in the Russian Embassy together with his two sons. Ahmad 
Mirza and Mohamad Hasan Mirza. He was exiled to the port of Odesa and in-
tended to take both his sons with him but Constitutionalists took his eldest son to 
the Palace and enthroned him as Ahmad Shah ! He was only 12 years of age and 
was assisted by the 86 year old Prince Regent, Azadol-molk the Chief of the Qajar 
Tribe, until 1915. Ahmad Shah was only a mere figure and was ousted by Reza 
Khan in 1925. He died in Paris in 1931 at the age of 34. The idea of a republic 
had not yet developed amongst Iranians. 
Returning to the re-establishment of the Majles in 1909, democracy had no 
background in Iran and foreign intrigue was strong forcing the nationalists to close 
the parliament down in 1911 to avoid ratifying bills under foreign influence. The 
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Majles was not re-opened until The 1921 coup by Reza Shah was the beginning of 
a new phase of arbitrary rule in Iran. Under his regime: election rigging became 
governmental policy and at least since 1928 all deputies were nominated by the 
authority. The election rigging was so obvious and widespread that it became 
subject of a joke by Modarress, a leading religious figure who had opposed Reza 
Khan. He commented that he was prepared to accept that all those 1--1,000 people 
who voted for him in 1926 were too frightened to elect him again in 1928, but what 
happened to that one vote that he cast for himself! 
The fall of Reza Shah was the beginning of a new period of parliamentar~' rule 
in Iran but in the early 1940's personality conflicts and fraksiun (factions) were 
ruling the Majles as there was no parliamentary tradition to rel~' on. The first 
Majles of this period, the 13th Majles, had five fraksiuns and the 14th ?\Iajles had 
seven. Factionalism helped Iran maintaining its independence in that a small group 
of deputies, by refusing to turn up, could prevent a quorum which was necessary 
to ratify bills. In 1911, Constitutionalists closed the Majles down for six ~'ears in 
an attempt to prevent ratifying bills under foreign influence. In 1940's. however, 
factionalism did the same. 
The habit of preventing a quorum took an ugly form when early 1946, the 
Tudeh activists, in support of Ghavam who had gone to ?\loscow. spat on the 
deputies to keep them away from the Majles. The 1--1th Majles was the first freel~T­
elected Majles of 1940's and was the beginning of a period of considerable political 
expectation and was obviously the most active one. It passed some 80 bills. the 
most important of them were the Law of 2 December 19--1--1 and the law of 1:2 
October 1945 prohibiting the new elections. The l\1ajles was frequently engaged 
in heated debates. In November 1944, for instance, it took 1:2 days to dehate o\,('r 
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who to succeed Saed who had resigned during the oil crisis. E\·entually. Ba~'at wa~ 
elected with a 5 vote margin. One important characteristics of the way ~lajle~ 
functioned should be noticed. Although some deputies were keen on remoYing 
foreign influence, attaining independence for Iran in foreign politics. and debating 
popular issues, majority of deputies were monarchists or conservatiYe land-owners 
who had been elected either by election rigging or through personal influence. 
In such an atmosphere and perhaps because of the uncertainty over the political 
future of Iran, towards the end of the Majles period. the~r were reluctant to pass 
important bills. 
Bazar was also an import part of the Iran's political life of the 19-10·s. At least 
for 5 centuries bazar has been a centre of commerce in Iran. Bazar \\"as structurall~· 
a long and narrow two-storey building accommodating a large number of stalls. It 
offered the public a variety of goods of different brands obtained through a complex 
trade system both domestically and from abroad. A large number of Bazaris w(,re 
associated with the religious section of the society. Throughout the centuries they 
have been a centre of finance for the clergy and had a great impact on social 
reform. A very obvious example of this is their involvement in the Constitutional 
Movement of 1906. In 1953 they helped in opposing communism and the return 
of the Shah to power. 43 
3.7 A Frustrated Shah 
The Shah and some members of the Royal Family occupied a special place in 
the politics of Iran. Britain did not appear originally to be interested in the Shah. 
With the abdication of Reza Shah and in view of his hostility. Britain was more 
43 Roosevelt K, pp 71 186. 
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interested in the restoration of Qajar D~·nasty. The Foreign Office made C()lltact~ 
with Mohamad Hasan Mirza and his son Hamid ).Iirza. Ahmad Shah's nephe\\'. 
The 24 year old Hamid Mirza resided in England with his father and was seryin(1 
, .... 
with the Royal Mail Shipping Company as an indentured cadet. Oli\'er Han·e~·. the 
Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden has recorded the eyenb 
of the early September 1941. Eden met with Prince 1Iohamad Hasan ).Iirza and 
Hamid Mirza. Harold Nicholson, the Governor of the BBe who had sen'ed \\'ith 
the British Legation in Tehran in the 1920's, was called to adyise. In their meeting 
of the 13 September 1941 with Nicholson, it was found that Prince Hamid ~Iirza 
could not speak Farsi ! 
The British Ambassador in Tehran had advised against the proposals and the 
matter was not pursued further. 44 The reluctance on the part of Prince ?\lohamad 
Hasan Mirza and his inconsequent response, may suggest that both father and the 
son were not sure about the seriousness of the British proposal and preferred not 
to pursue the matter. Hamid Mirza returned to Iran in 1957 as an employee of the 
oil company and held different posts within the company until 1971 when he left 
Iran. During his stay in Iran he was arrested by Sawak for allegedly removing the 
Shah's picture from the office !45 
The Shah was not alone in his attempts to influence politics. His mother and 
his twin sister, Ashraf, were politically active up to the fall of 1Iosaddegh in 1953. 
Princess Ashraf, was the most politically active member of the Royal famil~·. Freed 
from the tyranny of her father, after the invasion of Iran she took her opportunity 
and obtained a divorce from her husband, Ali Ghavam. to whom she was married 
44 Wright, pp 213. 
45 Memories of Hamid Mirza have been published in Nimruz, r-Iehr to Azar 131~) (Autumn 1996). 
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by arrangement. She established relationships with influential politicians of the 
1940's and had close association with Razmara. Ashraf's influential people were 
known as "Ashraf's Gang". During his government~ )'Josaddegh tried to conyinct' 
the Shah to send his mother and sister abroad. 
The 1940's was a period of frustration for the Shah. Lacking his father'~ au-
thoritarian grip, he attempted to destabilise the fragile political s~·stem. Earl~' 
1948, he planned to dissolve the Majles and called for a Constitutional COn\Tn-
tion, but both Britain and America opposed the plan for it would cause unrest 
throughout the entire country, a threat to the British-owned oil industr~' and to 
the American-proposed seven-year Plan. 46 Ambassador Le Rougetel wrote about 
the Shah's inexperience and weakness of character. The Shah's interferenn' in 
politics was also subject of criticisms by Lance P~rman~ a Foreign Office expert on 
Iran who wrote "governmental institutions would work better if the Shah did lIot 
intrigue against his prime minister".47 Attlee described the Shah as "quite a good 
little fellow" who "got in the hands of corrupt, awkward gangs".48 
In pursuance of monarchists plan for economic aid, the Shah arrived in \Vash-
ington on 16 November 1949 and met Truman on 18 I\ovember. He desired quick 
economic and military assistance in substantial quantities, but he was reminded to 
give priority to economic and social developments. As an example of wrong polic~' 
he was reminded of National China and that he would wreck Iranian econom~T if 
he wanted to build up his army to compete with Moscow. The Shah was jealous 
of Turkey which had spent large sums on military' but still maintained internal 
46 FRUS 1948 Vol 5 pp 162-163, Shah's plan for the Constitution. 
H PRO FO 371/Persia 61990 24 July 1947. 
cl8 Williams, pp 176. 
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stability.
49
To make sure that the Shah would not return home empty-handed. 
a joint statement was released on 30 November reaffirming Tehran Declaration of 
1 December 1943 which promised economic aid to Iran. 
The Shah did not always have an easy relationship \yith prime ministers. Some 
prime ministers, like Furughi and Sohaily, were pro-Shah and were effectiYe bolstf'r-
ing his power. Some like Hakimi were respected figures but ineffectiye. Ghayam 
was the most independent prime minister of the 1940's. His premiership mllst haye 
taught the Shah a lesson to be careful as to whom he appointed prime minister. 
After the fall of Ghavam in December 1947, the Shah was determined to secure 
his position. The Shah had to wait until after 1953 to find obedient politicialls to 
carry out his will. One such politician was Alam who maintained a close associa-
tion with the Shah up to his last days and often lunched and dined toget her apart 
from regular telephone conversations. 50 
The early 1940's was a difficult period for the Shah as he was not at liberty 
to reign and rule. His books, although they are not reliable memoirs, indicate 
that he was confused as to how he wanted to perform. 51 In the earl~' years. he 
desperately needed the help of monarchists like Furughi and Soheil~·. Aftpr 1933. 
the Shah both reigned and ruled and added personal control over the oil p()l-
icy and foreign relations but still he needed the assistance of monarchists as he 
49 McGhee, Envoy to .. , pp 66-67. 
50 A member of aristocracy, he was appointed Governor of Sistan by Ghava~l in his mid-twentit:s 
He was Minister of Interior in 1950 but lost his position with the assassmatlO~ ~f ~mara m 
1951. He had various appointments between 1953 and 1962. In July 1962, Amllll reslgne~ a~ld 
Alam succeeded him. However with the Shah's approval, the leader of a new party, ~ran. Nonn. 
succeeded Alam in March 1964.' Soon later he was appointed as the President of pah~avl ~lll~>r~lt.\' 
in Shiraz but returned to Tehran in December 1966 as Minister of Court. He.su~red om eu h' ellll~ 
in his later years resigned in 1977 and died in April 1978. The only other pohtlCl~ m rfecpenbt
l
. IS~or) 
, h h Etemados saltaneh \'Imlster 0 u lCa lOll who enjoyed such a relationship with t e monarc was - , . 
in the court of Naser-eddin Shah. 
51 Pahlavi, Mission for My Country and Answer to History. 
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gradually became the centre point of Iranian politics and needed help to handle 
such a weight of business. The increase in the oil revenues after 19.53 enabled the 
Shah to implement the White Revolution or the Re"olution of the Shah and the 
People ! According to him the new generation of lranain people would achieve the 
Great Civilisation with a promise of a productive life in which many problems of 
the population would be eliminated. 52 
In 1947, tribes were stronger than in 1941. The Kurds were still powerfuL 
Bakhtiaris in the centre and Ghashghais in the South drove the army out of Fal's. 
Ghavam concluded an agreement with both of them. He offered them local control 
in return for support in the Majles. There was rivalry betweell the Shah and 
Ghavam. In retaliation for keeping the army out of politics in the South, the Shah 
took the initiatives for issuing tea and sugar licences to tribal chiefs in autumn 
1947. The struggle between the Shah and Ghavam carried 011 throughout the 
year. Ghavam was much older and experienced than the Shah and independ('llt. 
He opposed the expansion of the army and was reluctant to ask for American 
military aid. However, seeking a special position was not the A.merican policy in 
Iran in 1947. Washington, in the case of the lrano-Soviet Oil Dispute of 19.,17, had 
indicated the fact that Iran should be free to decide. 53 
The Shah appeared to have used Hekmat to get rid of Ghavam. Ghavam rigged 
52 The Shah's Great Civilisation was the extension of the White Revolution and had begun by t.he 
formation of Rastakhiz Party in 1976 under which all Iranians would enjoy .a degre~ .of SOCIal 
security unrivalled anywhere in the world! The Shah's goals were. beyond hiS ~ap~blhty. The 
vagueness surrounding his goals and his unpopularity with the natl~n resulted I.n disaster. An 
example is the administrative corruption and poor management "":hlch resulte~ m poor project. 
selection as projects were often selected for their impact and \"IndICatIOn prlIlCiple than for ~1Jl\ 
long-run objective. The steel mill in Isfahan was constructed With. :"Ioscow.'s. help for POh~IC~ 
reasons. The vast amount of funds was spent on the railway network 1Il recogllltlOn of Reza Shah. 
. . h I f d' t ork of feeder roads could have been original plan for railway, otherWise Wit ess un mg a ne w 
constructed to integrate farmers into national economy. 
53 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 938 958 960. 
95 
the 15th Majles election and had control over deputies through his Democrat Pan~·. 
Yet Hekmat managed to lead half of the deputies into opposition. Influenced b~' 
the Shah, he turned against Ghavam and voted, in December 1947. for the Shah'~ 
candidate Hakimi a former prime minister. 54 Hakimi~s government lasted for about 
six months and fell in June 1948 when Hazhir, a protege of Princess Ashraf. became 
prime minister. The nomination of Hazhir had provoked \'iolent demonstrations 
by the followers of Kashani. Hekmat, later on became the Speaker of the \Iajl('s 
and with expectation of the Shah's support abandoned Ghayam. The politics of 
1940's was filled with intrigues. 
In 1949, the Shah again attempted to buy combatant \\'papons from \\"ashing-
ton. America had to be careful not to alienate the Shah and for('(' him to go to the 
other side. The State Department offered 25,000,000 dollars in CTedit. The Shah 
was jealous of Turkey and Moscow spread the rumour that \Vashington had made 
a secret agreement with Turkey allowing them to annex Azarbaijan,55 
In 1949 there was an attempt on the Shah's life, On the -1 February, the 
Shah survived an attack at Tehran University and in the wake of the pro-Shah 
sentiments which resulted from the attempt, the Shah took the acl\'autage h~' 
proposing that he should have the power to dissolve the parliament! The Majles 
agreed with the Shah's plan for a Constitutional Convention. A Senate, puvisaged 
in the Constitution of 1906 but never established, was to become a reality, in which 
the Shah would appoint half the deputies. The choice of the \Iinister of \\"ar as 
well as the Minister of Court was that of the Shah. He was Commander-in-Chipf 
54 The fall of Ghavam marked the beginning of a period during which the Shah acquired a bettl'r 
P
olitical position through loyal prime ministers. For a description of these governments s{'c :\IZlIllI. t' . tl 'It he appeared to be a t \It',lt 
pp 185, 193-225. The government of Razmara was an excep lOn 10 I, 
to the Shah. 
55 FRUS 1949 Vol 6 pp 1668. 
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and through the Army could cont lIt' . . . ro e ec IOns III areas under mIlItary control. The 
pro-Shah forces had the power thro h P l' . d 1 ug 0 Ice an t l(' Army, to preyent the crowd~ 
around the Majles. The political situation was so unstable that eyen during the 
Korean war Ambassador Grady commented that there was a possibility t hat Iran 
could adopt a pro-Soviet stance. 56 This was Razmara's pmyer game. ~ot being ,\bl{:' 
to obtain American commitment, he pretended to haye shifted side. Iran siglwd 
a trade agreement with Moscow on 4 November 1950 and eased the restrictions 
against the Tudeh Party, 
The Shah disliked independent prime ministers but in April 19·-)1 and for the 
second time, he found himself to have little alternatiye except to appoint an in-
dependent prime minister. Mosaddegh was a leader of unprecedellted popularity. 
The Shah disliked, perhaps hated, Mosaddegh. The R.o~'al Court was illYolv{'d in 
a bitter hostility between 1951-53 over limiting th{:' Shah's power and the distri-
but ion of the Royal lands. The respect that Mosaddegh's name carried was such 
that the Shah remained obliged to publish vituperatiY(, attacks 011 him right up to 
his fall in 1979, ten years after the death of Mosaddegh. In 1965, all newspapprs 
refused to place a message of condolence in the obituary column. The Shah was 
always interested in bolstering his power through the arlll~': the subject of disputes 
with some of his prime ministers. The Shah's prime minist('rs of 19--10's W('I'(' all 
monarchists but only Ghavam was not keen on strengthening the Shah's position. 
Even after 1953 the Shah was not at liberty to reign and rule. After signing a 
bilateral agreement with Washington in 1959, relations with ~loscow deteriorated. 
The balance of payments deficit and inflation resulted from mismanagement of the 
economy. The downfall of Iraq's monarchy in July 1~):)8 and mounting tPIlsiollS 
56 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 569-587. 
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wi thin Turkey convinced W h' t 
as mg on to exert pressure on the Shah to introduce 
social reforms The so call d" h' I' '. 
, e w lte revo utlOn "'as the outcome of thi~. III 
pursuance of the Revolution of the Shah and the People .. -\mini. the amhassCldor 
to Washington, although distrusted by the Shah, was appointed prime minisTPL 
The Shah dissolved both Houses of the Parliament and all ministerial posts. apart 
from Foreign and Defence Ministries, were left to Amini's appointees, .-\mini had 
a row with the Shah over the budget for the army and resigned in Jul~' 1962. 
3.8 Moscow and Oil 
Returning to the politics of the 1940's, Moscow menaced Iran in 19-1-1, Tht' 
reason was not territorial expansion but oil com]wtition, The compptition for 
Iranian oil was actually started by the Iranians themseln's and wpnt on despite 
opposition by the American Ambassador in Tehran as well as .-\merican financial 
adviser, Millspaugh, who warned that it would jeopardise the allied relationship 
in Iran. The State Department supported both companies and in February 19-1L 
they informed Iran of their backing. The West appears to haye been satisfied with 
the situation as long as their interests in Iran were maintained. An example is t hpir 
backing of the puppet regimes in the north of Irall at ~Ioscow Foreign :'Iinist(,I" 
Conference in December 1945 if Khuzestan, where the British oil industry was 
based would also become autonomous! Britain and Russia had, in 1907, diyided , 
Iran into three parts, the British zone of influence, neighbouring British India, the 
Russian zone of influence which covered the north, and a neutral zone including 
Khuzestan. 57 When oil industry was established in Khuzestan, Britain signed a 
secret agreement with Russia in 1915 dividing Iran into two zones of influence. 
57 Browne,. Persian revolution, pp 150. 
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However, Britain despite its remarkable position in Khuzestan. was not Pd:-;-
sive. Representatives of the British Shell Oil arriyed in :\ovember 1943 to suryey 
Baluchestan followed by representatives of the Standard \'acuum in December and 
later on, by Sinclair Consolidated Oil and soon they presented the goyernment \\'ith 
their prospective oil concessions. Standard \"acuum was the first one To arriy(' in 
March 1944, Shell in May followed by Sinclair in June. ObYiously. ~loscow wa~ not 
prepared to remain silent. Soviets had a long history of intervention in the nort h 
of Iran and, in their view, there was strong justification for their anger. They had 
enjoyed a concession through their company Russo-Persian :\aphta in 1896. In 
1901, five northern provinces had been excluded in D'Arcy concession because of 
Russian influence. The 1921 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and Sovipt L'llion 
forbade Iran from granting old Czarist concessions to a third part~' and finall~' they 
had asked Iran for cooperation to develop Kavir Khurian oil resources as recent as 
30 August 1941, only 5 days after the invasion.58 
Moscow originally did not object to this development but simply reminded 
Iran of their zone of influence. This may be attributed to the fact that t he~' "'('l'(' 
already involved in illegal drillings in the north, 59 or ma~' be because originall~' 
only Baluchestan was considered for oil surveys. However. prime minister Saed 
announced in April 1944 that north of Iran was also open for negotiations, This was 
a turning point in internal politics of 1940's and suggests that Iranian st atesmen 
had, once again, resorted to the old Qajar policy of movazeneh. 60 
America had a good reputation in Iran until early 1950's and Iranian statesmen 
. d A . f help to offset British position. had, at several occaSIOns, requeste mencans or . 
58 Lenczowsky, Russia and .. " pp 170. 
59 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 107, 
60 For policy of movazeneh see pages 37 and 59. 
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The New York banker Morga Sh t . d' 
, n us er, arnve III 1910 to regularise the Iranian 
finances which were in chaos. President \Yilson had supported Iran against the 
1919 Anglo-Persian Treatv wh'ch t ' .. ~ 1 was an a tempt to turn Iran lIlto a Bntl~h pro-
tectorate. In 1941, Iran requested advisers for several ministries including Financ(' 
and Education, and by the end of 1943 there were 70 American aciyisl'rs in Iran, 
At about the same time American General Schwarzkopf \vas in Iran to head the 
Gendermeri. Many Iranian statesmen were conyinced that American assistance 
was needed and that is why on 4 May 1943 they conferred :\Iillspaugh necessary 
power to carry out financial and economic reforms. 
Meanwhile, Americans and Britishs were busy in \Yashington negotiating on'l' 
fu ture oil policies and reached an agreement on 8 August 1944 on t he oil of the 
Middle East although as far as Iran was concerned, the~' 1l('YPl' cooperated on the 
Iranian oil until oil was actually nationalised. f\loscow, howen>f, decided that it was 
time to act. In August, Tudeh Party opposed granting oil concessions to any foreign 
power and their deputy in the 14th Majles, Radmanesh, stated that if Iranians 
could build the Trans-Iranian Railway on their own, the~' should he abl(' to expl()it 
their oil reserves too. But opposition by a communist deput~' was not enough 
and in September, Moscow dispatched deputy Foreign Minister, Ka\'taradze, to 
Tehran. The aim of Kavtaradze visit to Tehran was formally discussing Serrman 
oil but in 1924, the concession had been confirmed by the Government and Kavir 
Khurian Oil Company was a legal company operating with no problem. 61 One 
interpretation supported by Millspaugh was that the real aim was to stop the 
West from gaining a better position in Iranian oil. Another interpretation ,,'as 
61 . d' 29 0 t ber 1944 and '2 December 19-1-1 For debates on this issue see MaJles procee mgs, c 0 
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that Soviets really wanted to take advantage of a politically weakened Iran and 
obtain an oil concession. 
Kavtaradze met with saed and demanded an oil concession in the five northern 
provinces. Despite Saed's promise to raise the issue \yith the cabineL Kavtaradze 
wanted a definite answer. He met with the Shah early October 19--1--1.62 The rough 
manner of Kavtaradze created enough opposition amongst nationalists for Saed 
government to announce, on 16 October 1944, that no oil concession would be 
granted until the end of the war. Saed himself stated that he had made up his 
mind early September and before the arrival of Kavtaradze, but that was a political 
lie. Saed was an experienced politician and had adopted a good oil policy by tying 
the oil to troop withdrawal. The real reason behind the refusal was that Iran 
had, once again, decided to involve American interest in Iran, to create a rival for 
Britain and the Soviet Union. 
The Tudeh Party ridiculed itself. In August, the~' opposed granting oil con-
cessions to foreigner powers. In October, they launched a campaign against the 
government and arrange for mob demonstrations in Tehran and Tabriz to demand 
resignation of Saed. Kavtaradze remained in Tehran for another two months. His 
aim was most probably to remove Saed. The American Ambassador announced 
his government's support for Iran's sovereignty over oil affairs. This introduced a 
new element to Soviet foreign policy, the fact that Britain and the United States 
supported Iran. Soviet agents arranged for mob demonstrations and Soviet soldiers 
appeared in front of Majles during anti-Saed demonstrations. Under extreme pres-
sure saed resigned on 10 November 1944.63 Bayat succeeded Saed but his policy 
62 Skrine, pp 225-230. 
63 PRO Fa 371/40242, Bullard to Fa, 10 November 1944. 
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remained the same. He announced that no oil concession would be granted until 
Iran was evacuated. 0 2 December Mosaddegh introduced a bill forbidding go\"-
ernment officials of negotiating oil concessions without the approval of the ~lajles. 
The bill was ratified the same day with 80 votes against 7. 64 Kavtaradze called 
the bill a great mistake and left Iran on 9 December. 
What happened in Iran in 1944 should be considered as a duel between idose-em' 
and the West over the oil and it should be noted that it was arranged by the Iranian 
statesmen themselves and may be considered as the early' of the cold war. It also 
had other consequences. Firstly, Tudeh Party which, until then, had been known 
as one of the many political parties, was ridiculed as a soviet toy. Secondly, oil 
became an issue for public debate. Thirdly, Mosaddegh who until then had only 
been known as a nationalist deputy, emerged as the author of the Oil Law and a 
nationalist hero. This was the first stage of the rise of Mosaddegh to the leadership 
of nationalists in 1950. 
3.9 Rejecting Moscow 
The oil issue again came up in 1946 during Ghavam's negotiation with Stalin 
over Soviet withdrawal. Ghavam rigged the 15th Majles election and had control 
over deputies through his Democrat Party. Yet by early 1948, Hekmat managed to 
lead half of the deputies into opposition. Hekmat, influenced by the Shah, turned 
against Ghavam and voted for the Shah's candidate Hakimi a former prime minis-
ter. Hakimi's government lasted for about six months and fell in June 1948 when 
Hazhir, a protege of Princess Ashraf, became prime minister. The nomination of 
Hazhir had provoked violent demonstrations by the followers of Kashani. Hekmat, 
64 PRO FO 371/40242, Bullard to FO, 4 December 1944. 
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later on became the Speaker of the parliament and with exception of the Shah's 
support abandoned Ghavam. The politics of 1940's was filled with intrigues. 
Ghavam was certainly the most experienced prime minister of 1940~s. He was 
a cabinet minister even before the Shah was born. Unlike I\Iosaddegh he had no 
democratic sentiments, but he served Iran in 1946 by negotiating with Stalin to 
give up his policy over Azarbaijan in exchange for the imaginary oil reserves of 
the North. There is yet no proof of this but in view of Ghavanl~s character as 
an old Qajar-style crafty politician, one forms the opinion that Ghavam actually 
managed to mislead Stalin.65 An example of Ghavam's craftiness is his treatment 
of Farrokh. Knowing that the province of Fars would be in chaos in the absence of 
Governor Farrokh, he summoned the Governor to Tehran. The Governor arrived 
to find out that Ghavam had left for Moscow the very same morning. 
Ghavam's idea was to keep the Britishs busy with unrest in Fars whilst he was 
negotiating with Stalin in Moscow. Ghavam's favouritism for the Tudeh caused 
concern in Washington and London although this was most probably a part of 
his power game. Britain was concerned over its oil interests and could not allow 
oil nationalisation. 66 On the American side, Ambassador Allen contacted Ghavam 
over the same issue many times but Ghavam claimed credit for restoring authority 
in Azarbaijan. 67 Ghavam's resignation in 1947 was the end of his political career 
although he served as prime minister for few days in 1951.68 
Moscow menaced Iran in 1946 by refusing to leave. However, their attempt 
65 With the collapse of the Soviet Union it might be possible to unearth documents revealing the 
details of Ghavam's negotiations with Stalin. 
66 FRUS 1946 Vol 7 pp 518. 
67 Rossow R, "The Battle of Azarbaijan", Middle East Journal, Vol 10, 1956, pp 26-27. 
68 Oneal, pp 108. 
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to secure an oil concession in the north had an important consequence in relation 
to the oil nationalisation as it stirred up public feelings. The continuing unrest in 
the north west of Iran in 1946 prevented the ~Iajles elections to be held. ~Ioscow 
was anxious to see Irano-Soviet Oil Concession ratified. \Yhen it was announced 
in Tehran that the elections would be held in January 19·ri~ \Yestern observers 
detected Moscow's impatience indicated to Iran in a diplomatic note although 
Iran denied it.69 The Tehran elections was to be held from 11 to 17 Januar:v but 
Ghavam's opponents believed that the elections would be rigged. On 12 JanuarYl 
Mosaddegh led a group of officials to the Shah's palace asking for a fair election. 
The Shah refused to meet them. The provincial elections were held later on and 
by the 21 February, the 15th Majles deputies had been elected with a majorit~· for 
Ghavam and 2 Tudeh deputies. The election results were vital as Ghavam had to 
face the Irano-Soviet oil issue in the Majles. 70 
The British position at this time was of great importance. In view of India's 
independence, anti-colonial aspirations of the third world countries and growth 
of the Iranian nationalism after the war, Britain must have suspected that oil 
nationalisation would be desired in Iran. Ambassador Le Rougetel told Ambas-
sador Allen that it would be inadvisable for Iran not to grant an oil concession to 
Moscow. This suggests that Britain was anxious to protect the Iranian oil industry 
by granting a similar oil concession to Moscow. This was not unusual for Britain 
as it had divided Iran with Moscow once in 1907 and again in 1915.71 At Moscow's 
Foreign Ministers Conference, they suggested autonomous northern republics in 
return for the recognition of the oil industry in Khuzestan. Allen was doubtful 
69 New York Times, 1 January 1947, pp 21. 
70 Jones, pp 58. 
71 See page 57. 
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and believed that the concession would result in l\1oscow's economic penetration 
in the area. He expressed a view that such a concession could be supervised by 
the United Nations.72 
On 25 February 1947, Acheson, presented his view of the situation in the .\"ear 
and Middle East. He believed that a communist victory in Greece would threaten 
Iran's independence and open avenues for Soviet expansion into Africa and Asia.':l 
At this time, Moscow exerted a great deal of pressure on Greece and Turkey 
but Truman's Doctrine of 12 March 1947 blocked l\1oscow in the area. Churchill 
believed that Moscow would give way as they were not prepared to go to war in 
1947. In his view, Soviet action in the area was to test the American reaction 
and that their action could be dealt with through the United Nations. 74 The 
Shah was pleased with the Truman's Doctrine and expressed desire for American 
military aid. He believed that Turkey had a large foreign trade exchange than Iran 
justifying aid to Iran. Washington, however, considered Iran to have oil revenues 
and only offered 25,000,000 dollar credit to purchase military supplies. 75 
In the Spring of 1947, Iranian Army began the process of tribal disarmament 
which resented the tribal chiefs. Knowing that the Shah disliked him, Ghavam 
decided to win tribal political support. The tribal leaders were invited to Tehran. 
Ghavam offered protection against the army in return for political support in the 
Majles. Ghavam appeared to be unwilling to offer Moscow the oil concession as 
in June 1947 he informed the British Ambassador that he might have to attack 
the oil company to be even-handed in rejecting Moscow. 76 This is supported by 
72 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 891-893. 
73 Acheson, Present at .... , pp 219. 
74 New York Times, 12 April 1947, pp l. 
75 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 901-904 916. 
76 PRO FO 371/62047, Le Rougetel to Foreign Office, 27 June 1947. 
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the single clause inserted in the law of 22 October 1947 asking the government to 
negotiate for better terms with the oil company. Gass described the single article 
in the hand of Iranian politicians as "a stick with which to belabour us··. ii Gass 
returned to Tehran in 1949 to conclude the Supplementary Agreement. 
The 1944 episode was to be repeated in 1947. Ghayam made arrangements with 
Stalin to offer an oil concession in the North in return for Troop withdrawal from 
the North. The concession was contingent on Majles approval. Ghavam expressed 
his worries to Ambassador Allen in the early summer 1947 over the prospect of 
a Majles approval of an oil concession to Moscow. He desired negotiations with 
Moscow for better terms but feared that Moscow would see this as a tactic to 
delay Majles approval and lead to a Soviet invasion of Iran. He asked Allen for 
American support in case of an invasion. 78 The Shah opened the 15th l\1ajles on 
17 July 1947 and emphasised important issues including the oil bill. Ambassador 
Sadchikov pressed Ghavam for the approval of the oil proposals. lvIoscow must 
have seen the oil proposal as an international agreement but Ghavam perhaps saw 
it obtained by intimidation bearing in mind that under Mosaddegh's Oil Law of 
2 December 1944, negotiations over oil issues with foreign powers were illegal as 
long as Iran remained occupied. 
Ghavam knew that negotiations itself would be a burning political topic in the 
Majles. In the summer 1947, the intelligence reports indicated Soviet formation 
near Iranian border but Secretary Marshall did not believe that a Soviet invasion 
would be imminent that summer. Marshall was in favour of military aid to Iran 
but not in excessive quantities as this would mount a Soviet propaganda barrage 
77 BP 9257, Gass reporting to Fraser from Tehran, 3 December 1947. 
78 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 913-914. 
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claiming that Iran had been turned into a base for future operations against the 
Soviet border. He believed that Iran should maintain a good relationship with all 
foreign powers. 79 
In February 1946, Stalin announced that he needed to double his oil production 
capacity. Domestic resources were insufficient to achieve his goal. 80 Sadchikoy 
continued pressing Ghavam for Majles ratification. He did not show much patience 
and it appeared that Moscow was anxious to obtain the same oil rights that Britain 
, 
had in Khuzestan. Allen saw this as a sign that Moscow did not believe that they 
would achieve an oil concession in Iran. 81 This should be taken as Allen's O\vn 
view as by the end of the August 1947, Washington took a firm view and believed 
that the Soviet oil concession would be the beginning of l\loscow's infiltration into 
Iran. Washington must have been worried about their oil industry in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. The loss of Iranian independence would be detrimental to American 
interests in the area. 
No promise was made to help Iran militarily should Iran be attacked. Wash-
ington, however, believed that in case the oil proposals were rejected, Iran should 
promise to arrange for future oil sales to Moscow at a fair world market price.82 
In Tehran opposition to the oil proposal was fierce. Ghavam delayed presenting 
the oil agreement to the Majles. Most probably he was worried about the conse-
quences of a rejection or ratification. Moscow would be resented if the oil proposal 
was rejected. Ghavam could not have seen the oil proposal ratified as he had no 
intention of granting an oil concession but only to secure Soviet withdrawal as he 
79 Ibid, pp 945-946 924-927. 
80 Caroe, pp 75-76. 
81 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 931-936. 
82 Ibid, pp 940. 
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stated later on to the Majles. 
Mosaddegh was not a deputy but he had great influence over parliamentar~· 
procedures. He accused Ghavam of breaking the law by negotiating oil whilst 
Iran was occupied in 1946.83 On 14 September 1947, Ghavam made a statement 
to the Majles emphasising that the government should haw' good relationship 
with all countries but they should not intervene in Iranian affairs. Ghavam must 
have meant Moscow. He expressed a desire to have a vote of confidence before 
presenting the Majles with the oil proposals. 84 The Majles was not ready to offer a 
vote of confidence until Ghavam expressed his views on the oil proposals to which 
he replied to individual deputies that he had not promised anything to ~Iosco\\' 
except to present the proposals to the Majles. On 28 September deputy Masudi 
made a long speech criticising Ghavam for failing to ensure that only Iranian capital 
and labour would be used in the exploitation of the northern oil. G havam and 90 
deputies left in protest. 85 
In Tehran there was suspicion as to the position of London and Washington. 
It appeared that Washington had adopted the British position to grant the conces-
sion. 86 To clarify the American position, Ambassador Allen made a speech before 
the Iran-America Society in Tehran emphasising that Washington would respect 
Iran's sovereignty and protect Iran from threat and intimidation. The British em-
bassy in Tehran confirmed that British position was the same. 87 As it seemed likely 
that the oil proposal would be rejected, the State Department studied Moscow's 
possible course of action. It was considered that Moscow might instigate a guer-
83 New York Times, 8 September 1947, pp 4. 
84 New York Times, 15 September 1947, pp l. 
85 New York Times, 29 September 1947, pp l. 
86 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 95l. 
87 Ibid, pp 953. 
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rilla war by tribes to cause civil unrest in northern provinces. This would result 
in the deployment of the Iranian Army near border justifying a possible Soyiet 
intervention. 88 Washington finally decided that Iran should be offered economical 
aid to strengthen its position.89 
In October, Moscow moved troops near the Iranian border. Ghayam must haye 
been worried that under the Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1921, ~Ioscow 
could advance into Iran. Ambassador Allen suggested that Ghavam should call 
upon Sadchikov.90 On 5 October, Ghavam obtained a vote of confidence of 93 out 
120. The Majles had approved the government's stand to l\Ioscow. 91 According 
to Ambassador Allen, Ghavam planned to propose the Majles with two plans. 
One was to employ foreign experts to explore the oil under direct government 
supervision. The other was to establish an Irano-Soviet Oil Company with 51 per 
cent shares to Iran. Allen believed that the Majles would reject a joint company.92 
On 22 October 1947, Majles rejected the Irano-Soviet Oil Agreement with a vote 
of 102 to 2. Only 2 pro-'lUdeh deputies voted in favour. 93 
The Majles, however, required the exploitation of the oil resources through 
Iranian financial means. Not to resent Moscow, they agreed that Moscow would 
be allowed to purchase Iranian oil at world market price. The Majles also required 
better terms from Anglo-Iranian Oil company.94 This law had five clauses as 
listed below. It was clause E which led to the formulation of the Supplementary 
88 Ibid, pp 960. 
89 Ibid, pp 962-963. 
90 Ibid, pp 963-964. 
91 New York Times, 6 October 1947, pp 10. 
92 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 967-968. 
93 Ibid, pp 969. 
94 New York Times, 23 October 1947, pp l. 
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Agreement and its subsequent rejection. 95 It was possible that deputies decided 
that Clause E was needed to give Moscow the impression that Britain was not in 
a better position over the oil issue. However, as noted by one British official it 
provided the basis for the nationalisation of the oil industry.9G 
The rejection of the Irano-Soviet Oil Agreement was an important eyent in 
1947. The oil had already became an issue for public debate in 19-1-1 when Kay-
taradze arrived in Tehran to negotiate oil. In 1947. the electoral campaign for 
the 15th Majles caused a lot of public excitement as the oil proposals were to be 
a major issue for Majles debate. The occupation of Iran had ended and puppet 
regimes in the north west had crumbled. It was as if the public felt that it was 
time to assert their dignity. Ghavam expressed a desire to secure public satisfac-
tion over the Anglo-Iranian oil concession but he had no democratic sentiment. 
On 10 December 1947, most of his cabinet resigned and he was gh-en a vote of no 
confidence. There were two candidates to replace him. Hekmat received 72 yotes 
and Mosaddegh 31 out of 106 votes but Hekmat could not form a cabinet. In t h(' 
second round, Hakimi received 54 votes and Mosaddegh 53 ! Had Iv10saddegh been 
able to form a government the events of the future :vears would han' been different. 
The politics of Iran in the 1940's was full of opportunities. One such op-
portunity was the fall of Ghavam in December 1947 for General Razmara, the 
Shah's Chief of Staff, to take hold of Gendarmerie. Razmara had been encouraged 
because ambassador Allen was about to leave Iran! One day in January 1948, 
95 Clause A referred to the law of 2 December 1944 under which negotiations over oil concessions 
without Majles approval were null and void, Clause B instructed the government to carry out 
a survey of the oil prospects, Clause C forbade grant of further oil concessions without. l\Iajles 
approval, Clause D provided for the sale of the northern oil to ~Ioscow, and Clause E reqUlred the 
government to regain Iran's national rights over the southern 011. 
96 PRO FO 371/61974, Pyman minutes, 25 October 1947. 
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Major General Kupal arrived at Gendermeri headquarters and announced hinlself 
in charge. The conflict dragged on and in June 1948 Shwarskopf was instructed 
to leave for Germany. Gendermeri eventually became a part of the army in mid-
1949. Some 5000 personnel still remained under GE~~IISH contro1. 97 \"ot only 
the G ENMISH even over the extension of the ARMISH contract Iran backed down 
in October 1948. One problem with the army was that it \vas a major threat to 
the civilian control of power. The other was that corruption was common eyen 
amongst the top officers. The honest officer could not advance and the Shah ,,'as 
unwilling to dismiss senior officers. The monarchists pOliC~T from the earl~' days of 
the occupation was to bolster the Shah's power. He was traditionally head of the 
army and the strong army was justified by the internal unrest. In the 1940's, 9 
out of 12 prime ministers belonged to the titled families. 
3.10 Conclusion 
The occupation of the south of Iran by British troops in August 1941 may have 
looked like a relief for the oil company officials. A new era, however, began in the 
history of the Iranian oil industry. Only five days after the occupation Moscow 
demanded development of the Kavir Khurian Oil Concession.98 :l\Ionarchists, wor-
ried about the Shah's shaky position, needed a third power into the power game 
in Iran. Their attempts to involve Washington resulted in two American oil com-
pany surveying Iran for new oil resources in 1943. Moscow's response to this was 
the dispatch of Kavtardze to Tehran in September 1944. i\Ionarchists achieved 
their goal when arrival of a high ranking Soviet official stirred up the public sen-
97 GENMISH was the American mission to Iranian Gendermarie and ARMISH the mission to the 
Iranian Army. Shwarskopf served in Europe for several years. He returned to Iran just before the 
coup in August 1953 to see old friends! 
98 Lencowszki, Russia and... , pp 171. 
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timent and caused heated Majles debates. Nlosaddegh used the opportunit~· to 
obtain an oil law banning granting further oil concessions until Iran was e,·acuated 
from foreign troops. The public had been aware of the oil issue for the first time. 
Moscow's aggression against Iran and the attempts to obtain oil concessions III 
1944 are explained in details in Chapter 4. 
All the Shah's prime ministers of 1940's were monarchists but only Ghayam 
did not support bolstering the Shah's power through the arm:\,. In September 19·U, 
Furughi lost the opportunity to declare a republic. NIajority of l\Iajles deputies of 
this period were monarchists or supported the government. This did not have much 
to do with election rigging. The landowners, for instance, could be elected in rural 
areas with the help of peasants and their agents. The 13th l\lajles deputies had 
been elected under Reza Shah who used to call the l\Iajles. a stable! but after his 
abdication most of the deputies lost no time to criticise him for his wrongdoings. 99 
The 14th Majles also saw a handful of independent deputies such as Mosaddegh. 
The election for the 15th Majles was perfectly rigged by Ghavam but the same 
Majles went against him in 1947. The 1940's was supposed to be a period of 
pluralistic rule but, as before, the idea of parliamentary rule in Iran failed once 
again. Factionalism ruled over the Majles rather than ideology or parliamentary 
procedures. 
In 1940's, oil was the centre of power conflict in Iran. ~Ioscow demanded 
development of the Kavir Khurian Oil Company only 5 days after invasion in 19-1l. 
In 1942 monarchists were keen on dragging Americans into oil competition in Iran. 
, 
In 1943, American oil companies surveyed Iran. The arrival of Kavtaradze in 19-1-1 
99 In the absence of political establishments, the opponents had to wait until the Shah. abdicated to 
criticise him ! Similarly, Khrushchev had to wait until 5 days after the death of Stahn to call 111m 
a criminal! 
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caused an oil crisis which received international attention. Ghavam offered an oil 
concession to Stalin in 1946 to secure Moscow's withdrawal. The rejection of this 
concession in 1947 directed public attention to the oil issue. ?\Ionarchists negotiated 
with the oil company for better terms in 1948 and came up with an agreement 
to supplement the 1933 Oil Concession. The secrecy of their negotiations "'as 
fiercely criticised by the press and Majles opposition. A domestic crisis was resulted 
from the rejection of the Supplementary Agreement in 1949. The oil became a 
major electoral issue in autumn 1949 which provided for the election of the leading 
nationalists and the rise of the National Front in 1950. 
The 1940's witnessed major political changes in Iran. This was brought about 
by the Allied occupation. The authoritarian system apparentl~' collapsed quickly 
but the pluralistic political system promised in the early 1940's never materi-
alised. Clerics who had been incapacitated by Reza Shah became politically active 
although they never formed a political party. Oil was a major factor in policy mak-
ing both in Iran and abroad. There are several examples of this; the involvement 
of the American oil companies in Iran in 1943, the dispatch of Kavtaradze in 1944, 
Ghavam's tactics to secure the Soviet withdrawal by offering an oil agreement and 
the rejection of this agreement in 1947. A better example is Clause E of the law 
of 22 October 1947 which, as mentioned earlier, governed Iranian oil policy for the 
next few years. 
The impact of the law of 22 October 1947 and its consequences for the oil 
industry is the subject of Chapter 5. 
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Chapter IV 
International Politics and Iran 
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the threat to 
the oil fields of Baku created the need to assist the Soviet Union in its efforts to 
contain the German expansion. The lend-lease agreement of March 1941 provided 
for the supply of thousands of tons of war goods to Britain, Soviet Union and 
other United Nations members. Allied planners had to find the best route for the 
safe delivery of goods to the Soviet Union. Supplies could only reach the Soyiet 
Union via the route to Murmansk, the Pacific Ocean and through Persian Gulf 
and Iran. The Scandinavian route was not operational in winter and the Pacific 
was under Japanese threat. The Trans-Iranian Raihvay: which came to be known 
as the Persian Corridor or bridge to victory, appeared to be the only safe route. 
Bri tain had decided to invade Iran as early as 21 July 1941. 1 Iran had declared 
its neutrality on 4 September 1939 but London and Moscow both suspected that 
Iran might become a centre for German activity to control the Persian Gulf area. 
The possibility of a German invasion of Iran, no matter how remote, was a matter 
of concern for the Allies. Germany had invaded Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 and 
Greece a few days later. In the North Africa, a German offensive began towards 
Egypt and Lebanon and Syria were under the control of the Vichy France. So far 
as Britain was concerned, Reza Shah had turned to Nazi Germany in 1935 and 
even in 1941, nearly 2 years after the start of the war, pro-German sentiment in 
1 Churchill, pp 424. FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 401-403 415. 
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Iran, as well as in Arab countries, was so high that the i\Iojtahed of Jerusalem who 
had led a revolt against Britain, and Rashid Ali, the leader of the anti-British coup 
in Iraq, were both granted asylum in Iran. It was as if there was a pro-German 
government in Tehran. 
The German-inspired Iraqi coup of 2 April was a matter of such concern for 
Britain that only 6 days later Churchill directed that the rebellion be suppressed 
before the Nazis could intervene. Furthermore, Iran had not responded properly 
to the Alliance demands for the expulsion of some 2000 Germans working in Iran:? 
and as far as oil was concerned, Abadan refinery was the largest in the world and 
the only source of 100-Octane aviation fuel east of Suez. Moscow, however, had a 
better justification for the invasion. According to Gromyko, Iran was occupied in 
accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with Iran !3 
4.1 Special Relationship 
In view of its special relationship with Britain, \;Vashington also had to be 
concerned about the possible German invasion of the area. 4 There is controversy as 
to when the special relationship had actually began. Some writers believe that the 
relationship was deeply rooted in history as two countries were closely associated 
in early colonial time. 5 Nicholas believes that only since the First World War, 
Britain gave highest priority to establishing and maintaining close understanding 
with Washington. 6 There are others like professor Bell who believe that 1940 is a 
more appropriate date for the start of the specially close special relationship. The 
2 FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 383-385 401-403 405-406. Fatemi N S, pp 187-189. 
3 Ponomaryov, pp 429. 
4 Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State 22 August 1941. 
5 Baylis, pp xi. 
6 Nicholas, pp 22-26. 
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same view has been expressed in a study by the Council on the Foreign Relations 
and the Royal Institution of the International Affairs in 1953.7 They suggest that 
it was during the Second World War that cooperation was raised to a new level 
never before realised by other states. 
Winston Churchill in his famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton. 
Missouri on 5 March 1946 also mentioned the date 1940. He emphasised on the 
continuity of the relationship "as the only means whereby the safety of the parts of 
the world .. , could be maintained".8 For Britain at least since 1940 the relationship 
with Washington has been more important than the relationship with an~' other 
state. It was in support of this relationship that Washington, which up to this 
time had always condemned aggression anywhere in the world, refused to condemn 
the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran and even did not officially respond to Reza 
Shah's last-minute request for help.9 It was in view of the Anglo-American special 
relationship that Washington positively responded to a British request for help in 
Southern Iran. In later years and during the cold war, it was obvious that Britain, 
because of the decline of the British Empire and exhaustion of the British TreaSlIr~·. 
was unable to handle the Soviet Union on its own and had to maintain a closer 
relationship with Washington. 1o 
However, as far as relationship with Iran was concerned formal Irano-American 
political relationship had begun in 1883 but due to the fact that up to the late 
1930's Iran was a minor factor in American diplomacy. official intercourse was 
insignificant. In 1910, New York banker, Morgan Shuster, was employed h~' the 
7 Leuchtenburg, pp 61-63. 
8 Loth, pp 108-109. 
9 FRUS 1940 Vol 3 pp 701. FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 352-373 388-399 418-419. 
10 Bullock, pp 118 241-246 348-351. 
116 
Iranian Government as a private employee to regularise Iranian finances. In 1922. 
Millspaugh was employed by Iran in a private capacity to adyise Iranian Gm'ern-
ment with regard to finances and economy. In the late 1920·s. Iran started the 
construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway which took seven years to complete and 
cost 40,000,000 pounds and it has been said that were it not for the strengthening 
of the Iranian economy by Millspaugh, Iran would not have been able to complete 
the project which was so vital for the success of the Alliance. However, up to the 
occupation of Iran US Government's attitude towards Iran was one of neutrality 
and advised Americans working in Iran that they would not be supported. 
4.2 Policy of Movazeneh 
In bringing Americans into the politics of Iran in the 1940's, monarchists played 
an important role. When Iran was occupied the Shah was only a young man of 22 
with an insecure position. He did not possess any of his father's physical presence 
which was needed in those days to influence others and with the exception of his 
father's supporters, no one paid much attention to him. Iran was in a state of chaos, 
local khans had assumed self-rule, Government's authority outside the capital did 
not carry much weight and communist influence in the north was increasing.l1 
Moscow was traditionally an enemy and Britain, as well as being an enemy, 
was not interested in Pahlavi Dynasty either, a situation which created fears that 
Iran could be divided as it had been in 1915 in a secret agreement. Regardless 
of the Shah's position, American involvement was needed to weaken Anglo-Soviet 
position in Iran. The Monarchy, therefore, had no choice except to resort to the 
old policy of movazeneh. or using one power as a foil against another and t ht' 
11 For details see Lencowski, Russia and ... , pp 167-248. Bullard, Britain and ... , pp 132-146. 
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only choice was once again America, a distant and, as it seemed to be at that 
time, a disinterested and trustworthy outsider with no sinister intentions in Iran. 
America only entered into world politics in 1917. However~ it was soon realised 
that continued American support depended on self-interest than disinterest.12 
America had a good reputation in Iran before 1941 and during the war years 
as Britain and the Soviet Union were treated with dislike and distrust for the 
occupation of Iran. Some Iranian nationalists had appealed to President \YilsOll 
in opposition to Lord Curzon and the 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty. In the early 
1940's Iranian statesmen contacted American oil companies to search for oil in 
the north. There is evidence that in 1951 some nationalists were still hoping that 
America would help them with regard to oil nationalisation. 13 The decision to 
involve American in Iran appears to have been a unanimous decision taken by 
monarchists. The Shah himself was very much in favour of America, and Arfa, 
chief of Staff, was in favour of military aid. 14 The Shah's prime ministers of earl~' 
1940's were also pro-American which explains why Iranian Government was so 
quick in applying for aid. Only two months after the invasion, in November 1941, 
Iran requested American economic advisers and expressed desires to sign a trade 
agreement. 15 Even before that, on 8 October 1941, American Ambassador had a 
lengthy audience with the Shah during which the Shah expressed the desire to rule 
by law. 16 
The actual opportunity for directing attention to Iranian needs, however, came 
in March 1942 when the Allies declared Iran eligible for lend-lease aid. This marked 
12 FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 331-32, Jernegan memorandum, pp 413-414 420-426. 
13 Keihan, 28 Dei 1328 (18 January 1950). 
14 Arfa, pp 325. 
15 Iran, 16 Aban 1320 (7 November 1941). 
16 FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 470-471. 
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the beginning of the Anglo-American cooperation in Iran and for the monarchists. 
the opportunity they had wanted, for the Shah:s power could be bolstered through 
strengthening the army. In Iran, the Shah and the army have never been separated 
and in 1940's the Shah was still traditionally in control of the army. He had 
graduated from a military school in 1938 as a second lieutenant and became an 
inspector in the army. He formally requested for American military aid in person 
when he met Harriman in August 1942.17 
The Shah had definitely chosen the best time for help. The Axis Forces had 
made military advances in the Soviet Union towards Caucasus and in the Middle 
East towards the Suez canal. The surrender of Tobroq on 21 June 19-12 and massive 
German drives towards Stalingrad in July created the fear that Iran could also be 
invaded. Iran had requested advisors in January 1942 and \Vashington was willing 
to help. In April 1942, Wallace Murray described American efforts as "our desire 
to bolster the somewhat shaky position of the present Iranian Government".18 
The dispatch of American army officers to advise the Iranian Army was now 
considered desirable. Subsequently, Colonel Schwarzkopf was suggested by the 
State Department to re-organise the Iranian Gendarmerie which became known 
as GENMISH. He had a reputation for organising the New Jerse~' State Police in 
1920's. In Iran he headed a large force and his work had domestic implications 
in dealing with tribes. 19The Gendarmerie had to collect tax and suppress local 
unrest which resented the leftists as well as landowners in the Majles. On 20 
October 1942, D H Connally, arrived to take the command of the Persian Gulf 
Command. His task was to facilitate the transport of lend-lease supplies to the 
17 Harriman, pp 165. 
18 Quoted in Motter, pp 162. 
19 FRUS 1944 Vol 5 pp 393-395. 
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North. Washington had developed a huge level of war production for its own use 
and those of its allies. The end, however, came to the Persian Gulf Command in 
May 1945 after transporting 17.5 million tons of supplies through Persian Corridor 
including over 2000 planes. 
Washington also dispatched Major General Ridley to adyise the Iranian Gov-
ernment on service of supply matters affecting the Iranian Army a mission which 
became known as ARMISH. Ridley and Schwarzkopf were independently responsi-
ble for advising the government and took no part in commanding American troops. 
The arrival of 5000 service troops in December 1942 was a turning point in that 
it changed the American position from voluntary helpers to fully responsible op-
erators by 1 May 1943 when they assumed full control of movement in Iran. The 
German military threat to Iran had been removed by early February 1943 when 
Stalingrad was cleared from the last Nazi forces. 
The Shah's prime ministers of early 1940's were in favour of American inter-
vention. Sohaily was the first pro-American prime minister to take office. From 
March to July 1942 he advocated advisory missions. Ghavam succeeded Sohaily 
in July to persuade the same policy of attracting Americans. The US Government 
had now changed its attitude of neutrality and when towards the end of 1942, Iran 
requested economic advice, Millspaugh was nominated, this time sponsored by the 
US Government to take up the post of Administrator General of Finances earl~r 
1943, but Washington still did not appear to have a formal policy in Iran. The un-
official aspects of American interests in Iran had gradually necessitated providing a 
guideline. In February 1943, Secretary of State gave his approval to a polic~' paper 
on Iran prepared by Jernegan for the internal guidance. The paper read" internal 
situation justifies fears that Iran may prove a danger point when we come to tl/(, 
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post war settlement".20 On 8 April, Iran and America signed a trade agreement. 21 
Another turning point in the development of American policy in Iran was 
Sohaily's second term in office in February 1943 in that he initiated the campaign to 
attract American oil interests. The existence of this policy of attracting American 
oil companies has been confirmed by Iranians involved. 22 In this respect American 
oil interests and the US foreign oil policy has to be investigated in detail. Early' 
this century United States was in possession of adequate oil reserves within its own 
borders. However, the increasing domestic as well as foreign demand had created 
fear of oil depletion. In 1919, for instance, American oil industry' supplied 60 to 70 
per cent of the world oil demand.23 The British oil companies were in possession 
of 50 per cent of the world's oil reserves. 24 The State Department was active in 
giving diplomatic assistance to Americans seeking concessions abroad. 
In 1923, they severely protested at the Lousanne Conference against the 1920 
Anglo-French Agreement at San Remo to divide Balkan and Mesopotamia oil re-
serves between themselves and continued in 1930's to respond to requests for diplo-
matic assistance. 25 New oil reserves had been discovered in Texas, Oklahoma and 
California since 1924 which removed the fear of depletion and abroad, by 1928, 
in addition to the West Indies, American oilmen had, for the first time, secured 
footholds in Mesopotamia by holding 23.75 per cent shares in Turkish Petroleum 
Company. Later on, after 5 years drilling, Aramco discovered oil in Saudi Arabia 
in 1938 and began production immediately after the Second \Vorld War, but III 
20 FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 330. 
21 Ibid, pp 296-298. 
22 Arfa, pp 325. Fatemi, Oil Diplomacy, pp 219-224, 234. 
23 Tulchin, pp 120-121. De Novo, pp 854-876. 
24 Tulchin, pp 134-154. 
25 Nash, pp 52 81-86. Beaton, pp 230-234. Wilkins pp 206-241. 
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1940 and in view of the intensifying war, the oil companies would be affected b~' 
the course of the international affairs. Until then, it had been left to the oilmen 
to conduct their own business in foreign countries26 but nnw the need for a foreign 
oil policy was obvious. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the oilmen of Standard Oil 
and Texas Company believed that only governmenfs assistance could san) their 
interests. They had been dragged into the Middle Eastern oil competitions for 
the very obvious reason that the impact of the war and its drain on American oil 
reserves had to be reduced. 
The role played by the American oil companies was significant in that between 
December 1941 and August 1945, seven billion barrels of oil had been used by 
the Allies of which six billion was supplied by the United States.27 Besides the oil 
discoveries had made the Middle East a centre of oil production after the war. Ickes 
had foreseen the possibility of oil shortages due to the war as early as 1941 and 
had advocated American development of Arabian oil through a federal company 
rather than private firms.28 The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended, in a 
report to Roosevelt on 8 June 1943, the creation of a government body to acquire 
oil concessions abroad specially in Saudi Arabia. 29 
It was with this view that they responded positivel~' to the approach made 
by the Iranian Attache and sent their representatives to Iran in autumn 1943 to 
carry out surveys outside the area covered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The 
State Department also assisted them by using diplomatic channels for negotiations 
and provided them with communication facilities and equipment for su[\·e~·ing. 
26 Paterson, pp 1-29. 
27 Jacoby, pp 37. 
28 FRUS 1943 Vol 5 pp 46l. 
29 FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 921-922 925-930. 
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It is interesting to notice that Washington told Britain that those activities were 
strictly commercial. 30 
The campaign launched by Sohaily to attract American oil interests was suc-
cessful but Sohaily made another move to obtain American support. During their 
conference in Tehran, in November 1943, he seized the opportunit~· for asking the 
Alliance, to guarantee Iran's sovereignty in a declaration, and President Roosevelt 
saw in this an opportunity to resolve the legal status of American troops in Iran. 
The declaration of 1 December 1943 guaranteed Iran's sovereignty and recognised 
the need to strengthen Iran's economy.31 The American polic~' was then based 
specifically on this declaration. 32 
The Anglo-American Oil Conference of July 1944 was an opportunity for Saed 
who had replaced Sohaily in March 1944 to intensify attracting American oil in-
terests. Early December 1943, Secretary Hull had asked Britain for oil discus-
sions. The Anglo-American cooperation was needed to develop the Middle East 
reserves to supply Europe so that domestic American reserves could be conserved. 33 
Moscow was, however, concerned about the Western attempts to seek oil conces-
sions in Iran which resulted in a battle between the Soviet Union and the West in 
Iran before war ended in Europe. The battle actually started when Kavtaradze, the 
Soviet deputy foreign secretary, arrived in Iran in September 1944. Soviet policy 
was generally anti-Western not anti-British only, but in vieY\' of American attempts 
to obtain oil concessions, Kavtaradze position was anti-American. Moscow also ac-
cused America of being in Iran illegally despite the fact that American presence 
30 Ibid, pp 627. 
31 The Iranian Government's response to the Tehran Conference w~ one of jubilance. Three mains 
. IT' h were named after Churchill, Roosevelt and Stahn. 
streets III .Le ran 
32 Motter, pp 47l. 
33 Feis, pp 138. 
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had been legalised in the Declaration of 1 December 1943. 
In July 1944, American Embassy in Tehran received an informal polic~' paper 
which read "the President and the Department have considered Iran as something 
of a testing ground for the Atlantic Charter".34 The War Department was reluc-
tant, for military reasons, to maintain troops in Iran but on 25 October the State 
Department reminded them of the "desire to strengthen that country so that it may 
maintain internal security ... which breed foreign intervention". 35 In December. 
State Department classed Iran as an area "where inter-Allied friction might arise ". 
which proved correct in Azarbaijan a year later,36 but American policy was still 
restricted militarily to supplying the army, police and Gendarmerie, and econom-
ically to advising certain ministries. The Shah was, however, as persistent as ever 
in requesting American aid. In September 1945, he wrote to Truman reminding 
him of Iran's assistance to facilitate supplies to the Soviet Union and requested 
postwar assistance. 
The war ended in 1945 but Iran, as many times before, was to suffer from 
power rivalry. Since the invasion, Soviet attempts in the north to create satellite 
states had become obvious and it was the creation of two puppet republics in 1945 
which changed the entire inter-Allied relationship and caused a major international 
crisis. The separatist movement in the north was the result of at least four years of 
intensified campaign by Tudeh Party and associated groups which had frustrated 
Iranian pro-Shah governments. Now it was the Shah's turn to seize the opportunity 
and apply for American intervention.37 
34 Quoted in Motter pp 445. 
35 Ibid, pp 471. 
36 Ibid, pp 472. 
37 FRUS 1945 Vol 8 pp 400 431-432 437-438. 
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From an international point of view, there were two forces at work. One was 
Britain which attempted to preserve the present situation to protect its oil empire 
and the other one was the Soviet Union which "'as attempting to maintain the 
republics in the north. The American policy-makers who did not have much to 
do with Iran in 1940, were now faced with the loss of Iran's strategic position 
and American oil interests in the Persian Gulf. 38 This attitude is reflected in a 
communication between Secretary Byrne and the War Secretary in October 19-15 
in which strengthening Iran was considered to be in national interest. 39 
The monarchists interest is reflected in the policy of movazeneh. Hosein Ala, 
the former Court Minister, was appointed Iranian Ambassador to \\'ashington 
in November 1945. Upon arrival in Washington Ala told the press that Soviets 
were the cause of all problems of Iran !40 Ala had the support of some American 
diplomats such as Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of the Near East and 
African Affairs and it is not surprising to see him on 29 November appealing to 
Truman that only America could save Iran !41 
The exaggeration of the Soviet threat to Iran by Court people was Sllccess-
ful in that in November and December 1945, some American diplomats expressed 
fears that partition of Iran would threaten allied solidarit~· and international se-
curity. There were diplomats even in favour of intervention against Soviets but 
the American Army was in the process of demobilising units and this seems to be 
th h on 20 December 1945 they advised Hakimi to take Soviets before e reason w y, ' 
38 FRUS 1945 Vol 8 pp 417-419. 
39 Ibid, pp 534-536. 
40 New York Times, 11 November 1945, pp 19. 
4 Al I t on served as prime minister in 1951 and again ill 1955 t () 1957 after 
1 Ala, pp 408-410. a, a er , 
the fall of Mosaddegh. 
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the United Nations. 42 The Shah was still traditionally head of the army and now 
that military intervention of Moscow in northern Iran was evident. \Yashington 
continued to support him through supplying the army. America had now added a 
new element into the politics of Iran. 
The attempts by monarchists to attract American involvement in Iran had 
paid off. Washington did not appear to have any other choice except to support 
the Shah as there was no single political party or a popular political leader with 
a firm political backing in Majles to lead the nation. \\lashington was also hoping 
that by maintaining internal security, any pretext for British or Soviet intervention 
in internal affairs of Iran would be removed. The Iranian Government manoeuvred 
to attract more American involvement. In January 1946, Iran again approached 
some American oil companies to negotiate over oil concessions, but Americans 
were not interested as now they had access to Saudi oil. The negotiations were 
illegal under the Oil Law of 2 December 1944 and Washington was not interested 
either for they advised their oil companies as well as their embass~' to refrain from 
discussing the matter. The attempt by Hakimi Government to interest America 
had angered Mosaddegh who criticised the government for not adopting his policy 
of non-alignment. 43 
3 Moscow's Expansionism 
The Allied's position in Iran in 1946 is of paramount importance to this stud~·. 
British and American troops had already left Iran. The position of ~Ioscow was 
much more different. During the past few centuries, Iran has traditionally regarded 
. . h d' t t and rear Russian aggression against Iran datps back to about RUSSIa WIt IS rus 1'. 
42 B 255 FRUS 1945 Yol 8 pp 430-431 501 5()-l-505 507, Gaddis, pp 291. yrnes pp , , _ 
43 h M 'les (MaJ'les Proceedings) l-lth MaJles, 1946, pp 8 I () Mozakerate aJ 
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1,100 years ago when Russian Cossacks crossed the Caspian Sea and raided the 
island of Abskoon in the year 297-298 Islamic Lunar calendar (AD 908). This 
was not an isolated incident as it happened again in 332 and in 571 at different 
occasions. There are also transcripts dated about 1600 ordering Iranian border 
troops to shoot Russian Cossacks wherever they were sighted.44 In recent history 
Russia advanced towards the Northern Iranian borders taking advantage of Iranian 
military weakness. On three occasions Iran lost territory to Russia namely in 1813 
and in 1828 when Caucasus, including seventeen cities, was separated from Iran 
and in 1881 when Turkamanstan, although nominally under Iranian rule, was 
annexed. The area was lost over several years with the fall of Tashkent in 1865. 
Bokhara in 1866, Samarghand in 1868, Khiveh in 1873 and f\Iary in 1884. In 
the late nineteenth century, Russian influence in Iran was strong enough to allow 
Russian subjects to secure banking, fishery, oil concessions and preferential customs 
arrangements. Russia also offered low-interest loans to N aser-eddin Shah as w('ll 
as to his heir, Mozaffar-eddin Shah, who were desperate to raise funds to cover 
their Court expenses. 45 
In 1907, Britain and Russia signed an agreement to divide Iran into two zones 
of influence and a neutral zone and in 1915 they once again divided the neutral zone 
secretly. Britain had to pay a price to stop the influence of its rising competitor, 
G 'n Iran At least since 1902 Britain was worried about Russia~s attempts ermanY,l . 
to acquire a naval base in the Persian Gulf. In a dispatch to Ambassador Harding 
in St Perstburg, Foreign Secretary Lansdowne wrote on 6 February 1902 "Britain 
4
4 . A b d to Washington Hosein Ala, gave an account of Russian aggression 
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45 Brown, Persian Revolution, pp 99. 
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could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the 
Persian Gulf. "46 
Early in 1904, Russia's powerful armada was making its way around :-\'frica en 
route to war with Japan. Britain was concerned that the fleet could turn north 
towards the Persian Gulf or anchor in the Iranian port of Chah Bahar, near the 
Indian Baluchestan. In May 1904, British Embassy in St Petersburg reported 
Russia's success in obtaining a lien on a prospective railway through Iran to Chah 
Bahar. 47 Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905 and the rise of the domestic violence 
forced it to seek stability in foreign relations. Britain also had to contain German 
expansion in the Middle East. In a lecture at Oxford, Curzon defined "A sphere 
of influence is a less developed form than a protectorate, but it is more developed 
than a sphere of interest" !48 
Iran was going through a difficult time due to the Constitutional Movement 
but Russian politicians, unlike British ones, sided with the Shah. The Russian 
Cossack officer, Colonel Liakhof, assisted Mohamad Ali Shah b~' raiding the Ilewl~r­
established parliament, an incident in which a number of deputies were murdered, 
and helped the Shah to establish his traditional absolute monarchy. The friendly 
relationship between Russians and the Shah begun years before when Mohamad 
Ali Shah was the Crown Prince and the Governor of the province of Azarbaijan. 
The absolute monarchy, however, did not last long for Tehran was invaded by 
Constitutionalists. The Shah took refuge in the Russian Embass~' and abdicated. 
The Constitutionalists then chose his 12 year old son, Ahmad. to be the new king. 
46 Gooch, Vol IV, no 321a. 
47 Bucsh, pp 264-265. 
48 Fraser L, pp 129. 
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Contrary to what one might think the defeat of absolutism did not end the 
Russian aggression as in December 1911 a Russian ultimatum forced the depar-
ture of an American financial advisor, Morgan Shuster. During the First \Yorld 
War, Russia disregarded Iran's neutrality and moved troops into the :\orthern 
provinces, but after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and only for a short time the 
newly-established revolutionary government treated Iran in a friendly manner by 
denouncing all Czarist agreements including 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement. This 
friendly gesture did not last very long for in 1920 the Red Army invaded the North 
of Iran. They soon made contact with Mirza Kuchek Khan, Ehsanolla Khan and 
other leaders of a rural guerrilla movement. The movement was to bring about 
radical social changes in Iran. The movement spread to the prm"inces along the 
Caspian Sea but since it was contained by the Central Government in 1919, their 
leaders had decided to obtain assistance from Moscow. 
Mirza Kuchek Khan was a moslem and had insisted that there should be no 
dissemination of communist propaganda in Iran. I\Ioscow, howen'r, saw him as an 
instrument for revolutionary propaganda in Iran "he is a bearer of social slogans ... 
closely connected with communism, although it is interpreted by the Persians in a 
different sense ... ".49 Moscow's support for Mirza Kuchek Khan of Jungle and the 
Soviet Republic of Gilan was a small scale revolutionary gain. 50 j\Ioscow, however, 
had to remove her troops from Iran in 1922 in return for a treaty of friendship 
with Iran. The Iranian army moved to the northern provinces and the rebellion 
was crushed. Kuchek Khan who attempted to flee to Azarbaijan was found frozen 
to death in the mountains of Talesh ! 
49 Eudin, pp 117. 
50 Lencowzski, Russia and ... , pp 170. 
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The treaty with Iran allowed the Soviets to advance into Iran if a third party 
desired to use the Iranian territory as a base against Soviet union. This treaty. 
which was another gesture of good will, was signed in 1921 under which the Soviet 
Union returned to Iran numerous concessions, granted under the old regime, on 
the condition that they were not granted to a third party. Considerable amount of 
property was returned as well on the condition that they were used for the benefit 
of the Iranian people. The significance of this agreement was Article 6 under which 
the Soviet Union could advance into Iran. This article appears to have been drafted 
to facilitate the withdrawal of British troops from the South and it will be shown 
later on how it was used by Moscow to justify their activities in the North of Iran 
in 1940's. 
Despite signing the treaty Moscow continued supporting rebellion in the north 
of Iran. An example of this is their support for revolts of Sheikh l\Iohamad Khia-
bani in Azarbaijan or Khoda Verdi Khan in Khorasan. Later on, lVIoscow's political 
penetration in Iran turned into obtaining pro-Moscow sympathy.51 In the 4th Ma-
jles, for instance, the minority was led by Soleiman Mirza, a socialist. Soleiman 
Mirza joined Reza Rusta, a communist, in the electoral campaign for the 5th Ma-
jles and formed the National Bloc. They did not succeed as they were denounced 
by the authorities as subversive. Many of its members were arrested or killed. 
Rusta disappeared but Soleiman Mirza continued to lead an opposition of 15 left-
ist deputies in the 5th Majles in 1923. In 1927, Moscow attempted to agitate 
Iranian Kurds through their scheme for an independent Kurdish republic within 
the Soviet Union! The scheme was rejected by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 
for it would strengthen the relations between Kurds and Iran. 
51 Lencowszki, Russia and ... , pp 54. 
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The invasion of Iran in the last few days of August 1941 is of important rel-
evance to the nationalisation of the oil industry. The fall of Reza Shah and his 
totalitarian regime opened the door to the re-establishment of the long-time desired 
parliamentary system in which nationalists managed to find a forum to represent 
and lead the urban middle class. On 25 August 1941, Iran was invaded by the 
British forces from the West and by the Soviet forces from the North. The idea 
was to open a supply line to help the Soviet Union and to maintain the oil flow to 
the British Navy. Soviet Union could not be helped through the Pacific routes be-
cause of Japanese threat, nor via Northern Scandinayia because of harsh winters. 
India also had to be secured against a German invasion and Iran had, once again, 
fallen victim to the rivalry of superpowers. The invasion of the Northern provinces 
of Iran is in two respects relevant to this study: 1- Soviet attempts to obtain an 
oil concession in the North, and 2- Soviet threats to the independence of Iran. 
At the time when Iran was invaded there was mainly one oil concession in 
operation in Iran, the 1933 revised concession in which British Government had 
51 per cent share. There was also Kavir Khurian Oil Concession, in which the 
Soviets had 65 per cent stake but Kavir Khurian was a small company theoretically 
operating in Semnan area 70 miles to the East of Tehran. The Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, on the other hand, covered some 100,000 Sq miles in the south west 
and owned the largest refinery of the world in Abadan. The rest of Iran was, 
therefore, free for foreign competition. During the war Iran attempted several 
times, with no success, to interest American oil companies. In February 1943, 
Iranian commercial Attache in Washington approached the Standard Vacuum and 
in June contacted the Standard Oil of New Jersey.52 In September, Standard 
52 FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 627. 
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Vacuum became interested in Baluchestan, south east of Iran, and at about the 
same time State Department changed its oil policy because of the fear of domestic 
oil depletion. 53 
The competition for Iranian oil was actually started by the Iranians themselves 
and went on despite opposition by the American Ambassador in Tehran as \Yell as 
American financial adviser, Dr Millspaugh, who warned that it would jeopardise 
the allied relationship in Iran. The State Department supported both companies 
and in February 1944, they even informed Iran of their backing. The West appears 
to have been satisfied with the situation as long as their interests in Iran were 
maintained. An example is their backing of the puppet regimes in the north of 
Iran at Moscow Foreign Minister Conference in December 1945 if Khuzestan, where 
the British oil industry was based, would also become independent! Britain and 
Russia had, in 1907, divided Iran into three parts, the British zone of influence. 
neighbouring British India, the Russian zone of influence which covered the north, 
and a neutral zone including Khuzestan. When oil industry was established in 
Khuzestan, Britain signed a secret agreement with Russia in 1915 dividing Iran 
into two zones of influence. 
However, Britain despite its remarkable position in Khuzestan, was not pas-
sive. Representatives of the British Shell Oil arrived in November 1943 to survey 
Baluchestan followed by representatives of the Standard Vacuum in December and 
later on, by Sinclair Consolidated Oil and soon they presented the government 
with their prospective oil concessions. Standard Vacuum was the first one to ar-
rive in March 1944, Shell in May followed by Sinclair in June. Obviously, Moscow 
was not prepared to remain silent. Soviets had a long history of intervention in 
53 Yergin, The Prize ... pp 395. 
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the north of Iran and, in their view, there was strong justification for their anger. 
They had enjoyed a concession through their company Russo-Persian :\aphta in 
1896. In 1901, five northern provinces had been excluded in D'Arcy concession 
because of Russian influence. The 1921, Treaty of Friendship between Iran and 
Soviet Union forbade Iran from granting old Czarist concessions to a third part~·. 
They had asked Iran for cooperation to develop Kavir Khurian oil resources as 
recent as 30 August 1941, only 5 days after the invasion. 54 
Moscow originally did not object to this development but simply reminded 
Iran of their zone of influence. This may be attributed to the fact that the~' were 
already involved in illegal drillings in the north,55 or may be because originally 
only Baluchestan was considered for oil surveys. However, prime minister Saed 
announced in April 1944 that north of Iran was also open for negotiations. This was 
a turning point in internal politics of 1940's and suggests that Iranian statesmen 
had, once again, resorted to the old Qajar policy of movazeneh. 56 
America had a good reputation in Iran until early 1950's and Iranian statesmen 
had, at several occasions, requested Americans for help to offset British position. 
The New York banker, Morgan Shuster, arrived in 1910 to regularise the Iranian 
finances which were in chaos. President Wilson had supported Iran against the 
1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty which was an attempt to turn Iran into a British pro-
tectorate. In 1941, Iran requested advisers for several ministries including Finance 
and Education, and by the end of 1943 there were 70 American advisers in Iran. 
At about the same time American General Schwarzkopf was in Iran to head the 
Gendermeri. Many Iranian statesmen were convinced that American assistance 
54 Lencowzki, Russia and ... , pp 171. 
55 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 107. 
56 see page 59. 
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was needed and that is why on 4 May 1943 they conferred ~1illspaugh necessary 
power to carry out financial and economic reforms. 
Meanwhile, Americans and Britishs were busy in \Yashington negotiating oyer 
future oil policies and reached an agreement on 8 August 19.J-1 on the oil of the 
Middle East although as far as Iran was concerned, they never cooperated on the 
Iranian oil until oil was actually nationalised. Moscow, however. decided that it was 
time to act. In August, Tudeh Party opposed granting oil concessions to any foreign 
power and their deputy in the 14th Majles, Radmanesh, stated that if Iranians 
could build the Trans-Iranian Railway on their own, they should be able to exploit 
their oil reserves too. But opposition by a communist deput~· was not enough 
and in September, Moscow dispatched deputy Foreign Minister, Kavtaradze, to 
Tehran. The aim of Kavtaradze visit to Tehran was formally discussing Semnan 
oil but in 1924, the concession had been confirmed by the Government and Kavir 
Khurian Oil Company was a legal company operating with no problem. One 
interpretation supported by Millspaugh was that the real aim was to stop the 
West from gaining a better position in Iranian oil. Another interpretation was 
that Soviets really wanted to take advantage of a politically weakened Iran alld 
obtain an oil concession. 
The Majles opposition made a fuss about the arrival of a Soviet official forcing 
Saed government to announce, on 16 October 1944, that no oil concession would 
be granted until the end of the war. Saed himself stated that he had made up his 
mind early September and before the arrival of Kavtaradze. but that was a political 
lie. The real reason behind the refusal was that Iran had, once again, decided to 
involve American interest in Iran, to create a rival for Britain and the Soviet 
Union. The reaction of the Tudeh Party is of interest. In August, they oppospd 
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granting oil concessions to foreigner powers, in October, they launched a campaign 
against the government and arrange for mob demonstrations in Tehran and Tabriz 
to demand resignation of Saed. Kavtaradze remained in Tehran for another two 
months during which American Ambassador announced his government's support 
for Iran's sovereignty over oil affairs. This introduced a new element to Soviet 
foreign policy, the fact that Britain and the United States supported Iran. In 
November 1944, cabinet changed and on 2 December Mosaddegh introduced a bill 
forbidding government officials of negotiating oil concessions without the approval 
of the Majles. The bill was ratified the same day. Kavtaradze called the bill a 
great mistake and left Iran on 9 December. 
What happened in Iran in 1944 should be considered as a duel between Moscow 
and the West over the oil and it should be noted that it was arranged by the Iranian 
statesmen themselves and may be considered as an early stage of the cold war. It 
also had other consequences. Firstly, Tudeh Party which, until then, had been 
known as one of the many political parties, was ridiculed as a soviet toy. Secondly, 
oil became an issue for public debate. Thirdly, Mosaddegh who until then had 
only been known as a nationalist deputy, emerged as the author of the Oil Law 
and a nationalist hero. This was the first stage of the rise of Mosaddegh to the 
leadership of nationalists in 1950. 
The Soviet threat to the Iran's independence is of great relevance to the oil na-
tionalisation in 1951. Had Soviet agents managed to maintain the two autonomous 
republics in the North West of Iran, the formation of a Soviet oil industry in the 
North, which was an obvious consequence of this, would have made it more difficult 
for the nationalists to fight in two battles. 
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4.4 Puppet regimes 
After the invasion of Iran, Britain and the Soviet union signed a treaty known 
as the Tripartite Treaty of 29 January 1942,57 which brought Iran into the Alliance 
and required military evacuation of Iran within six months after the end of hostil-
ities with Germany, but soon it became obvious that Moscow ,,"as interfering with 
domestic affairs of the North. The West was concerned about the Soviet activities 
from the very beginning. On 3 October 1941, Secretary Hull relayed his concern to 
the British Government. He was concerned with the Soviet sympathy towards the 
Arminian separatists movement in Iran which could have affected Turke~" as welL a 
view which was shared by Secretary Hul1. 58 The North of Iran, excluding Tehran,59 
was practically occupied by the Red Army which began its policy of isolating the 
area from the Iranian troops and foreigners. Then, under their protection, Soviet 
agents began transforming Azarbaijan into a communist republic. Some estates 
were seized, Soviet-style collective farms were organized, and the export of grain 
and rice was forbidden. 
The Soviet Embassy in Tehran involved itself in political propaganda about 
the achievements of the Soviets. The activities occasionall~r extended to the British 
zone of influence as well. Moscow resorted to the same policy of Nazis who, through 
broadcasting propaganda, appealed to the Soviet moslems to revolt against the 
Soviet rule. They also found an excuse for their activities. Under the Article 6 of 
the 1921 Agreement between Iran and Soviet Union, the Red Army could advance 
into Iran now that Iran had been occupied by a third party ! Their presence in 
the province of Azarbaijan was strong enough to allow two Soviet immigrants of 
57 For details of the Tripartite Treaty see FRUS 1943 Vol 4 pp 410-420. 
58 FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 463-475. 
59 During the war Allied troops always avoided being in Tehran. 
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Iranian origin, Pishevari and Daneshian, to seize power under the protection of the 
Soviet Army. They had been expelled by Stalin in 1930's and had been detained 
in Iran. In December 1945, Pishevari became the Prime ).Iinister and Daneshian. 
commander of the rebel army. But who was Pishevari ? 
Born in 1888 in Azarbaijan, he went to Baku in 1904 and sta~'ed until the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. A year later, he returned to Iran under the name Jafar 
Badkubeyi. He was appointed as the Deputy Interior I\Iinister in the Republic of 
Gilan in 1920 which had been declared by Mirza Kuchek Khan of Jungle. He has 
been accused of being responsible for murdering hundreds of people. 60 He returned 
to the Soviet Union when the republic collapsed and became active in Commintren 
under the name of Soltan-Zadeh.61 Pretending to be a victim of Soviet purges, he 
returned to Iran in 1936 and was detained until 1941 when Iran was invaded. 
Pishevari then helped forming the communist Tudeh Part~r and became the editor 
of Azhir. He ran for the membership of the 14th Majles in 1943 but because of his 
separatist activities, his credentials were rejected. 
In 1945 and with the help of a group of trained communists, he formed a po-
litical party, Democrats of Azarbaijan, to replace the Tudeh party in Azarbaijan. 
His government collapsed when Iranian Army invaded the Azarbaijan in 1946 and 
he fled to the Soviet Union. The end of Pishevari was as mysterious as his real 
origin. He died in a car crash in the Soviet Azarbaijan in 1947.62 The separatist 
idea was not restricted to Azarbaijan. A Kurdish leader, Ghazi Mohamad, pro-
claimed an independent republic in Mahabad but his republic was not dominat<'d 
60 Fatemi, Diplomatic History ... , pp 230. 
61 Commintern issued identity papers of the deceased to give new id~ntity to its ~em~ers. O,ne 
famous case is that of Tito who was allegedly given the papers of Joslb Broz who died III 1915 . 
62 Pishevari himself has given a different account of his life claiming to have been a porter at a school 
in northern Iran (see Azhir, September 1941). 
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by communists. The Republic of Mahabad had attracted Iraqi Kurds for ~Iollah 
Mostafa Barezani arrived from Iraq with his men to join Ghazi ~Iohamad. 
Returning to Azarbaijan, with the backing of ~Ios('ow, Pishevari declared Re-
public of Azarbaijan on 12 December 1945. On 15 December, Kurdish people'~ 
Republic was also established in western Azarbaijan. j\;foscow had taken an in-
terest in Kurdestan since 1920's. In 1927, they showed interest in establishing 
a Kurdish puppet satellite within the Soviet Union in 1927 to encourage Kurds 
abroad for independence. The idea was understandable as the route from Cau-
casus to the Persian Gulf passed through Kurdestan. Unlike Azarbaijan, the 
communist-dominated Tudeh was incapable of serving l\loscow's intentions in the 
traditional tribal Kurdestan. Some 30 tribal leaders were invited to Baku. Th('~' 
met Bagherov, the president of the Soviet Azarbaijan, visited farms and factories 
and returned to Iran after two weeks. On 16 September 19-12, a small group of 
Kurds formed a Kurdish nationalist committee in Mahabad called Komelle. 63 The 
membership grew and in October 1944, Ghazi Mohamad became the spokesman of 
the group and on 22 January 1946, the president of the puppet republic.64 Ghazi 
Mohamad appears to have been naive when in response to Bagherov extending a 
helping hand, he said "not only we shake it, we will also kiss it "!65 
Returning to Pishevari, he initiated the re-distribution of land, nationalisation 
of larger banks and declare the Azari as the official language as well as improving 
public transport and introducing a labour pension scheme to impress the masses. 
But Moscow had made a mistake not noticing that the bulk of Azarbaijanis had 
63 This is a broken form of Farsi standing for Kord Mellat (Kurdish Nation) ! It is common to find 
broken Farsi words in Iranian local languages. 
64 For details see Eagleton, Kurdish Republic of 1946. 
65 Ibid, pp 44-45. 
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not yet forgotten the atrocities of the Russian Army during the Constitutional 
Movement and in 1910's. Azarbaijanis were happy oyer the Bolsheyik Revolution 
hoping that Russian troops would go home. They had formed an anti-Russian 
attitude which helped bringing about the fall of Pishevari. To this, of course, olle 
has to add the economic decline of the province. creation of a secret police and 
the abuse of power by Pishevari. Even when creation of an arm~; was declared. 
Pishevari had to order police to arrest draft evaders. The lack of genuine support 
for Pishevari was clear. The American Consul had commented that if Soviet :-\rm~' 
left, the regime would crumble quickly. The Iranian central government ordered 
troops to Azarbaijan but they were stopped near Qazvin by the Red ArIll~·. 1\ e-
gotiations between Tehran and Moscow revealed that I\Ioscow's true intention was 
the oil concession. Eventually, puppet regimes collapsed in December 1946. 
The fall of Azarbaijan was a major defeat for Moscow. 6 (i Moscow's previous 
attempt in 1921 to establish the Republic of Gilan was also unsuccessful. One 
reason for such a quick collapse was most probably Moscow's unwillingness to 
assist militarily. Their reluctance may be explained through their strong position 
in Eastern Europe and the fact that Washington would not tolerate a Soviet-
controlled Iran. Another reason was Stalin's interest in the ratification of the Irano-
Soviet Oil Concession which would seem to be impossible had ivloscow invaded 
Azarbaijan. One can see the service that Ghavam rendered to Iran by offering an 
oil concession contingent on Majles ratification. The public dissatisfaction with 
puppet regime also has to be considered. Azarbaijanis were resented of Russian 
atrocities a generation ago. The communist rule over a Moslem Azarbaijan was 
also another source of distrust and fear. 
66 New York Times, 13 December 1946, pp 13. 
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The idea of puppet regimes in the north of Iran was at some stage supported b~' 
the West. In December 1945, at Moscow Foreign ~Iinister Conference, Secretary 
of State Byrne and British Foreign Secretary Bevin. suggested that Azarbaijan. 
Kurdestan and Khuzestan become autonomous provinces. but Stalin refused per-
haps believing that like Eastern Europe the entire Iran would fall into the Soviet 
hand. 
4.5 Ghavam's Power Game 
On 20 January 1946, Prime Minister Hakimi resigned and the 1-1th i\Iajles 
chose Ghavam, a 73 year old competent politician as Prime ~Iinister. Hakimi 
was unable to solve country's problems and had been invited by the i\Iajles to 
resign. Furthermore, Soviets did not like him for, in 1919, he was a member 
of the Iranian delegate at Paris Conference which made claims over the Russian 
territory. Ghavam was, on the other hand, an experienced politician and a man 
of compromise rather than conflict. He was born in 1873 in N aser-eddin Shah's 
palace and was educated in Russia where he learnt Russian as well as French. In 
1910, he held the post of the Minister of Finance and in 1918, was appointed as th(' 
Governor of Khorasan. He was prime minister between i\Ia~' 1921 and June 1922 
and again in 1923. When Reza Khan was enthroned, like many other politicians, 
he quitted politics. 
In August 1942, the 13th Majles elected Ghavam as prime minister by a vote 
of 109 out of 116, during which he showed his anti-Shah feelings by demanding the 
post of the Minister of War, whose choice was traditionally that of the Shah, and 
appointed a well-known religious scholar, Sadr, as rdinister of Justice. The 1-1th 
Majles elected Ghavam by only one vote and it has been claimed that had the 
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Tudeh deputies not voted as it was usual of them to abstain. Ghayam would not 
have been elected.57 It had become clear that Soyiets were reluctant to withdraw 
from Iran and Ghavam, being a traditional politician embarked on his one-man 
policy of compromise to remove the threat from Iran's independence. He wa.." 
well-versed with Qajar policy of "movazeneh". between powers. 
The policy of movazeneh was deeply rooted in the nineteent h century Iran. 
Up to the early 1800's, Iran was a mighty power. The Safavi kings ruled over the 
entire plateau of Iran. Following them, Nader Shah invaded India. Agha ~Iohamad 
Khan, the first Qajar king also ruled from Caucasus to the "'estern part of the 
present Pakistan. Fath Ali Shah, the next king, however. suffered defeats from 
the Russian army in 1813 and 1828 with the loss of Caucuses and 17 cities. In 
1888, Turkamanestan was annexed by Russia shrinking Iran to its almost present 
size. This coincided with growing British influence in India resulting in Iran being 
threatened on both sides. The advance of the powers of the time towards Iran 
could only be contained by a carefully balanced foreign policy.68 In those days, 
Qajar statesmen granted concessions to both Russia and Britain to keep them 
content. It was obvious that granting concessions and its consequences had made 
it impossible for Iran to attain full independence, to establish the rule of law and 
to promote the progress, but it was enough to satisfy the economic and political 
greed of both powers to avoid military advancement or colonisation of Iran. This 
policy was successful as it turned military conflict into commercial rivalry. 
It had already been proved early nineteenth century and throughout the fol-
57 Keiostovan, pp 233. 
68 Policy of movazeneh was not always successful. The attempts by Reza S~ah. for instance, to 
involve Germany in Iran adversely affected Iran's position in international pohtlCS and encouraged 
the Allieds to occupy Iran. 
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lowing years that Britain could stop Russia~s military advance into Iran. There 
are transcripts in Naser-eddin Shah~s handwriting indicating that if. in 1881. Iran 
had not consented to the Russia's annexation of Turkamnstan. Russia would han' 
annexed the north of Khorasan as well. The Central Goyernment even had to 
keep internal rebels satisfied. For instance, in 1898: they appointed Sheikh Khazal 
as the Governor of Mohamareh, otherwise he would haye declared independence. 
They were, however, careful to maintain the balance between two powers. British 
influence in the South was allowed to build up to a level whereby the Russian idea 
of a warm water port by Peter the Great, would han> seemed to be an impos-
sibility, but meanwhile commercial rivalry was encouraged to keep the Russians 
satisfied. For instance, Palashovisky's plan to build a kerosene pipeline from the 
Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf, or construction of railroads by Russian subjects, 
were promised to be considered. 
Returning to Ghavam, he had a reputation for being pro-Soviet or may be hE" 
was only pretending. He rewarded the Tudeh Party by lifting the government ban 
on their activities and actually took part in the opening of some of their labour 
clubs in Tehran. He tried to convince Pishevari to accept the post of the Minister 
of Agriculture but failed. 69 Ghavam's next move was to get away from a I\Iajles 
in which he only had one extra vote and travelled to Moscow to meet Stalin. 
The meeting took place on 21 February 1946, but negotiations got nowhere as 
Stalin made Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and Russia an 
excuse for maintaining troops in Iran. By 2 March, American and British troops 
had already departed but Moscow only withdrew from peaceful districts arguing 
that full withdrawal would follow "pending examination of the situation "70. but 
69 Davudi, pp 64. 
70 Gromyko, pp 406-408. 
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reports sent by the American Consulate at Tabriz were alarming indicating that 
Soviets had actually moved troops into Iran together with at least 200 tanks in the 
month of March 1946. Knowing that he was not favoured in the :\Iajles. Ghavam 
deliberately delayed h' t 'T' h . 
IS re urn to l.e ran and arnved on 10 :\Iarch. The next da~' 
he presented the Majles with a report on the results of his negotiations in :\Ioscow 
only one hour before Majles expired ! 
Not being successful in Moscow, Ghavam informed the \Yestern powers, on 
14 March, that he would take the case before the Security Council. The Iranian 
Ambassador to the United Nations and Washington, brought the case to the at-
tention of the Security Council on 18 March. The case was originally heard on the 
26 March and all Soviet excuses that the case should be adjourned because with-
drawal had already begun, or an understanding between parties had been reached, 
as well as the excuse that they could maintain troops in Iran under :-\rtide 6 of 
the 1921 Treaty were rejected and the hearing was adjourned until 3 April for the 
parties to prepare reports. 
Meanwhile, Ghavam carried on his traditional policy and now that l\Iajles had 
expired and the former deputies did not have immunity, he arrested some right 
wing leaders and closed down their papers and since he had agreed in Moscow for 
further talks in Tehran, he met the Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov on 21 March who 
informed Ghavam that Soviets were prepared to withdraw if an Irano-Soviet Oil 
Company could be set up. This was against the Oil Law of 2 December 19-1-1, but 
there was no other alternative in view of the fact that Moscow had other demands. 
They wanted local autonomy for Azarbaijan and Kurdestan whereb~' they could 
choose their own governor but central government was still in charge of the arlll~', 
police and finances. Immediate withdrawal from Tehran had been promised if oil 
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concession and autonomy were agreed. It should. howeyer, be noted that ~Ioscow 
seemed to have been concerned about the action taken by the Security Council. 
Gromyko, for instance, did not bother to wait until 3 April and informed the 
Security Council that Soviet troops had actually started withdrawing on 25 ;\Iarch. 
At this time, the Shah was concerned about Ghavam's compromising policy and to 
hinder the negotiations, the War Minister announced, in a press conference, that 
Soviet troops were actually moving towards Tehran.71 
On 5 April 1946, Ghavam and Soviets finally reached an agreement under which 
Soviets would withdraw within two months and an Irano-Sovi<>t Oil Company 
would be set up for 50 years with Soviet shares to be ;)1 per cent for the first 
25 years.72 The interesting point was that the concession area was exactly the 
same area which had been excluded under the D'Arcy's concession, except the 
area along Iraq and Turkey border. Ghavam haYing offered the oil agreement, 
may have used the Law of 15 October 1945 to convince Stalin to withdraw. The 
law prohibited the new elections which was needed to ratify t he agreement until all 
foreign troops had left. Ghavam's success was twofold, withdrawal of the Soviet 
troops and recognition by Moscow that Azarbaijan and Kurdestan were Iran's 
internal problem. Although one might disagree that the oil revenues were to be 
paid in Soviet rubbles which was a locked currency and was onl~' good to buy Soviet 
goods, it has to be remembered that as Majles had expired, Ghavam knew that the 
agreement could not have been implemented without ratification and indeed it has 
been widely accepted that he did not have any intention of granting concessions 
to Moscow. 
71 Davudi, pp 115. 
72 Stocking, pp 153. 
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Furthermore, it might be asked if Soviets had any intention of seeking an oil 
concession. The answer is most probably negatiye. During the occupation of the 
North, Soviets had carried out a number of drillings all oyer the \'orth and had 
found no oil. 73 It is more likely that since American oil interest in Iran was re-
vived in Autumn 1943 and in view of the Anglo-American Oil Conference of 19-1-1. 
Moscow decided to stop the West from obtaining a much more adyantageous posi-
tion in Iran and that is why they dispatched Kaytaradze to Tehran in Septpmber 
1944 with a three-day ultimatum to provoke the Iranian nationalists like l\Iosad-
degh so that no oil concessions could be granted to any power. The oil agreement 
of 4 April 1946 between Ghavam and Moscow was also more likely to be a face-
saving political measure to end an international crisis and avoid Anglo-American 
coalition. This may be justified by the fact that Soviets did not attend the Security 
Council's further hearings of 3 April, 6 May and 22 fda~' 19-16 as a part of their 
tactics to find time for withdrawal which, according to Soviets. was completed on 
9 May. The date of Soviet's complete withdrawal from Iran has neyer bpen estab-
lished and considering the large number of agents they left behind, it is right to 
say that it was never complete! 
The Soviets did not forget their oil agreement and on 12 August 1947, requested 
Ghavam for its ratification which did not seem to be a problem as Ghavam had 
already rigged the 15th Majles elections to the extent that even Mosaddegh had 
not been elected, but Majles rejected the agreement in October and exempted 
Ghavam from punishment under the Oil Law of 2 December 19-1-1. The l\Iajles 
instructed the government to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for 
better terms. 
73 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 108. Lencowzski, Russia and ... pp 170. 
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America used the Security Council and the General Assembly once more in 
1946 to debate the puppet regimes in the north but once the crises in the north 
were over, Washington appears to ha\'e forgotten Iran in that they paid more at-
tention to Turkey and Greece. Congress \\'as also reluctant to become in\'oh·ed. 
Once the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill which was the official start of the cold war was 
ratified, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the new Congress 
of 1947-48 declared that no more aid could be offered. The decision may have 
been taken in view of the fact that Iran, unlike Turkey and Greece. had oil rev-
enues or perhaps administration corruption was the reason, There is also anot her 
possibility. Britain maintained the responsibility for the defence of Iran and kft 
that of Turkey and Greece to Washington. This might be the reason why Iran 
was excluded from the 400,000,000 dollars aid that Truman Doctrine requ(,sted 
for Turkey and Greece in March 1947.74 However, Iran's strategic importance was 
clear. As Senator Vanderberg said before Congress in April 1947 if the :"Iiddle East 
falls under communist expansion "the repercussions will echo from the Dardanelles 
to the China sea".75 
As mentioned before, Ghavam had offered Moscow oil rights in the north in all 
attempt to force the Soviets out of Iran. Now in 1947 and in view of the Iranian 
elections, Moscow was anxious to have the agreement ratified and this did not 
go unnoticed by the West. The issue of the Irano-Soviet Oil Company had be('Il 
discussed between Bevin and Stalin in March 1947 at the Moscow Conference' of 
Foreign Ministers without any objections from Washington.76 Thus, remarks made 
by Ambassador Allen to the Shah and Ghavam in private that Irano-Sovipt Oil 
74 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 901-902 993. 
75 Caroe, pp 121. 
76 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 929-930 934 953. PRO FO 371/Persia 61970. 
146 
Company was not in the interest of Iran, must haye been his own yiew. 7i The 
British Ambassador, Le Rougetel, also had the same opinion that rejecting the Oil 
Concession by Majles would be resented by ~los('ow. Be"in had assured Stalin 
that Britain would encourage Iran to offer the concession in return for Stalin \ 
assurance that Moscow would not interfere in Iran's internal affairs. Attlee \\'a~ 
in favour of maintaining the arrangements of i'.larch 1947 with Stalin and dela~'ed 
the return of Le Rougetel to Iran until the 15th :"lajles had "oted.'i' At thi~ time 
there was also a rumour that just as they did in 1915. London and )'loscow had 
secretly divided Iran so that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could be protected.'!l 
Washington was, however, paSSIve. Now that they had access to oil resenTS 
in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, there was no point in starting another oil competi-
tion in Iran. 80 In February 1945, Roosevelt had met with Ibn Saud at Su('z in an 
attempt to stabilise the region. Washington's desire t() interfere the region ('\'('n-
tually involved them with the political affairs of Palestine after the war. 81 Britain 
was, however, more influential in the region as the~' had already courted the Arab 
Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf and the Arabia. Years before the~' had signed 
treaties and truces guaranteeing their independence on paper but in fact practi-
cally turned them into British Protectorates. The agreement with Ibn Saud, king 
of Soltanate of Nejd, had been signed some 30 years earlier in 1915 and it wa~ in 
recognition of the importance of the stabilising the region that Britain resumed 
subsidies to Ibn Saud in 1940. Baxter recorded the British subsid~' for the year 
77 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 965 968. 
78 PRO FO 371/Persia 61971 7 July 1947, 61973 13 October 1947. 
79 PRO FO 371/Persia 61972 12 September 1947, 29 September 1947. FRUS 1948 Yol 5 pp 97 
80 Pollard, pp 113. Kuniholm, pp 192-202. Lytle, pp 82-99. 
81 Jenkins, pp 115-117. 
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1940 as 396,582 pounds.82 However, once Irano-Soyiet Oil Concession was rejected 
by the Majles in October 1947. the Iranian Government came under attack b~· left-
ists who found the Irano-American Relationship an excuse for turning Iran into a 
base against the Soviet Union. In the same year. Ambassador .-\llen put into effect 
the new policy of active opposition to the Soviet Cnion and saw in :"Iosaddegh a 
possible opponent to Soviet infiltration.83 
4.6 American Economic Aid 
In March 1948, a policy planning paper recommended that treaties be signed 
with the Near Eastern countries but this idea was abandoned by both the State 
Department and the Foreign Office. Britain did not ,vant to commit herself outside 
NATO but since the war pro-Shah governments had attempted different methods 
to acquire aid. Iran had requested American non-combat milit ar~' equipments in 
September 1946 which was finally sold to Iran in 1948 for 26,000,000 dollars. For 
the first time Washington had sold weapons to Iran. The first shipment of combat 
goods including light tanks and fighter planes arrived on 9 Februar~' 1949. The 
growth of the army, however, did not correspond with the economic growth. 84 
The Seven Year Plan was an example of economic advice. It was a 1250-page 
five-volume report prepared by the American firm Overseas Consultants Inc with 
a 650,000,000 dollars budget. But American policy-makers in 1948 were busy with 
policy towards other parts of the world. After the end of crisis in Azarbaijan, 
Washington was reluctant to involve itself greatly in Iran. Secretar~' ?\Iarshall 
believed that in any case Europe could be used to stand as the first line of defence 
82 PRO FO 371 EI775/128/25 16 March 1944 Baxter Minutes on Anglo-American Oil Agreement 
Discussions. 
83 Elwell-Sutton, Oil Diplomacy, pp 193. 
84 FRUS 1949 Vol 6 pp 1-5. 
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to keep Moscow out of Iran. 85 Some Iranian politicians were against large arms 
credit. On 17 February 1948, Hakimi cautiously suggested 10,000,000 dollar credit 
arguing that Iran could afford it from the oil revenue. The ~Iajles accepted this 
by a vote of 79 to 6. 86 The Soviet threat on Iran was gradually building up and 
Ambassador Wiley was justifiably accused by Britain for attacking i\Ioscow by 
encouraging Iran to bring their case before the Security Council for a revision of 
the Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and Soviet Union. 87 
In 1949 the Soviet threat was considered serious. When Ambassador \Viley 
returned to Washington early 1949, he had lengthy discussions with Iranian dele-
gation at the United Nations and the State Department supported the idea that, 
should the threat become a reality, Iran should immediately inform the Security 
Council as they did early 1946. Under Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty, Moscow had a 
right to advance into Iran but under the United Nations Charter, their right ap-
pears to have been suppressed. The communications between Ambassador Wiley 
and the State Department early 1949 suggests that the Ambassador considered 
the threat seriously but Secretary Acheson viewed it differently and invited Wi-
ley to act according to the Departmental policy.88 Iran again requested economic 
help in 1949. Help could only be provided through the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Allies 
had called Iran the bridge to victory. for providing an all-weather route to the 
Soviet Union and this became an excuse for pro-Shah forces to request post-war 
assistance periodically. Early 1947, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
concluded that the United States was "committed to economic assistance" under 
85 Brown S, pp 46-47. 
86 FRUS 1948 Vol 5 pp 99-101 166. 
87 Ibid, pp 160-161 173. 
88 FRUS 1949 Vol 6 pp 492-494 519-512. 
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the 1943 Declaration of Alliance. 89 
In 1949, Iran made a number of requests for help and Iranian Ambassador 
once asked for 100,000,000 dollars supported by Acheson. 9o Some American diplo-
mats, like Loy Henderson, had already suspected that I\'loscow would abuse Iran's 
economic weakness. 91 If Moscow's desire was to turn Iran or some part of it into 
a Soviet satellite, Iran eventually became an American satellite through the con-
tinuous supply of American aid.92 The American reluctance to help Iran at this 
time may be explained by the fact that the United States itself had budgetary 
problems. America had a budget surplus in 1947-48. Now in 1949 the budget 
deficit was 3 billion dollars. Despite this the Shah in search of aid desired a trip to 
Washington and Ambassador Wiley sent a number of communications to prepare 
the way for the Shah's trip to America in pursuance of his policy of attracting 
Americans. This, in conjunction with other indications, can be taken as Wiley's 
incompetence compared to Ambassador Allen. In spite of all the difficulties facing 
Truman administration and the State Department's advice that the time was not 
right, Wiley was so keen on a trip which proved to be a failure. 
Monarchists, seeking American help, encouraged the Shah to go to Washington 
in November 1949. Washington was more interested in Europe, Turkey and Greece 
than in Iran. Domestically, it had not been possible to have the Supplementary 
Agreement ratified and there was public concern about the lack of progress. 93 
The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development was reluctant to lend 
money to Iran. The Shah was keen on obtaining help. He visited a number of 
89 Ford, pp 47-48. 
90 FRUS 1949 Vol 6 pp 523-525. New York Times, 20 November 1949. 
91 FRUS 1949 Vol 7 pp 520 521 523-525. 
92 Lencowzski, Soviet Advances ... , pp 340-341. 
93 PRO FO 371/Persia 75468 EI4184/11015/134 18 November 1949. 
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officials and even piloted a bomber in Ohio in an attempt to impress his hosts. 
But at this time Berlin Blockade seemed to be more important than the ;\1iddle 
East. Besides, the State Department was unprepared to help third world countries. 
The Shah returned to Iran unsuccessful. 
Acheson who took office in January 1949 did not have much knowledge of the 
third world countries and to him requests for help appeared to be attempts to 
obtain commitment outside the United States.94 Such was the situation in April 
1950, when Assistant Secretary McGhee warned that "time of collapse may not be 
far away". and that Iran could fall into Soviet camp in search of aid. 95 Officials 
agreed that economic assistance was needed and chose Grady, the Ambassador to 
Greece, to make promises of 50,000,000 dollar loan from Export-Import Bank. In 
Iran, as in Washington, it was felt that a strong prime minister was needed to 
ratify the Supplementary Agreement. The choice fell on Razmara. Grady arrived 
soon after Razmara formed his cabinet but was Grady really dispatched to solve 
economic problems of Iran? The answer is most probably negative. 
The Korean war had started in June 1950. The Soviet Army started pres-
sure tactics on Iran, such as troop movements in Caucasus and abducting Ira-
nian soldiers and General McArthur believed that following Korea, Iran was the 
next victim,96 but economic aid to many third world countries including Iran was 
stopped,97 and Grady's mission was viewed by Acheson not as a means of economic 
progress but to raise expectations.98 The Iranian Government was not passive as 
94 McLlelan, pp 398. 
95 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 509-518. 
96 FRUS 1950 Vol 1 pp 324 329. Vol 5 pp 572-573. Vol 7 pp 181 314 369. 
97 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 180-184 576. 
98 Ibid, pp 519. 
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in July 1950 they requested a 25,000,000 dollar loan from Export-Import Bank.99 
but American involvement in the Far East jeopardised the grant of the loan. loo 
There was also concern because Britain believed that the loan could encourage 
Iran not to come to terms over the Supplementary Agreement. E\Oentually. t he~' 
agreed with 6,000,000 dollars which was viewed by Grady not good enough.lOl 
Grady himself commented later on that Washington should ha\"e come in quicker 
to avoid oil nationalisation. 102 
The Korean War diverted the attention of policy makers to the Far East and 
Europe where Soviet invasion would be considered likely. Nevertheless, Washington 
decided in July 1950 that the invasion of Iran would create a situation whereby a 
general war was unavoidable but the task of the defence of Iran was considered to be 
that of Britain and that explains why they commented that the oil issue should be 
settled as soon as possible.103 In October, Washington decided to invade Khuzestan 
if Moscow invaded Iran. 104 Britain also considered sending Commonwealth troops 
from Pakistan and India.105 However, Iran was never invaded but Razmara played 
a power game in Autumn 1950 when Iran signed a trade agreement with Soviet 
Union and stopped the Voice of America relaying broadcasts on Tehran Radio. 
This was, according to the State Department, a violation of standards of diplomatic 
conduct. Tehran was, however, unrepentant in that they even removed restriction 
against the Tudeh Party. This is a good example of the uncertainties surrounding 
Iranian politics of 1940's. 
99 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 590-591. Etelat, 15 Tir 1329 (6 July 1950). 
100 Acheson, pp 502. 
101 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 591-600. 
102 Grady, What went wrong in Iran, Saturday Evening Post, 5 January 1952, pp 57. 
103 FRUS 1950 Vol 3 pp 1657. 
104 FRUS 1950 Vol 1 pp 324 380 387 437 447. FRUS 1951 Vall pp 6-7 68 1018-1019 1039. 
105 PRO FO 371 82353 EP1192/15/34 26 Oct 1950. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Looking back at the events of 1940's, one can see that \Vashington:s invoh'e-
ment in Iran was an obvious consequence of Anglo-Soviet inyasion of 1941. Britain 
eventually had to request for American assistance in any case but it was pro-Shah 
attempts which deepened their involvement. America eventually found itself in a 
position whereby they either had to witness the collapse of the strategically im-
portant Iran or support the Shah. In 1950's they even had to refrain from helping 
nationalists in an attempt to maintain the Western position in the area. \\'ash-
ington had no choice except to side with Britain. Supporting Iranian nationalists 
would jeopardise American oil interests elsewhere especially in British-occupied 
Bahrain. In addition, Anglo-American special relationship which had begun in 
1941 would be damaged. 
Washington watched Mosaddegh closely since the beginning of the oil national-
isation and when supporters deserted him, Washington decided to act as a mediator 
and urged him to negotiate. This caused considerable resentment and demonstra-
tions in Iran during which Kashani, the Speaker of Majles, called the United States 
another imperialistic power hand in hand with Britain and called on Mosaddegh 
to find another customer for Iranian oil amongst the Soviet block. 106 
Collaboration between Washington and London grew stronger and it was with 
American backing that monarchists defeated communists and nationalists and re-
stored the Shah to power in a coup in August 1953. However, despite their in-
volvement in the coup one has to accept that, in general, America treated foreign 
nationals better than the Britain. In accordance with the Atlantic Charter, they 
returned a fair share of their oil to improve their countries and contributed to the 
106 Taraghi, 29 Khordad 1332 (19 June 1953) pp 2. 
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stability of the local governments. 
The cooperation between Moscow and Washington should be seen from a differ-
ent point of view. In general there were a number of mutual concerns and interests 
which gave rise to their cooperation during the Second \\TorId \\'ar. Firstly. the 
defeat of Germany to the point of unconditional surrender. Secondl~". to avoid de,"-
astation of the Soviet Union due to the effects of the war and thirdly, to maintain 
the world peace. However, Stalin's cooperation soon turned into suspicion and 
mistrust. The main reason for this was Stalin's idea of the second front. 
To relieve the Soviet army which was fiercely engaged in war with Germany, 
Stalin was in favour of American land forces opening a second front in Western 
Europe, an indication of which was Molotov's trip to Washington in May 1942.107 
However, such an invasion would require certain level of armaments production 
in Britain which would not be reached before 1943. As an alternative, Churchill 
suggested an offensive in the North Africa in the Autumn of 1942.108 The offensive 
was met with tough resistance by the Vichy and German troops the result of which 
was a prolonged fight and the surrender of Tunisia in May 1943. 
Apart from Stalin's desire of the second front, the fundamental mistrust be-
tween Moscow and the West was based on the anti-Soviet policy of the Western 
countries since 1917 although the lengthy postponement of the second front in 1942 
and 1943 must have increased Stalin's suspicion that the West might have reached 
an agreement with Hitler. Roosevelt was worried that Stalin could have reached 
an agreement with Germany and urged Stalin for a conference of the three powers 
in 1943. 
107 FRUS 1942 Vol 3 pp 577-594. 
108 Pogue, pp 305. 
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The coalition was overshadowed by suspicion on either side. The reason was not 
always strategic but divergence of the economic interests as well. During the war. 
Washington was faced with the over-production of industrial goods and equipment. 
On the contrary, Moscow needed considerable supply of such goods to offset the 
effects of the war. One would expect that Allied coalition would ha\'e justified 
extending credit to Moscow after the war. Some American politicians. howen'r. 
took a different view, George Kennan, for instance, believed that Moscow would 
take advantage of the situation. l09 The Roosevelt administration decided initiall~' 
to extend the lend-lease agreement free from any political conditions. l1° In 1945, 
Congress announced its unwillingness to extend lend-lease allowances. The war 
coalition broke up in the same year and, apart from the oil crisis of 1944 in Iran, 
the most significant conflict between the East and West developed over the issue 
of Eastern Europe which was to determine the course of international politics. 
With regard to the Soviet Union, the change from a Tsarist autonomy to a 
communist state in 1917 made little difference to Iran. Formally, all concessions 
obtained under the Tsarist regime were cancelled and some property was returned 
to Iran. l1l However, soon Soviet imperialism helped to establish the Republic 
of Gilan by the Iranian communists. It was as if Russian policy of intrusion 
into Iran had remained unchanged. 112 The Second World War became a good 
opportunity for Stalin to occupy north of Iran. Although Allied powers understood 
that the occupation did not offer them any territorial rights, Stalin eventuall~' 
refused to withdraw troops. It was as if Secretary Hull had suspected this from 
109 FRUS 1943 Vol 3 pp 722f Kennan's memoirs. Memorandum of Sept 1944. 
110 Herring, pp 150. 
111 See page 57. 
112 Comments made by Zhirnovsky about Iran indicates that the same way of thinking still exists in 
Russia. 
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the very beginning when he sought public commitment from the Allieds .. -\5 early 
as 27 August 1941, he had advised Ambassador Oumansky that both London and 
Moscow should repeat this assurance and that such statement would have a healthy 
effect on Moslem world. 113 
This undertaking was affirmed in the Tripartite Treaty of January 19-12. Con-
trary to this, Moscow sealed off north of Iran to foreigners and the communist 
party outlawed under Reza Shah appeared as Tudeh Party \vith full Sm'iet back-
ing in the north. On 23 September 1941, Eden cabled the British representatiyE' in 
Moscow regarding Azarbaijan informing him that "about first September, a large 
open air meeting had been held at Tabriz which was chiefly attended by A rmeni-
ans, who demanded independence for Azarbaijan and its federation with the Soviet 
Union" .114 
In 1944, the Iranian oil reserves became a source of friction between two coun-
tries when Kavtaradze proposed an Oil Concession for 75 years. As Yalta Confer-
ence approached Churchill sent a secret telegram to Roosevelt on 15 January 1945 
reminding him that "they have refused to accept the Persian decision to grant no 
concessions until after the war: and have brought about the fall of a Persian Prime 
Minister... This may be something of a test case... Persia is not the only place 
where the bad effect will be felt".115 At Yalta, Eden took note of Moscow's desire 
for the Iranian oil but insisted that oil concessions should not be obtained by force. 
He suggested that the withdrawal could be effected as soon as the supply route 
through Iran was shut down. Molotov, however, believed that the decision not to 
grant oil concession was in contradiction to the early assurances. He was proba-
113 FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 435. 
11·1 FRUS 1941 Vol 3 pp 468. 
115 H' 44 urewltz, pp 2 -245. 
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bly referring to the promise made by the Iranian Government after the inyasion 
to cooperate in the development of the Kayir Khurian oil concession. 116 He also 
stated that Iranian people have always benefited from the Soviet economic role in 
Iran and the decision not to grant oil concessions was against their desire ! He was 
surprised why question of withdrawal was raised at the conference and urged that 
the discussion be suspended. Molotove even refused to consider a communique 
reaffirming Tehran Declaration. They firmly believed that this matter should be 
pursued through diplomatic channels.1I7 
At Potsdam Conference of July 1945 the question of Iran again came up but 
Stalin appeared to make war with Japan an excuse not to withdraw from Iran 
although under the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, evacuation of troops was considered 
six months after the end of the war in Europe. It is obvious that Britain wanted 
to hold their grip on the oil industry in Iran without Soviet rivalry but Moscow 
had no justification as they had not yet declared war on Japan. Stalin agreed 
with withdrawal from Tehran and as Truman planned to transfer troops to the 
Pacific, Stalin gave assurances that he would not take any action against Iran.1I8 
The question of withdrawal from Iran remained unresolved even at the Council 
of Foreign Minister in London in September 1945. It was only mentioned in the 
secret protocol of the conference.1I9 In the post-war period, however, the priorities 
of the Soviet foreign policy were directed towards Eastern Europe, the Balkans 
and the Far East. 
The occupation of Iran in 1941 was an important political event in the Iranian 
116 Lencowzski, Russia and ... , pp 170. 
117 Stettinius, Roosevelt and ... , pp 175 230 . See appendix A. 
118 Feis, pp 304. 
119 FRUS, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) pp 593-594 1460-1-196. 
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modern history. It was Reza Shah's non-cooperation with Allieds and the strong 
pro-German sentiment in Iran which encouraged the Allied to occupy. The interest 
in Germany was so strong amongst the Iranian educated that even after the occu-
pation, in January 1942, a group of Iranain army officers founded an underground 
Organisation called Nehzate Melliun Iran (National ~Iovement of Iran) headed by 
General Zahedi, commander of Esfehan Garrison. Franz ~Ia~T was in touch with 
general Zahedi and Major Bertold Schulz was the advisor to the Ghashghai tribes 
in the British-occupied South. Their plan was to prepare the Iranian Army to 
assist Germany's invasion of Iran. They were supposed to revolt against the Allies 
as soon as the battle of Stalingrad was won by Germany. Factions emerged among 
the group and one of them turned them in to the British agents. Kashani, who 
was in touch with the group, was arrested and exiled to Palestine. In his trial, 
Kashani said that he was aware of the landing of Germany's parachutists among 
Ghashghais in the South. 120 Nazi intrigues in Iran ended in 1943 when British 
Army captured both Mayr and Schulz. 
However, without the occupation the abdication of Reza Shah would not be 
possible. Iran became a new battleground for the powers but the electoral cam-
paigns of the 14th and the 16th Majles resulted in a new political environment 
unseen before during which public awareness and interest in country's problems 
increased. The Allieds eventually respected Iran's sovereignty and withdrew their 
forces, that is what Hitler would probably have never done had he won the bat-
tle against Moscow. Iran never acquired the pluralistic political system that was 
promised in the early 1940's. However, the fight against absolutism, the aspira-
tions of the new society, the desire for independence and a parliamentar~' ruling 
120 Rad, 23 Tir 1322 (14 July 1943). 
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system continued to exist. Without the occupation, the nationalists would have 
never achieved a forum in the Majles to attain the oil nationalisation. 
Moscow's attitude towards the West was as defiant as before. They continued 
criticising the presence of American service troops in Iran even at the time they 
were receiving supplies. Soviet hostility towards the \Yest \\"as quite understand-
able. They had both strategic and ideological reasons. Iran \\"as an outlet to the 
oceans, had large oil resources and was an ideal base for communist infiltration 
of the Middle East. Moscow's actions in Iran was due to the expansionist inten-
tions of Stalin although, in this regard, Soviet's expansionist histor~' should not be 
overlooked as this was their policy since the early 1800's. 
The collapse of the Soviet-German alliance and the declaration of war on 22 
June 1941 made Iran a potential battlefield. The massive German drive towards 
the Caucasus changed Iran's strategic position dramatically. Reza Shah did not 
cooperate with the Allies leaving them with no choice except to invade Iran. The 
construction of the Iranian railway had provided the basic infra-structure for a 
supply route to the Soviet Union. A possible German advance towards India could 
be blocked in Iran and the importance of the Iranian oil for Britain was too evident. 
Moscow invaded the north and British the south. 
After the defeat of the Germany's offensive in 1943, Moscow was in a better 
position to interfere in Iran but they were now faced with two rivals, London and 
Washington. The involvement of American service troops in Iran, the monarchists 
attempts to drag America into the Iranian affairs, and American oil developments 
in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, had changed Washington's position. The disintpr-
ested Washington of 1920's, which had no sinister intentions in Iran, had no\\" 
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turned into one of the Shah~s allies and concerned about the post-war settlement 
in Iran. 121 In preparing Roosevelt for Tehran Conference. Secretary Hull warned 
"it is to our interest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite 
the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia. ~·.1:::: The Change 
of the American attitude from passivity of 1920~s to full engagement in 1940's was 
most remarkable. 
The rightness of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran is difficult to assess. Reza 
Shah would have probably never agreed to cooperate with the Allies. There was no 
other safe route to assist Moscow and Allies had no other wa~' to control the Iranian 
railway without resort to force. Although Iran had declared neutrality and showed 
no aggression, the requirements of the international law could not have prevented 
the occupation if the result was to lose the fight against Germany. However, one 
thing could have been expected by the Iranians. In recognising the role played by 
Iran, the moral burden on Britain was to assist Iran in the post-war period and in 
particular resolve the oil dispute which had been dragging on for many years. 
Instead Iranians encountered hostility, stubbornness and humiliation. 
121 FRDS 1943 Vol 4 pp 330. 
122 Ibid, pp 378. 
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Chapter V 
The Crisis 
5.1 Introduction 
The Iranian desire to have a share in the exploitation of the Iranian oil resources 
was evident, despite lack of expertise and finance, from the yer:" early years of 
oil search in Iran. The Russo-Persian Naphta Company established in 1896, the 
oil concessions granted to Iranian nationals, the Amiranian Oil Company and 
the acquisition of shares in the Soviet controlled Kavir-Khurian Oil company, are 
examples of this. The application of the old policy of "movazeneh"l also played a 
part in this respect. After the conclusion of the First \\Torld 'Var, which resulted in 
the partition of the Ottoman Empire and the division of its oil resources between 
France and the Soviet Union, Iranian statesmen attempted to involve American 
oil companies in the North. This did not succeed but the idea of finding a rival for 
the British oil industry in Iran continued to exist. 
In 1925, Iran acquired 35 per cent share in Kavir-Khurian Oil Company. In 
1932, Reza Shah's dissatisfaction with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company resulted in 
the cancellation of the oil concession and the draft of a new oil concession covering 
a much less area. In 1941, only 5 days after the occupation, Moscow requested 
Iranian cooperation to develop Kavir-Khurian Oil Company, but this request was 
met with reluctance on the part of the Iranian Government as a result of which 
the idea was forgotten until 1944. The monarchists, resorting to the policy of 
For a description of movazeneh see pages 36-37 and Section 4.2 . 
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"movazeneh" continued to involve Americans into Iranian affairs. The Standard 
Oil Company of New Jersey surveyed Baluchestan. 
In the early 1940's, it seemed as if Britain had realised that the ,,'estern control 
of the East was no longer possible in its conventional way as Britain needed a 
partner to assist in the war which could not be anybody else except \Yashington. 
This was not only in view of the intensifying war as even exploiting the j\Iiddle 
Eastern oil fields needed Anglo-American cooperation. 2 The Anglo-American Oil 
conference of 1944-45, initiated by London, is an indication of this. The first 
conference was held in April 1944 and was attended b~' representatives of Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, Royal Dutch Shell Group, British Board of Trade, Admiralty, 
British Treasury, Foreign Office and Ministry of Fuel and Power. This conference 
was followed by a second conference in July 1944 and on 8 August, an agreement 
was reached defining principles of operation of the oil industries and setting up an 
international petroleum commission. All the oil-producing countries were excluded 
to have a say in the commission! This agreement did not pass through the Congress 
and was withdrawn in January 1945. The principles established by the conferences, 
however, continued to guide oil policies of both countries. 
The involvement of American oil companies in the early 1940's was a turn-
ing point in the history of oil in Iran. 3 In response to this, Moscow dispatched 
Kavtaradze to Tehran, an event which resulted in the oil crisis of 1944 which 
received considerable international attention and Majles debates during which 
deputy Rahimian demanded oil nationalisation. Mosaddegh declined to back him 
arguing that time was not right for oil nationalisation. The Majles which had 
2 There is still a rumour that British agents encouraged Japanese to attack Pearl Harbour to lure 
Washington into the war ! 
3 See pages 129-130. 
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opened in the early 1944 was the first free-elected ~lajles since the enthronement 
of Reza Shah in 1925 and had acquired considerable power. The public desire to 
have a say in political affairs was high.4 
Mosaddegh disagreed with the abrogation of the 1933 oil conceSSIOn when 
Rahimian asked him to back a single-article bill for the annulment of the oil con-
cession. At the same time, he supported another bill forbidding future gmrern-
ments from negotiating and granting oil concessions to foreigners without ~Iajles 
approval. The 14th Majles had been elected freely, the deputies gave a straw ,rote 
for the premiership of Mosaddegh and Mosaddegh had been elected as Tehran's 
First Deputy. Why did he not back Rahimian ? It was perhaps because there was 
no single party with firm political backing in the Majles or because the Second 
World War had not ended yet and Iran was still under occupation) but Tehran 
was in the free zone and deputies had bravely defied Soviet pressure by rejecting 
Kavtaradze's proposals. Unlike industrial countries, in Iran political parties did 
not represent the aspirations of social classes but mostly served the interests of in-
dividuals or groups. This was not unexpected as there was no tradition to rel~" on, 
tactics and ideology were not known, social interests were conflicting, suppression 
was intense and foreign intrigue was strong. 
The following year witnessed other important events. The Soviet's refusal to 
comply with the requirements of the Tri-partite Agreement of 1943 to evacuate 
Iran, caused an international crisis. Premier Ghavam seized the opportunity to se-
cure the withdrawal by offering an oil concession to Moscow. It was the ratification 
of this concession which again made oil an issue for public debate in 1947. GhaY(lm 
had offered Moscow oil rights in the north in an attempt to force the Soviets out 
4 See Sections 3.2 and 3.9 . 
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of Iran. Now in 1947 and in view of the Iranian elections. ~Ioscm\' was anxious to 
have the agreement ratified and this did not go unnoticed by the \Yest. The issue 
of the Irano-Soviet Oil Company had been discussed between Bevin and Stalin in 
r.larch 1947 at the Moscow Conference of Foreign ~Iinisters \vithout any objections 
from Washington. 5 The British Ambassador, Le Rougetel, believed that rejecting 
the Oil Concession by the Majles would be resented by ~Ioscow. Britain was not 
opposed to the Irano-Soviet Oil Agreement as long as it was fair and acceptable. 
However, in rejecting the Irano-Soviet Oil Concession, Ghavam may have con-
sidered the American stand to Moscow in Greece and Turke~' and the fact that 
granting the concession would be seen by the West as an intrusion in Iran. The 
events surrounding Irano-Soviet Oil Concession ma~r have increased suspicion be-
tween East and West which led to the Cold War. I\Ioscow had more than oil in 
mind when they pressed Ghavam for Majles ratification of the concession as they 
had extensive oil reserves in the Caucasus which needed development. Bevin had 
assured Stalin that Britain would encourage Iran to offer the concession in return 
for Stalin's assurance that Moscow would not interfere in Iran's internal affairs. At 
this time, there was a rumour that, just as they did in 1915, London and I\10scow 
had secretly divided Iran so that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could be protected. 6 
In 1947, Washington was unwilling to start an oil competition in Iran. 7 This was 
most probably because they had an oil industry in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 
However, once Irano-Soviet Oil Concession was rejected by the i\Iajles in October 
1947, the Iranian Government came under attack by leftists who found the 
5 FRUS 1947 Vol 5 pp 929-930 934 953. PRO FO 371/Persia 61970. 
6 PRO FO 371/Persia 61972 12 September 1947, 29 September 1947. FRFS 1948 Yoi 5 pp 97. 
7 Pollard, pp 113. Kuniholm, pp 192-202. Lytle, pp 82-99. 
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Irano-American Relationship an excuse for turning Iran into a base against the 
Soviet Union. 8 
5.2 Development of Iranian Nationalism in the 1940's 
In the late 1940's Iranian society suffered from extreme and unprecedented 
nationalism. Nationalism could not have suddenly appeared in Iran with the re-
jection of the Supplementary Agreement in 1949. The roots of Iranian nationalism 
extends deep into Iran's long history. The development of Iranian nationalism 
of the 1940's can only be understood by studying the rejection of the Tobacco 
Rebellion of 1891 and the 1906 Constitutional Movement and the few following 
years leading to the closure of the Majles in 1911 because of foreign intrigue. The 
Tobacco Rebellion of 1891 and the period 1906-1911 were important years dur-
ing which character of Iranian nationalism was originally formed. All the future 
campaigns for democracy in Iran were modelled on Tobacco Rebellion of 1891 and 
the example and aspirations for great changes were provided by the Constitutional 
Movement of 1906. 
The widespread public support for the clergy's demand for the cancellation 
of the profitable Tobacco Concession to the British interests in 1891 must have 
helped the public to realise that time had come to challenge the traditional obe-
dience to the Shah. By this time, the Western educated had already transmitted 
sufficient knowledge of the Western way of life to demand a new ruling system. 
The Shah's assassination in 1896 was an unprecedented event which paved the wa~' 
for fundamental changes in Iranian society. It is not surprising to see the quick 
establishment of the parliament in 1906 and public support for it. 
8 FRUS 1948 Vol 5 pp 130 160. 
165 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century~ the political influence of Britain 
had become, at least in Tehran and Southern Iran, an obvious fact of life. Resort-
ing to the British influence became so common that in 1906 and for the first time 
in Iranian history, some 16,000 people sought sanctuary in the British Legation to 
demand changes in absolute monarchy. Britain had been identified with the Con-
stitutional Movement. The understanding of British influence, their secret contacts 
with influential ministers, religious leaders and Bazar; will help to understand why 
concessions so valuable were so easily granted to British subjects and not to other 
Europeans. The description of the Iranian society and political situation shortl~' 
before 1900 given in Section 2.1 helps understand why concessions were granted at 
all and why they differ in details as leadership and public awareness develops. 
The Public had already expressed resentment over De'Reuter's concession in 
1873. This concession gave De'Reuter exclusive right for 70 years to exploit forests, 
all minerals, construct roads and railways, as well as monopoly over banking. \\'hat 
enabled De'Reuter to obtain this concession was the payment of 180,000 pounds to 
the Shah. 9 The public resentment over granting concessions was such that Seyyed 
Jamaleddin, an Iranian reformist, told Edward Browne that reforms would not be 
possible until six heads were cut off, the first two those of the Shah and his prime 
minister.lO Concession-hunting by foreigners had become so common that to avoid 
interference Britain and Russia defined two zones of influence in Iran and signed 
an agreement to this effect in 1907.11 Later on, the oil discovery in the south 
motivated Britain to sign a secret agreement with Russia for further division of 
the zones. When these treaties were disclosed, they deeply offended the Iranian 
9 Jones G, pp 11. 
10 Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 45. 
11 Ibid, pp 150. 
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sense of national dignity. 
When the Shah arranged, with the help of Russian Cossacks, for the bombard-
ment of the Majles, the public was infuriated. Having removed the Shah from 
power in 1909, the nationalists just began to realise how difficult it was to find so-
lutions for Iranian problems. There was not much security outside principle cities 
and the government's authority would not go further than Tehran. The Iranian 
finances were in chaos because taxes could not be collected. Corruption and lack 
of revenues forbade restoration of authority and order. 1\ ationalists were also con-
cerned about the honesty of some Majles deputies. Fearing passing bills under 
foreign intrigue, they decided to close the Majles down in 1911. The closure lasted 
for 6 years. This was an important period in Iranian history during which Iranian 
modern nationalism took form. It was during these years that nationalists with 
liberal values gave a new direction to the Iranian traditional nationalism. The 
potential for great changes was recognised during these years. 
Before 1891, all the cohesive ingredients of nationalism were present in Iran. 
The reason why nationalism did not find a base amongst ordinar~' people was most 
probably illiteracy, population dispersal, lack of transport and the existence of only 
a tiny population who were politically aware. The public was not expected to par-
ticipate in political life. If nationalism is defined as a phenomenon of mass politics, 
then 1940's should be considered as the beginning of the Iranian nationalism and 
the 50 years between 1891 and 1941 as the formative years. This definition is 
more applicable to Iran as in the 1940's nationalism was the determinant factor of 
political behaviour of most Iranians. 12 
Nationalism in its Western style also brought modernism to Iran. Howev\,r. 
l'1 
- See Section 3.4 and 3.9 . 
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not all Iranian nationalists were modernists. It is true to say that in view of strong 
\Nestern influence in Iran, Iranian nationalism soon became associated with a desire 
for great social changes. It became polarised and complicated with the Bolshevik 
Revolution although it had already been affected through indirect colonial control 
of both Russian and British empires. An example of this is the tragic story of 
Kuchek Khan of Jungle, the leader of Gilan Movement in 1910:s.l3 A. landowner 
and a liberal intellectual, he was inclined towards Russia but his primary loyalty 
was directed towards the Iranian nation. In 1915, he met with a group of intellec-
tuals in Tehran and drew up a reform program for the entire Iran rather than the 
province of Gilan. 14 
Throughout the history, Iranian tribes and minorities helped fighting foreign 
invaders and shared a unique history.15 Amongst a multitude of other loyalties, 
they all showed a primary loyalty to the nation. An obvious example of this is the 
loyalty shown to the nation by Azarbaijanis in 1909. After bombardment of the 
Majles by the Shah who had opposed Constitutionalism, the Shah's troops lay siege 
to Tabriz. Several hundred Turkish-speaking Azarbaijanis gave their lives to defeat 
the forces of absolutism. Two local heroes, Sattar Khan and Bagher khan, led the 
Azarbaijanis throughout the 10 months siege. Their resistance revitalised national-
ists all over Iran. After Tabriz was released they joined with Bakhtiaris and moved 
towards Tehran to form a national government. Azarbaijanis had the choice to de-
clare independence, join the Ottoman Empire or the Russian Azarbaijan. Their 
loyalty was, however, with the nation. The political behaviour of Azarbaijanis 
was identical to that of Farsi-speaking Iranians indicating that Iran possessed the 
13 See Section 4.3 for Moscow's support for local rebellion in the north of Iran. 
14 Lencowzsky, Russia and ... , pp 54. 
15 Ibid, pp 232. 
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elements which were extremely useful for the integration of nationalism: history. 
nation state and a distinctive culture. This may explain the widespread support 
for Mosaddegh in 1951. 
The 1910's was a period of uncertainty in the politics of Iran. Iran declared 
neutrality but the First World War extended to Iran. After the Bolshevik Rev-
olution, Britain tried to turn Iran into a British protectorate through the 1919 
Anglo-Persian Treaty. Nationalistic opposition was fierce but this period of Ira-
nian history had failed to produce a national leader with firm political backing. 
There was simply no audience to which a secular national leader could appeal 
which will explain the widespread role that clerics played in politics of these years. 
Taking advantage of the situation, Britain arranged for a coup in 1921 which 
was carried out by Reza Khan. Reza Khan was an illiterate Cossack who rose 
rapidly through Iranian ranks. He soon overtook control of the government and 
was elected, through intimidation, as the Shah in 1925. This year was definitely 
the end of the aspirations of Iranian reformists who initiated the Constitutional 
Movement of 1906. Reza Shah is known in the Iranian history as a dictator whose 
rule was symbolised with prison. Many Iranian politicians quit politics under his 
rule. He was, however, a fierce nationalist with his own national values. Under 
him, modernisation of Iran began and the oil revenues were used to back issuing 
notes, importing goods from industrial countries and help currency reserves. He 
removed the insecurity and extended the government:s authority all over Iran. Reza 
Shah did what no traditional leader was able to do after the 1906 Constitutional 
Movement; he established stable control over the entire country. 
Under Reza Shah, Iranian nationalism in terms of mass politics was ignored 
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as he had no democratic sentiment, opposed all liberal institutions and Tolerated 
no criticisms. However, he managed to make Iran a national state although under 
him Iranian nationalism did not develop. In this period there was a sense of 
economic depravation amongst Azarbaijani and Kurdish communities which gave 
rise to separatist sentiment in 1940's. It was perhaps Reza Shah's anger against 
Britain which led him to establish friendly relationships with :\"azi Germany in 
1935. Germany like America had a good reputation in Iran for not being an 
imperialistic power. Reza Shah abdicated after Iran was occupied by the Allied. 
Only after his abdication it was realised that he had rendered a great service to 
Iran by removing the feudalistic system of government. A large number of people 
migrated to urban areas. The modernisation of Iran and centralisation of power 
had resulted in an urban nationalistic middle class concentrated in Tehran. 
After Reza Shah, a new era started in the history of Iran and there was hope 
for a pluralistic political system. A large number of political parties were formed 
and the press flourished. Hundreds of Farsi magazines, newspapers and pamphlets 
were published. The fall of Reza Shah was the beginning of a new period of 
parliamentary rule in Iran but in the early 1940's personality conflicts and fraksiun 
(factions) were ruling the Majles as there was no parliamentary tradition to rely 
on. The first Majles of this period, the 13th Majles had five fraksiuns. However, 
just as it did in 1910's, the re-appearance of nationalism in the early 1940's caused 
considerable problem for the central government as well as foreign powers. This 
time, the problem was compounded with the demands of a newly-emerged middle 
class and a large group of artisans, the product of the oil industr:;, with their 
demand for labour legislation. Unlike 1910's. this time German power did not 
exist but Iran was the scene of power rivalry. A new international power had been 
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added to the scene and the oil factor was to affect the conduct of both foreign 
and domestic politics of the ~tfiddle Eastern countries. ""hatever the ideological 
attractiveness, the power rivalry was more intense in Iran because of the existence 
of the world's largest oil industry in Iran. The development of Bahrain and Saudi 
Arabian oil industries across the Persian Gulf also added a new dimension to the 
rivalries. 
Several issues fuelled nationalistic feelings in the late 1940's which are worth 
investigating. In this category are Azarbaijan crisis and sovereignty over Bahrain. 
The other issue which was a major source of public resentment was the behaviour 
and attitude of the oil company officials. In particular, this was extremel~' impor-
tant in a country with a long history and civilisation. 
Prior to 1945-46, there is no evidence that the bulk of Azarbaijanis favoured 
an autonomous Azarbaijan. Under Reza Shah, there was a sense of resentment 
over economic depravations. However, this in itself did not amount to a desire 
for separatism as that was the case with other provinces. Rossow, the American 
consul in Tabriz, has suggested that the puppet regimes in Azarbaijan was a part 
of Stalin's expansionism than a popular Azarbaijani move. He suggests that in 
view of intensive Western interest in Greece and Turkey. the puppet regime was 
designed by Moscow to reduce the size of Turkey. 16 Pishevari was brought to power 
with the help of the Soviet Army which had occupied the north of Iran. In 19--1-1. 
he was elected a Majles deputy from Azarbaijan, but his credentials were rejected 
because of his separatist activities. He then suddenly discovered that Azarbaijan 
had a destiny of its own. No matter how well-calculated the Soviet design or what 
ideological attractiveness, Ghavam negotiated with Stalin in 1946 and offered him a 
16 Rossow, pp 17-32. 
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oil concession in the north. The massive international attention compounded with 
weak Tudeh Party position in Iran, eventually persuaded Stalin to withdraw from 
the north. The Iranian army moved to the province in December 19--16. After the 
end of Azarbaijan crisis, the Iranian sense of national dignity became stronger. 17 
The Tudeh agitators always looked for a topic for propaganda. :\ ationalistic 
feelings were running high in the late 1940's and Bahrain would make a good topic. 
Hakimi was a respected politician but not very effectiYe. The Tudeh deputies 
attacked his government for failing to secure Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain or 
to obtain better terms from the oil company. IS 
Iran had several times objected over the interference of foreign powers in the 
affairs of Bahrain. Bahrain was under Iranian rule until 1873 when Arabs seized it. 
Britain made several agreements with the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1880, 1882. 1906 
and 1914 and established a protectorate over Bahrain under which the Shaikh 
undertook not to enter into any relationship with other governments without ob-
taining Britain's consent. 19 Iran made repeated appeals to the League of Nations 
to recognise its claim over Bahrain between 1928 and 1936. When Shaikh of 
Bahrain offered oil concessions in 1930 and 1936, Iran again protested to London 
and Washington. In February 1948, Majles passed a bill instructing the govern-
ment to restore Iran's sovereignty over Bahrain. In August, Iran announced all 
pacts and agreement made between Bahrain and foreign powers null and void. 20 
Apart from Azarbaijan and Bahrain, the other issue which appealed to public 
sense of national dignity was the oil issue which, by 19--17, had become a matter 
17 For details of Azarbaijan crisis see Sections 4.3 and 4.4 . 
18 PRO FO 371/68704/Le Rougetel to FO, 7 January 1948. 
19 Mansfield, pp 118. 
20 Khadduri, pp 631-647. 
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for public debate. This was most probably because of the oil crisis of 19-1-l and the 
rejection of the Irano-Soviet oil Proposals in October 1947. The disputes arising 
from the oil issue included financial aspects, employment and subsidiaries. How-
ever, by 1948-49, perhaps the most important of all, were behayiour and attitude 
of the oil company officials. As explained before by this time oil had become a 
matter for public debate. It had come to the public attention that oil had been 
nationalised in Mexico and the Venezuelan Government was receiving income tax 
in addition to royalty. The Iraq Petroleum Company and new Kuwait oil conces-
sion paid six shillings gold per ton as royalty.21 This was more than three times 
the royalty paid to Iran. Non-compliance of the oil company with the terms of the 
1933 oil concession, as well as the concession itself, had become a matter of great 
concern for Iranians. The stubbornness of the company officials was very obvious 
as early as 1949 when Prime Minister Saed secretly visited London. His attempt 
to resolve the matter was to no avai1. 22 
The Iran and oil company relationship was an important issue as it was a source 
of social discontent. The relationship was far from satisfactory. There were numer-
ous examples of this. On 2 July 1946, workers went on strike in Aghajari making a 
number of demands amongst which drinking water and decent pay including that 
for the Friday. The wages were low and would not extend to Fridays which wPre 
public holidays. The company's response was to encourage native Arabs to form 
the Arab Union! The infuriated labourers clashed with Arab Union members in 
mid-July during which two of its members were killed. At about this time, the 
interest for labour legislation amongst artisans was strong. A large number of 
21 There has never been a coin representing four shillings gold. The interpretation in banking and 
foreign exchange transactions was that four shillings gold represented one-fifth of a gold pound. 
2:2 PRO FO 371/75480 E 12712/1055/34/18 October 1949. 
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artisans were attracted to the Zahmatkeshan Party (Toilers) led by Baghai. He 
came from a religious family but had democratic sentiment and appealed to the 
labour force. On 13 July, the whole oil industry in Khuzestan stopped. Ghayam 
declared martial law in the province. The British Nav~"s presence in the Persian 
Gulf was intensified and troops were put on alert in British India. The strike. 
however, broke down with the intervention of the Tudeh Party. The reason was 
that the Tudeh was in the process of forming a coalition cabinet with Ghavam. 
The standard of living of the Iranian employees had improved but industrial 
relationship was poor and Iranian employees lived apart from foreign employees. 
Not only British officials even ordinary British employees lived in European sectors 
isolated from the Iranian society. This had caused resentment amongst the Iranian 
employees. The oil company officials, however, carried on mistreating their Iranian 
employees, described by Fateh as perhaps one of their gravest mistakes. 23 Fateh 
had spent his whole career with the oil company. The company officials behaved 
irresponsibly when on the eve of the Iranian New Year, March 1950, they dismissed 
500 Iranian workers, a move which was so outrageous that the Department of 
State recommended that American Oil Companies should not behave like this. 
They suggested good labour relationship and encouraged consideration of public 
sentiment. 24 
The Iranians had found it very disturbing that high positions in the oil compall~' 
and decision-making were exclusive to British subjects. Up to 1935, 92 per cent 
of Iranian employees were illiterate. 25 As reported by New York Times, by 1950, 
the highest ranking Iranian in managerial hierarchy was assistant general manager 
23 Fateh, pp 447. 
24 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 86-89 97. 
25 Fateh, pp 443. 
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and the highest technical position given to Iranians was assistant chief chemist. 
In 1951, only 10.45 per cent of staff and skilled employees were Iranian. The :\ew 
York Times reported that, by 1951, only three Iranians had e\"er been to the control 
room of the power plant supplying the refinery.26 By 1951, the oil company had 
refused to let Iranian officials, as well as British ones, see its accounts !27 The 
oil company's personnel policy must have been a disgrace. ~obody appeared to 
have tried to understand the Iranian employees and the reason behind it was most 
probably British character. They hardly attempted to know people's wa~" of life 
and aspirations. Their arrogant attitude had long been noticed b~' Iranians. (ref) 
The colonial frame of mine and offensive remarks made bv some British of-
ficials were deeply resented the Iranian intellectuals. An example is the remarks 
made by Shinwell. Defence Secretary Shinwell warned against the" sport of twist-
ing the British lion's tail" 128 The colonial practices of the company officials who 
saw their only role to exploit oil at minimum expense without little or any regard 
for the country itself was evident.29 The oil deposits were transformed into an 
energy source of great value but the imperialistic patterns adopted by the com-
pany officials had long resulted in deep resentment and suspicion. Some of their 
decisions still remain difficult to understand. As mentioned earlier, on the eve of 
the Iranian New Year in March 1950, they suddenly laid off some 500 Iranian em-
ployees. Their number later on reached 4000. 30 Their attitude was most probably 
to antagonise rather than to cooperate with Iranians. Even assuming that they 
26 New York Times, 31 January 1953, pp 6. 
27 Williams, pp 249-254. 
28 Attlee, pp 175-176. 
29 This may be briefly summarised as : 1- royalty payment at a lower rate of gold price, 2- British 
income tax deductions, 3- dividend limitations, 4- oil sale at non-commercial prices, 5- domestic 
consumption of oil, 6- employment policy. 
30 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 86-89. 
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could not read Farsi or unwilling to mix with Iranians, at least one leading journal 
of oil industry had published a series of articles warning about lack of compromise 
over oil concessions in the Middle East. 31 This was the way British officials saw 
their relationship with Iran, but why was the attitude of the British employees not 
different? 
The answer again is not difficult to find. The resident employees were indebted 
to the oil company for facilities of every kind offered to them. f\Iost probably they 
saw themselves as a part of the company on which their job was dependent. Foreign 
staff lived in their own quarters, they were not encouraged to travel into Iran. they 
did not read Farsi publications, and the company's dail~' bulletin did not contain 
anything about Iranian problems. The segregation must have been complete in 
the use of public facilities, employment and social activities which were exclusively 
British. 
There is one more explanation for the stubbornness of the company officials. 
Whilst the American tax law allowed deduction of tax before profit calculations, 
the British tax law, perhaps in view of the hardship of war years. had no such 
provisions. Some of the remarks made by British Officials in this respect are of 
interest. The Inland Revenue would not break the taxation law "in order to make 
concessions to the Persians. ,,32 Their attitude's towards Iran was also remarkable. 
At the same time when American oilmen exercised high order of business states-
manship in dealing with Saudi Arabia, the British comment on Iran was that "if 
you give the Iranians an inch they'll take a mile"33 Neither side was capable of 
finding a quick settlement for the oil dispute as the dispute was subject of political 
31 Oil Forum, November 1948 to February 1949. 
,p 0 C PRO FO 371/75496,2 April 1949, Chadwick Note, Anglo-Persian il ompany. 
33 McGhee, Envoy to ... pp 324. 
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considerations on both sides. The problem with the oil company was not onl!' 
financial grievances. The Iranian Government accused the oil company of turn-
ing Khuzestan into an autonomous province and interfering with the affairs of the 
Central Government by bribing officials and encouraging them to be more loyal to 
the oil company. In Khuzestan, it looked as if the oil company was a government 
within a government. 
This attitude and behaviour in a society so proud of its cultural heritage and 
civilisation was most outrageous. The Iranian's consciousness of his cultural her-
itage and history has a significant bearing on the Iranian nationalism. His belief 
of his cultural pre-eminence in the Middle East gave him a feeling of uniqueness 
worthy of international respect. This consciousness and such a feeling helped rapid 
development of nationalistic values within the Iranian society. Naively, one might 
think that Britishs, in view of their democratic system, should have considered 
Iranian liberals as their ideological brothers. The colonial system of exploitation 
had no provisions for such considerations. 
Most Iranian nationalists were European educated and had come to contact 
with nationalism as a European phenomenon and experience. However, there were 
traditional nationalists in every walk of Iranian life who had nothing to do "'ith 
Europe. Examples are bazari elements and clerics. Clerical support for Iranian 
nationalism in general and for the oil nationalisation in particular was diverse. 
Some clerics like Kashani had liberal values and saw Iran as a part of the Islamic 
community. They were, however, concerned about the secular consequences of 
nationalism. Most probably, they supported nationalists in an attempt to reduce 
the foreign influence in an Islamic society. 
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Despite their differences with secularists, in the period of January to .\Iarch 
1951, the clergy actively supported the National Front but for different reasons. 
Seven leading mollas joined Kashani and a decree was issued in February asking 
moslems to support the movement. In a telegraph to the ;'I.Iajles, some clerics 
requested immediate nationalisation of the oil. 34 In a declaration. Kashani had 
already discussed the nationalisation from religious point of view. Holding Britain 
responsible for Iran's poverty and backwardness, he said that Iran should follow 
the example of Indians, Irish and other freedom fighting peoples. According to 
Kashani, this was a part of duty of every moslem Iranian. 35 
Kashani's declaration encouraged low-level clerics to ask for guidance from the 
high-ranking clergy. Khonsari, a leading cleric, issued a decree in which he called 
the oil nationalisation in harmony with principles of Islam. 36 Other leading clerics, 
Ghomi, Mahalti and Shahrudi, issued similar decrees in which the~' emphasised the 
fact that moslem property should be controlled by moslems and asked the pu blic 
to join Kashani. There was no mention of non-moslem Iranians in these decrees. 37 
By late 1940's, clergy could be classed into three groups. One group traditioIl-
ally supported monarchy and had nothing much to do with the oilnationalisation. 
Examples of these were Behbehani, Hojjat, Sadr and Fayz.38 It was only after 
Razmara's assassination in March 1951 that a number of religious leaders came 
forward in support of the oil nationalisation amongst them Khonsari, Mahalati, 
and Shahrudi. The second group, led by Kashani, were the most politically active. 
Kashani was sent to exile in early 1940's for pro-German activities. In 1949, he 
34 Bakhtare-Emruz, 12 Dei 1329 (2 January 1951). 
35 Etelat, 30 Azar 1329 (21 December 1950). 
36 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 204. 
37 Etelat, 12 Esfand 1329 (3 March 1951). 
38 Richard cited in Keddie (1983), pp 104. 
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was arrested for being involved in the Shah's assassination attempt. This time he 
was sent to Turkey. He returned to Tehran in 1950 as a :\lajles deputy. 
The third group were the militants, Fadayian Eslam, who adopted political 
assassination as an official policy. They were responsible for the assassinations 
of 1940's. In February 1949, a religious conference was held in Qom forbidding 
religious activity by the clergy. Burujerdi was not interested in politics and the 
decision was most probably taken in support of the political establishment as clergy 
was happy with the demise of the Tudeh Party. In later years, Burujerdi refused 
to support oil nationalisation. He was single-minded as in 1960 he opposed land 
reforms. He died in 1961. Unlike Burujerdi, Behbehani was politically active and 
acted as a link between the government and the clergy. Kashani defied the non-
involvement in politics and made a statement in exile attacking offering the Shah 
power to dismiss parliament through constituent assembly. 
The clergy had opposed the Shah but they did not want the Shah or monarchy 
removed. In 1925, they preferred Reza Khan to a republic like that of Turkey 
perhaps fearing that like Ataturk, the republicans would separate religion from 
politics. The only cleric to oppose Reza Khan was Modarres who led the opposition 
in the 3rd Majles. Now in 1940's, they considered the Shah as the only Shia king in 
the world in whose name religious establishments could be maintained. In February 
1953, when a rum our was spread that Mosaddegh had forced the Shah to leave 
the country for a visit, Kashani and Baghai joined together to take action against 
Mosaddegh. There was a mob attempt on Mosaddegh's life. 
The clergy had an advantage over the Western educated. The~' were able to 
reach the religious labourers much easier. Clergy nen'r formed a political party 
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but they easily appealed to the bazari elements and could mobilise thousands who 
had little understanding of the complications of Iranian politics. In addition to 
artisans, university and high school students were available to secular and leftist 
groups. Unlike supporters of Kashani, they were capable of sustained political 
purpose. Clerics could lead because the public mainly came from lower middle 
class with religious background who traditionally turned to clergy. An example of 
this is the Shah's downfall. They managed to mobilise the political mass through 
the clerics. 
In 1949, the Iranian society was engulfed in a major tide of nationalistic sen-
timent. The heated Majles debates and fierce press opposition to the Supplemen-
tary Agreement generated a politically-charged atmosphere. The liberal nation-
alist groupings shifted more towards Mosaddegh and resulted in the formation of 
National Front in October 1949. Most members of the National Front had one 
goal to bring an end to the imperialistic intervention in Iranian domestic politics. 
This movement was mainly directed at Britain as Britain was in an overwhelming 
position in the Middle East for many decades. As public resentment was mainly 
directed against Britain, its main commercial concern in Iran, the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company, became the main target of the nationalist campaign. The oil com-
pany had become the symbol of the British imperialism. Britain had 51 per cent 
share in the company. During the Second World \Var, it provided cut price oil 
products to the British Navy. Besides, the oil company had become, through in-
terference in the Iranian politics, an instrument of exploitation and oppression. In 
Khuzestan, some Iranian officials seemed to be more loyal to the oil company than 
to the central government. To the British, the oil company was a part of their 
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defence strategy, political influence, wealth and pride. 39 
A rarity amongst the oriental countries, Iran has maintained a multi-ethnic 
state for the past several centuries. Iran has been ruled by kings belonging to 
different tribes including Turks, non Farsi-speaking provinces have also been able 
to identify themselves with Iran's history. This might explain why support for 
Mosaddegh was so widespread in 1951. The major problem with Iranian national-
ism, however, was that although nationalistic aspirations were easily understood by 
the ordinary people, these aspirations were to lead to the establishment of liberal 
institutions of civil rights. The comprehension of liberal values required certain 
degree of political sophistication which Iranian public and man~' leading figures 
lacked. It was nationalism of ordinary Iranians that created the potential for 
great changes in Iran rather than the liberal values of Iranian liberal nationalists. 
The fact that nationalism was only a sentiment might explain wh~' Constitutional 
Movement of 1906 and the movement for the oil nationalisation in 1951 did not 
succeed. Why did the movement not succeed ? 
First one can consider the question whether Mosaddegh's ideals had any ideo-
logical basis. Mosaddegh and his supporters had democratic views but they never, 
at least up to the formation of the National Front, presented any ideological formu-
lation for Iranian problems. This deficiency of Iranian nationalism of these years 
had been noticed by the westerners, at least since 1917, when Edward Browne 
characterised Iranian reformists as more nationalist than democratic. 40 Studying 
Mosaddegh's political life and in particular his speeches indicates that whatP\'pr 
he said or did was his own program. 41 His speeches which range from oil to the 
39 For details of the oil company's interference in Iranian politics see Fateh or ~Iakki, the Black Book. 
40 Ramazani, The Foreign Poicy of Iran 1500-1941 ... , pp 81-113. 
41 Makki, Mosaddegh's Historic Speeches. Also see Keyostovan, Yol L 
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construction of railways in Iran all indicate an ideological uncertainty and a desire 
for independence. 
The next question is whether National Front was a liberal democratic organi-
sation with firm political backing. The answer is most probably negatiyE' when it 
is realised that some groups joining National Front had undemocratic orientation. 
Examples are leftist Zahmatkeshan party (Toilers), Pan-Iranist Party on the right 
and the fascist SUMKA.42 There is doubt whether Fadayian Eslam (Devotees of Is-
lam) joined National Front. However, Mojahedin Eslam, a group close to Kashani, 
did and Kashani himself supported the National Front. The religious orientation 
of these groups contradicted the secularism and liberalism of I\Iosaddegh. I\Iany 
religious elements fiercely o~posed secular values suggesting that ~ ational Front 
and the nationalistic movement of the late 1940's was undemocratic. One aspect of 
Iranain culture should not be overlooked; the interest in personalities than ideolo-
gies. Mosaddegh's appeal, for instance, was so strong that he reached a symbolic 
status that no one could easily oppose him. Baghai lost much of his democratic 
support when he broke with Mosaddegh. Kashani's status amongst clerics \\'as 
similar to that of Mosaddegh amongst secular nationalists. His defection from 
Mosaddegh in the early 1950's was significant as it caused a polarisation amongst 
politically active supporters. Clerical leaders followed Kashani but majority of 
Majles deputies and bazari elements remained with :Mosaddegh. 
Mosaddegh's era may be called a period of constitutional revival with early' 
hope and promise for a pluralistic political system. HowE'\'E'r. the movement frag-
mented nationally from the very early stage and although Mosaddegh's govern-
ment was brought down by a coup, it is true to say that factionalism was more to 
42 See Section 3.4 . 
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blame for his collapse than economic and ideological difficulties arising from the 
oil nationalism. Lack of democratic tradition in Iranian society may be blanled 
for the factionalism which also provided the opportunity for the royalists to defeat 
nationalists after the Constitutional Movement of 1906. 
Mosaddegh was supported by masses because he appeared to represent the Ira-
nian national community. He was seen to be fighting for an independent, dignified 
and internationally well respected Iran. The public did not see l\Iosaddegh as a 
national leader who attempted to turn liberal thoughts into civil right institutions 
but mainly as a leader who fought imperialism and international oppression. His 
speeches43 indicate that he upheld the principle that Iranians should gain their 
independence in domestic and foreign politics. Unlike 1910·s. in the late 19~O's, 
there was a large urban middle class audience to which a secular national leader 
could appeal. He had opposed the establishment of the Pahlayi Dynasty for which 
he spent years in exile. In 1944, he became the author of a single-article bill which 
banned the grant of any further oil concessions to foreigners. This law provided 
the basis for the rejection of the lrano-Soviet Oil Proposals in 19~ 7. 44 Mosaddegh, 
although not a deputy, became the driving force behind the opposition in the 15th 
Majles. In the late 1940's, it was Mosaddegh's nationalistic appeal to the public 
which produced such a political standing which brought about the oil national-
isation. The street demonstrations, strong public support and Majles backing 
produced such dynamism for the oil nationalism that even I\Iosaddegh would seem 
unable to affect the course of events. 
It was by coincidence that the character of Iranian nationalism began to form 
43 Makki, Mosaddegh's historic Speeches 
-t.\ See Section 3.9 . 
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at about the time oil was discovered in Khuzestan. The oil, however. had no impact 
on the development of the Iranian nationalism for 35 years until it became an issue 
for public debate in 1944. That is when Kavtaradze arrived in Tehran demanding 
an oil concession. Economically, the impact of the oil was felt much earlier when 
modernisation of Iran began. To appreciate the impact of oil on Iranian economy. 
one can consider Mosaddegh's oil-free policy introduced after 1951 which was an 
error of judgement. The vast oil resources of Iran should have been properly used 
for the benefit of the Iranian people. 
The liberal nationalistic movement caused a chaotic situation in Iran which 
threatened British and American interests in the Middle East. Confronted with 
such a threat both British and American governments decided to replace Mosad-
degh's government with one that would serve Iran's stability. Just as they did in 
1921 by bringing Reza Khan to power to end chaos, they arranged for a coup to 
overthrow Mosaddegh. 
External intervention has been responsible for great changes in Iran whether 
positive or negative. The defeat of the Constitutional I\Iovement of 1906 was 
brought about by foreign interference. Reza Shah came to power by a foreign power 
and was sent to exile by foreign powers after the occupation of Iran. Mosaddegh 
was also removed from power by foreigners. After the coup, the secular nationalists 
were excluded from the politics. As the Shah had lost his legitimacy, the clergy 
gradually filled the vacuum over many years and appealed to the urban lower-
middle class. 
5.3 A New Demand 
In October 1947, the Majles rejected the Irano-SO\'iet Oil Concession outright. 
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Ghavam resigned in December and Mosaddegh, although not a deputy. came close 
to premiership by one vote. The Speaker of the I\lajles was unable to form a 
cabinet. Hakimi received 54 votes against 53 for Mosaddegh ! Had l\losaddegh 
been elected prime minister, the events of the following years would haw' been 
much different. The cabinet of Hakimi was required, by the Law of 22 October 
1947, to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for better terms. The 
Minister of Finance suggested setting up a special Oil Committee, but Hakimi was 
succeeded by Hazhir in June 1948 who undertook immediate negotiations with the 
oil company. The idea of a better oil concession was beginning to take form. 
Monarchist favoured economic progress and attempted to obtain American aid. 
The Allied's declaration of 1 December 1943, which promised economic aid at the 
end of the war, was a good excuse. The trade and budgetar~' deficits increased 
after 1948 and resulted in the deterioration of Iran finances. l\lonarchists could 
not afford to finance the Plan Organisation in 1949.45 After the end of crisis in 
Azarbaijan, Washington was reluctant to involve itself greatly in Iran. The Soviet 
threat to Iran was gradually building up and Ambassador "cile~' was justifiably 
accused by Britain for attacking Moscow by encouraging Iran to bring their case 
before the Security Council for a revision of the Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty of 
Friendship between Iran and Soviet Union. 46 
As mentioned before, oil had been nationalised in Mexico and American oil 
companies had undertaken to pay 31.2 per cent tax. in addition to royalties. to 
the Venezuelan Government. The tax was to be calculated before deductions of 
the American income tax. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company planned 
45 Review of the Economic Condition in the ~1iddle East, UN Secretariat, Department of Economic 
Affairs, 1949, pp 70-78. 
46 FRUS 1948 Vol 5 pp 160-161 173. 
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to build a 30,000,000 pounds refinery in Kent. 47 The huge amount of taxes paid 
to the British Government were made public. The oil company:s profit for the 
year 1947 rose to over 18,000,000 pounds almost double of profit for 1946. Later 
on, at the annual General Meeting of December 195L Fraser declared that unlike 
Aramco, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was not exempted from British income 
tax. 
The British Treasury had been exhausted due to the Second \\'orld \\'ar and 
a limitation had been placed on dividend payments, most probably for the same 
reason. Was this a proper excuse to pay Iran less? These facts had come to the 
attention of the Iranian intellectuals. In the opinion of Iranians, the wealth of the 
oil company in relation to the financial situation of Iran was outrageous. 48 As an 
example from the beginning of the Second World War to the end of the Azarbaijan 
crisis, Iran received 37,488,000 pounds, British Treasury 75,000,000 pounds and 
shareholders 34,245,000 pounds. In addition to taxes, British Government received 
50 per cent of dividends too !49 The monarchists were also aware of the situation. 
The Minister of Finance proposed that the Majles should set up an Oil Committee 
to review the oil situation. The Plan Organisation was to be financed b,\' oil 
revenues. 50 
47 The Oil Company had established a large number of subsidiaries over the years. In April 1929 
a list of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's subsidiaries was given to the House of Commons as : 
Scottish Oils ltd, British Tanker Co ltd, First Exploitation Co ltd, National Oil Refineries ltd, 
British Petroleum Co ltd, Tanker Insurance Co ltd, D' Arcy Exploitation Co ltd, Khaneqin Oil Co 
ltd, North Persian Oil Co ltd, Britanic Estates Co ltd, Anglo-Persian Oil Co (India) ltd. A list 
given to the House of Commons in March 1953 included Aden Petroleum Refinery ltd, Australin 
Petroleum Co ltd, and Kent Oil Refinery ltd. National Oil Refineries was established in 1921 to 
build refineries in Britain. One refinery was constructed in Llandarcy, Wales, in honour of D' Arc\', 
48 A comparison of the funds paid to the British Government in Taxes, to shareholders in dividend, 
and that paid to Iran is given by Fatemi, N S "Tension in the Middle East" in the Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 282, July 1952. pp 55 
49 PRO FO 371/Persia,68707/E10496/25/34, 9 August 1948. 
50 See page 52. Also see Plan, pp 242. 
186 
The cabinet of Hakimi fell in June 1948. The Shah supported Hazhir who has 
been described as princess Ashraf's protege. 51 Hazhir formed his cabinet with a 
majority of 6 votes. Likewise, Hazhir was in favour of economic development and 
financing the Plan Organisation which required better terms with the oil company. 
In London, Iran's request for a 10,000,000 pound payment b~' the company was 
considered in a meeting between Gass and Treasury officials in August 1948. They 
agreed with 5,000,000 pounds. 52 At about the same time, deputy Eskandari de-
manded the nationalisation of the oil industry. The oil compan~' was required by 
the 1933 oil concession to replace more British and Indian employees with Irani-
ans. Between July and August 1948, talks took place between Pirnia, director of 
Concessions Department in the Ministry of Finance, with the company's General 
Manager in Tehran. The company's lack of sympath~' disappointed both Pirnia 
and Hazhir. 53 
Hazhir again negotiated with the oil company and the company dispatched its 
vice-president Neville Gass, accompanied by three high-ranking company officials, 
to Tehran. They arrived late August but talks formall~' started on 26 September 
and in secret. The Iranian delegate was Varasteh, Finance Minister, Pirnia and 
Shademan, Minister of National Economy. It soon appeared that the most the 
oil company was prepared to offer was cash payment to compensate for the loss 
of dividend payments. In conformity with British Government's policy, the oil 
company had limited its dividend payment to 30 per cent. Varasteh presented 
the company with a 25-point memorandum linking the negotiations to Clause E 
51 The 27 year old twin sister of the Shah was the most politically active member of the Royal family. 
She carried on interfering with the politics of Iran up to the fall of the Pahlavi DynCl-'-;tv in I D7g 
In the last few years of the regime she acquired a reputation for being involved in drug trafficking 
in Iran. The attempt on her life in Paris in 1975 was related to :\lafia. 
52 PRO FO 371/68731, Cripps to Bevin, 14 September 1948. 
53 BP 95576, Northcroft to Gass, 24 August 1948. 
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of the Law of 22 October 1947, but the oil company was not prepared to consider 
the memorandum as it had wide implications. 54 The 50-50 agreement was also 
discussed but Gass explained that as the oil company's operations had extended 
outside Iran, this would result in unreasonable share of the profits in that Iran 
would have shared profits of the operations in Iraq and Kuwait ! The Bank of 
England's gold price exchange rate as well as company's employment policy were 
discussed but no specific agreements were reached.·5.s The i\Iajles and the press 
made severe criticisms of the secrecy of talks and Varasteh resigned on , October. 
The negotiations ended on 13 October and the oil company officials left for London 
with the memorandum on 18 October 1948. 
The parties agreed to meet again in three months~ but Hazhir's cabinet resigned 
on 6 November 1948 perhaps because he could not get the budget through the 
Majles. One reason for this was that although deputies had been elected through 
rigged elections, by now they had been divided into at least 6 factions and Hazhir's 
vote of confidence had disappeared. The 15th Majles had onl~' 6 months before 
dissolution and because of political instability there was less legislative activities. 
This was a characteristics of the Majles. In 1911, for instance, nationalists closed 
the Majles down for 6 years to avoid ratification under Russian pressure! 
Regardless of the Majles mood, a much more experienced prime minister was 
needed to deal with the oil issue. Saed, suspected of favouring Britain. formed 
the next cabinet. Golshayian was appointed as the Minister of Finance and was 
given the task of negotiating with the company. The Government sought ad\'i('(' 
from Max. Thornburg, the advisor to the Plan Organisation. Early l~l-lq. it was 
54 See page 106. 
55 BP 71181, minutes of negotiations in Tehran, October 1948. 
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revealed that the British Government received 15~000,000 pounds in income ta\: 
for the year 1947 compared to 7,000,000 pounds paid to the Iranian Government. 
On 20 January 1949, deputy Eskandari launched a bitter attack on the government 
for failing to be tough on the oil company. He talked for three J\Iajles sessions and 
demanded the cancellation of the oil concession. He persuaded Taghi-zadeh, min-
ister of Finance under Reza Shah, to admit that he signed the 1933 oil concession 
under duress. 56 Makki and eight other deputies backed him. \Vhy did Eskandari 
demand oil nationalisation at this time is a question which remains unanswered. It 
might be that Ghavam wanted to muddy the water to gain power as Eskandari was 
close to him. However, the attempt on the Shah's life brought a drastic change. 
The attempt by a member of Fadayian Eslam who turned out to be a member 
of the Tudeh Party, gave the Government an excuse to outlaw the Tudeh Party, ban 
opposition newspapers and impose Martial Law. General Razmara was suspected 
of being involved in the plot against the Shah but there was no e\'idence against 
him, The suspicion was based on the fact that Razmara, who was normally present 
at such ceremonies, was in his office at the time allegedly waiting to take control of 
the country had assassination been successfuL 57 Soon after, Razmara had allegedly 
met in secret with Ruzbeh, an army officer member of Tudeh who was on the run.58 
Suspicion grew stronger when on 15 December 1950, Tudeh prisoners broke jail and 
crossed into the Soviet Union. Razmara was suspected of having cooperated with 
Tudeh military network. About a week later, deputy Baghai named Razmara in a 
Majles session as the culprit. 59 
56 PRO FO 248/1489, Le Rougetel to Bevin, 2 February 1949. 
57 The Shah, himself, has been accused of being involved in the assassination of Razmara on 7 ~larch 
1951 !! 
58 Behnud, Nimruz, 19 Bahman 1375 (8 February 1997) pp 24. 
59 For more on the cabinet of Razmara see Makki, Ketabeh Siah (Black Book). 
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Razmara was accused of assassination again. On 27 )'Iay 1950, deputy Dehghan 
was assassinated by Jafari a secret member of the Tudeh. In his trial, his defence 
lawyer, Baghai, stopped short of naming Razmara as the culprit. 60 Razmara was 
not a communist and this, if true, must have been a part of his power game. His 
actions were sometimes sinister. For instance, when the first shipload of militar~" 
goods arrived from America, he refused passes to correspondents who wished to 
travel to the port of Khoramshahr. By this time, nationalists had to be wary of 
the Shah as well as Razmara as he had become a major threat to both. 
The clergy was happy with the demise of the Tudeh. Burujerdi, a leading 
molla, sent the Shah a telegraph of support. This was not unusual for clergy 
although Kashani was in exile in Beirut. The British delegate. headed by Neville 
Gass, returned to Tehran on 9 February and negotiations began on 13 February. 
The new Minister of Finance, Golshayan, headed the Iranian delegate and an 
advisory committee represented Iran. These were Jean Rousseau, a French expert, 
Emami, former legal advisor ~o the oil company, Jahangir, deputy Governor of 
Bank Melli Iran (National Bank), Pirnia, Shademan and Adl, a cabinet member. 
The government claimed that they had invited Taghi-zadeh, :Nlosaddegh, Ebtehaj, 
Governor of the Bank Melli Iran, and Matin-daftarL a former prime minister, to 
cooperate but they all denied this! 
The Government asked a 50-50 share of profits, control over the operations 
inside and outside Iran and, in view of the changes in the world, a H'\"iew of 
the agreement every 15 years. As all the oil industry had expanded on profits 
made of the Iranian oil, the legal advisers had agreed that there should be no 
separation of the oil activities otherwise the oil company would simply transfer 
60 Shahed, 21 Shahrivar 1329 (12 September 1950). 
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refining overseas. The company officials may have believed that Iran had invested 
no capital neglecting the fact that oil was in itself a capital asset. There was a 
further demand for back payments for the years 1947 and 1948. The 50-50 share 
was now the key proposal on the Iranian agenda. It might seem strange that 
Moscow's 50-50 offer on the Northern oil had been rejected by the 15th ~Iajles in 
1947 but that was for a different reason, and besides the dispute was not solely 
financial. 61 
As before the British delegate did not agree with new demands. The company 
officials appeared to agree with back payments and an increase in royalty payment 
from 4 shillings gold a ton of crude oil to 6 shillings. The price of gold also ,,'as 
disputed as the company would pay at the Bank of England rate which was some 
40 per cent below the market price. The talks broke down and Gass left on 16 
March 1949, but monarchists were eager to bring the matter to an end. The 
Iranian ambassador in London attempted to meet Foreign Secretary Bevin to put 
pressure on the oil company. Gass returned to Tehran on 18 April 1949 presumably 
with new proposals but Iranian government was not happy as they contained no 
advance on the previous proposals. 
The government asked the oil company to produce a General Plan within 
3 months. The General Plan called for revision of the oil concession every 15 
years, revision of the price of the oil products sold in Iran, and Iranisation of the 
company. Although 97 per cent of the employees wee Iranians, the company had 
failed to raise a young generation of Iranian experts and there was no Iranian on 
the board of management.62 The government asked for further talks this time 
61 See Chapter 3 for details. 
62 BP 3B 5086, Meeting, 26 April 1949. 
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with the chairman of the oil company, Sir \\iilliam Fraser. Fraser agreed on the 
condition that he negotiated with the Iranian prime minister! He left London 
on 28 April. On the same day, Bevin informed the Iranian Ambassador that he 
considered the oil proposals fair ! 
In May, Fraser presented the Iranian government in secret with the draft of 
a document which contained nothing but the proposals which had already been 
rejected by Iran. The British contempt for Iran was obvious. The Finance j\Iinister 
Golshaiyan put forward a new proposal which would eventually increase the Iranian 
share to 50 percent. He asked for one-sixth of the extracted crude oil, 6 shillings 
gold per ton of crude oil, and 20 per cent of the gross profits. The payment in 
shilling gold was to cover for sterling devaluation. Fraser saw this inconsistent with 
the concession. The secrecy of the negotiations caused some Majles deputies to 
voice concern about publicity. There is still a question as to the appropriateness 
of the secrecy involving the talks. The public had a bad view of both sides and it 
may be suspected that had public opinion been sought, there might have been a 
chance of reaching an agreement acceptable to the public. 
Fraser left Tehran On 14 May. In the absence of Fraser. the government invited 
some deputies to a meeting and informed them of their attempt to secure better 
terms for Iran, but when the oil issue came up for debate deputy Rahimian again 
demanded oil nationalisation. Fraser returned to Tehran. The Majles authorised 
the Government to resume negotiations but Fraser, very rigidly, declined to agree 
with any demands made by the Government. The monarchist's tactic was to make 
a number of demands and retreat step by step until an agreement was reached. 
There was still disagreement over the details of the General Plan and it appeared 
that a settlement on the General Plan would not be reach before j\Iajles expired. 
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On 17 July 1949, negotiations between Gass and Golshaian led to an agreement 
acceptable by monarchists to supplement the 1933 oil concession. This agreement 
came to be known as the Gass-Golshaian agreement or the Supplementary Agree-
ment. It was written in a technical language and was cross-indexed to the 1933 oil 
concession, that is perhaps why few officials bothered to read it ! It provided for 
increased royalties and reaffirmation of the 1933 oil concession.63 
One newspaper reported that monarchists were so confident about the passage 
of the agreement that there was a quarrel between the Shah and I'{ asr, head of the 
Plan Organisation, over how to use the revenues. The Shah wanted to spend much 
of the revenues on the army !64 
.4 Oil Issue : a public concern 
The 15th Majles was to expire on the 28 July 1949 and Government's hope was 
to rush the agreement through, which they did on the 19 July. The newspapers 
published the contents of the agreement on 20 July. Iran was to receive more in 
royalties but only from 1948 onward and all the previous claims were to be settled 
for a sum of 3,000,000 pounds. The 15th Majles election had been completely 
rigged but there were a few nationalists who formed an opposition to the agree-
ment. They were Makki, Baghai, Azad, Hayeri-zadeh and Nariman. It has to be 
mentioned that while negotiations over Supplementary Agreement was going on, 
in January 1949, deputy Eskandari suddenly voiced concern over the oil dispute. 
Eskandari was closely associated with Ghavam and it is probable that Ghavam was 
planning to provoke the West to bring him back to power to resolve the oil issue! 
Eskandari called on Taghi-zadeh to give the Majles his account of how the 1933 Oil 
63 For details of Supplementary Agreement see Shwadran, pp 105. 
64 Iraneh Ma, 25 Esfand 1328 (16 March 1950). 
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Concession had been obtained. Taghi-zadeh, the :\Iinister of Finance under Reza 
Shah who had signed the 1933 concession, told the ?\Iajles that he had signed it 
under pressure and that the extension of the D' Arc~' concession was Reza Shah' s 
fault. 
Deputy Makki read out a letter from Mosaddegh in a ?\Iajles session in which 
Mosaddegh advised the deputies to pursue the oil issue. The press had been alerted 
to the issue and public opinion was aroused against the Supplementary Agreement. 
The campaign outside the Majles included bazaaris, university students, intellectu-
als and for the first time, the public, as public meetings were frequent. The public 
sentiment had been aroused before in the summer of 1947 and over the Irano-
Soviet Oil Concession but public gatherings were not so frequent and widespread. 
The Times correspondent made an interesting suggestion that Iran should hold 
majority of shares in further oil developments with a maximum of 15 per cent to 
foreign companies. Some Majles deputies also made their opposition clear. Deputy 
Etebar attacked the Anglo-Iranian Oil Concession. Deputy Masudi, the proprietor 
of the influential daily Etelat, suggested that only Iranian companies should ex-
ploit Iranian oil. However, he did not say where the expertise should come from! 
The question of expertise was an important one. Any' impartial person with some 
knowledge of the oil industry would suspect Iran's capability' of running the oil 
industry. The problem was not only operating the Abadan refinery but shipping 
and marketing as well. 
As Majles was to expire on 28 July 1949, time was running out. Saed asked 
the Majles for evening sessions to debate the agreement, but opposition deputies 
walked out to prevent a quorum. The opposition tactic was to drag out the pro-
ceedings, so they resorted to filibustering methods and prolonged speeches. There 
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was not much time left and nationalists had to stop the bill to come to a Yote. 
Makki opposed the bill by saying that the country was in a turmoil, the press 
had been banned and suppression of public opinion limited discussion of the oil 
issue. 65 He kept questioning Minister of Finance in details for few days to bu~· 
time. Eventually, he found a way to make sure that the agreement would not go 
through the Majles. There was no time limit on speeches made b~· the deputies. 
Makki slept at the Majles to register to make a speech. On the yery last day, he 
kept talking until the Majles actually expired at 1 am ! 
The main reason for the rejection of the Supplementary Agreement was most 
probably the fact that since it had been shown that the 1933 oil concession was 
invalid, then the agreement to supplement it could not be ratified. Also, the 
government rushing the agreement through the Majles caused a lot of suspicion 
as to its suitability. Golshayan, in replying to Makkis·s questions in the Majles 
debate, did not appear to be able to defend the agreement sufficiently. 
The elections for the 16th Majles should be considered as a turning point in 
the process of the oil nationalisation. The rejection of the Supplementary Agree-
ment had made the question of oil an important electoral issue. In the last days 
of the 15th Majles, Saed had announced that the new elections would commence 
on 6 August 1949.66 The government's attitude towards the oil company was in-
teresting. Despite opposition to the Supplementary Agreement, Foreign Secretary 
Hekmat, pretended that the new Majles would quickly pass the bill. He asked the 
oil company for 6,000,000 pounds advance against the future royalties! The com-
pany agreed to pay but Finance Minister Golshaian refused the offer because under 
65 Etelat, 28 Tir 1328 (19 July 1949). 
66 PRO FO 248/1489, Le Rougetel to Attlee, 1 August 1949. 
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the Iranian accounting procedures, funds in the form of an advance would go to 
the Plan Organisation.67 This was a further indication of the internal feud between 
Iranian politicians. The request for an advance also indicates that the government 
may have felt the financial effects of the non-ratification of the Supplementary 
Agreement as in October 1949 Saed arrived in London for Private medical treat-
ment. Iranian politicians and diplomats have used such excused as a cover for 
their missions abroad. A further indication is the Shah's trip to YVashington in 
November 1949. However, despite meeting Bevin and having lunch with Fraser at 
Britanic House, the oil company's headquarters, Saed returned to Tehran without 
immediate financial help.68 
The Tehran elections in the late 1949 became subject of a major controversy. 
On 13 October 1949, a large crowd accompanied a number of nationalists including 
Mosaddegh for a sit-in in the Shah's palace demanding new elections. 69 Mosad-
degh and 19 other nationalists were allowed into the palace. As negotiations got 
nowhere they decided to go on hunger strike, but this collapsed. This group of 
nationalists had a reputation for decency.70 They were Shaigan, Sanjabi, N ari-
man, Fatemi, Zirakzadeh, Baghai, Azad, Moshar, Makki, Amiralai, Hayerizadeh, 
Gharavi, Sadr, Naini, Khalatbari, Maleki, Khalili and Amidi-Noori many of them 
Western-educated and lecturers at Tehran University. 
67 PRO FO 371/75499, Lawford to FO, 18 September 1949, FO to Tehran, 28 September 1949. 
68 PRO FO 371/75500, Bevin to Le Rougetel, 26 October 1949. 
69 See page 75. 
70 The public had a bad view of certain deputies. Mir-ashraafi, for instance, was known as lastic 
dozd meaning tyre-thief for he had been accused of stealing tyres in a Government Department. 
This was a characteristics of the Iranian society then. National Treasury made raids on Plan 
Organisation funds to meet budget deficits. There was in-fighting amongst personnel in the Plan 
Organisation. Ebtehaj was exiled to Paris (Thlu, 12 Mehr 1329 (4 October 1950). Later on, 
Thornburg blamed the Plan's low performance on young men without experience and old men 
with titles. He said that in America a man would be judged on his ability to have some worthwhile 
task performed rather the title he carried around! (Keihan, 18 Mehr 1329 (10 October 1950). 
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Not being successful at the palace, they sought a better wa~' of dealing with 
the ruling system by establishing a political organisation. Fatemi. the editor of 
Bakhtareh-Emruz, which started publication in summer 1949, suggested a strong 
party or a powerful front.71 The choice fell on a front whose formation was an-
nounced on 23 October 1949. Bearing in mind that the bulk of the Iranian popu-
lation was illiterate, it is not surprising to learn that the National Front attracted 
mostly the middle class. It mobilised civil servants, professionals and students 
through Iran Party and Pan-Iranist Party, and bazaris~ mOllas and theology stu-
dents through the support of the clergy. The Front was a coalition of the traditional 
and modern middle class the conflict between them had been revealed as early as 
the Constitutional Movement of 1906.72 
By the early 1940's another class had been added to the Iranian society, an 
urban middle class of artisans and the educated, the children of recent modernisa-
tion. The urban middle class was represented by the bazar and merchants outside 
the bazar as well as the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia were teachers, university 
members and professionals. If group struggle was a feature of life in traditional 
Iran, in the 1940's class struggle was introduced as a novel ingredient of political 
life for which Tudeh party was mainly responsible. The new middle class called for 
nationalism, modernisation and obviously for secularism. The lower class who had 
the most to gain from social reform, were the least radical of all. The reason was 
most probably the fact that the lower class was illiterate and superstitious. The 
Marxist Tudeh never produced any proper analysis of the Iranain peasant's con-
servatism. In such an environment, political action could only occur when ordered 
by feudal superiors and this is how some of them managed to cause unrest or gain 
71 Bakhtareh-Emruz, 1 Aban 1328 (23 October 1949). 
72 For details see Chapter 2. 
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access to the Majles. The traditional middle class was theocratic. The modern 
middle class was technocratic. It was the oil issue and the respect for ~Iosaddegh 
which prevented an open split amongst them rather than their anti-court feelings. 
The coalition between Mosaddegh and Kashani, between l\Iosaddegh and Baghai, 
are examples of this. 
By the late 1940's the Shah's control over the army had grown. Nationalists 
were concerned as the army appeared to be a major threat to the civilian control of 
political power. Apart from the possibility of a coup, with the help of gendermarie, 
the army was capable of election rigging in rural areas, just as police was in urban 
areas. The Shah's relationship with the high-ranking army officers was of great 
importance. The Shah was traditionally head of the army and would appoint the 
high-ranking officers, but he had to be concerned about conspirac~r between them. 
As a precautionary measure, he appointed rivals to top military and police posts. 
In the late 1949, General Zahedi was Tehran's Police Chief and General Razmara, 
chief of the Staff. 
The nationalists were concerned about the 16th l\Iajles re-elections as Hazhir, 
the pro-Shah Minister of Court was in charge of the elections. Hazhir fell victim 
to an assassination early November 1949.73 The nationalists had nothing to do 
with the assassination but they were arrested and Mosaddegh went to his village 
of Ahmad-abad. Few days after Hazhir's assassination some American senators 
visited Tehran followed by the arrival of the Under Secretary of State, George 
McGhee. 74 
73 He was shot by Emami a member of the Fadaian-Eslam. Emami had assassinated Kasravi in 
March 1945. Hazhir had used his influence to save Emami from justice to impress the clergy! The 
ruthlessness of the clergy and their betrayal of their non-clergy allies occurred many times after 
the Revolution of 1978-79. 
74 Bakhtar Emruz, 19 Aban 1328 (10 November 1949). 
198 
When the new elections began, the rivalry between two generals benefited na-
tionalists. Zahedi, the police chief of Tehran, had already quarrelled with General 
Razmara, chief of Staff. Perhaps motivated by hostility, he made sure that in 
Tehran, no one rigged the ballot boxes with the help of the Army! It was common 
for the army officers in those days to replace the ballot boxes with faked ones. As a 
result several nationalists including Mosaddegh were elected to the 16th ~lajles in 
which the oil nationalisation was the major issue. Other nationalists elected were 
Shaigan, Baghai, Makki, N ariman and Hayerizadeh. Saleh was elected from his 
native Kashan. 75 The National Front secured only 8 seats out of 136 and formed 
the opposition. The events of the later months showed that the~' exerted control 
over Majles proceedings. But how was it possible for a small group to have control 
over the oil policy? As explained in Chapter 3, there was no tradition for democ-
racy to rely on and no political party in Western sense as faction ruled rather than 
parties. Mollas temporarily supported nationalists and l\1ajles factions were flexi-
ble. The press and public supported nationalists and a small group could achieve 
a political goal disproportionate to its numbers. However, one question remains to 
be answered. Why did Zahedi suddenly support the National Front? 
It might be argued that the Shah who was to make a trip to Washington in 
search of aid may have decided to put his house in order by allowing a free elec-
tion to take place to impress American statesmen. This might be supported by 
the fact that Zahedi turned against Mosaddegh onl)' 4 years later and took part 
in an American coup which brought Mosaddegh down in August 1953. Washing-
ton was critical of the government of Kumintang because of corruption although 
in accordance with their policy of containment, the)' strongl)' supported Taiwan. 
75 Zahedi was appointed by Mosaddegh as Minister of Interior in April 1951 when t\losadegh formed 
his government. 
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Washington had suggested to Chiang Kai Shek to make economic and social re-
forms. Instead he decided to find a military solution for China. Lack of confidence 
in his government was such that eventually his soldiers did not fight for him and 
American military goods ended up in communist hand as a result of mass defection. 
This might suggest why the Shah wanted to present a better picture of Iran. 
Despite this, the political turmoil in Iran in Autumn 1949 due to the 16th 
Majles election and the Shahs trip to Washington appears to have made little 
impact on Western politicians. Assistant Secretary McGhee, for instance, had a 
series of meetings with the Under Secretary of State Michael "lright between 14 
and 20 November 1949. They showed no concern over Iran as the~' discussed all 
the Middle eastern topics except Iran F6 On his return, the Shah opened the 16th 
Majles without the presence of the majority of deputies. This was against the 
constitution. 77 
Ambassador Wiley was keen on the Shah's trip but the opposition press criti-
cised its wisdom and compared it with the trips of Naser-eddin Shah and his son 
Mozafar-eddin Shah who granted concessions or borrowed money to travel to Eu-
rope. This comparison was wrong as the Shah was attempting to obtain economic 
aid. The Shah' unsuccessfulness in Washington may be explained through the fact 
that the new American administration in 1949 was unwilling to assist countries 
outside Europe. In this respect comments made by McLleland, Acheson's biogra-
pher, are of interest. He described Secretary Acheson as having little knowledge 
of the Middle East and respect for third world leaders who travelled to Washing-
ton for economic help.78 Corruption of these countries had an adverse effect OIl 
76 FRUS 1949 Vol 6 pp 54-89 579-582. 
77 Etelat, 20 Dei 1328 (10 January 1950). 
78 McLleland, pp 358 398-406. 
200 
American view. 
The American view of the Iranian Government ,,'as best reflected in an article 
by Ross, the New York Times correspondent, translated by an Iranian newspaper. 
Ross believed that because of the existence of a "one thousand family" in Iran which 
was mostly consisted of landowners, merchants and feudals, not much progress 
could be made. According to Ross, examples of this were election rigging, election 
of corrupt landowners with the help of their peasants, and their infiltration into the 
Plan Organisation.79 . The following year, Philadelphia commented that how could 
America make sure that American dollars were not wasted in Iran. The reference 
was made to Song and Kong brothers in China who had paid American funds into 
their personal accounts in America !80 The Shah's attitude towards nationalists 
also changed. After his return from Washington, he had a long meeting with 
Mosaddegh. The Shah's idea was perhaps to appease nationalists to pass the 
Supplementary Agreement through the 16th Majles, or perhaps to keep Saed in 
power as prime minister. 
By the early 1950, it appears that National Front had established itself. The 
banning of Tudeh may have benefited them. The monarchists had appeased the 
nationalists and the public and helped to keep premier Saed in power hoping that 
he could ratify the Supplementary Agreement, but nationalists saw Saed as a pro-
British politician. How did Saed remain in power? It should be noted that free 
election was limited to large urban areas. The deputies from remote areas wpre 
still elected as before. In these areas there was not much need to rig the ballot box 
as an influential landowner, for instance, could easily secure his seat in the Majles. 
79 Bakhtareh Emruz, 13 Esfand 1328 (4 March 1950). The term "one thousand family" may be 
. " t" translated into Enghsh as the upper en 
80 Published in Bakhtare Emruz, 24 Sharivar 1329 (15 September 1950). 
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Saed failed to win a vote of confidence. His cabinet fell on 19 i\Iarch 1950. In 
1949, he was weakened by the inability to bring the Supplementar~' Agreement to 
a vote. The Shah, in search of a royalist appointed ?\lansur prime minister. As 
the Majles had acquired some political power, it was common for the 11ajorit~, 
to give a straw vote before a prime minister was appointed but the Shah did not 
wait. This indicates the Shah's impatience over resolving the oil issue. Mansur 
had served as prime minister under Reza Shah. He did not have a cabinet post 
for 9 years. Mansur had a conviction for embezzlement under Reza Shah. He was 
too conservative and it appeared that the Shah had not noticed that tackling such 
an issue required a politician familiar with power game and double-dealing like 
Ghavam ! or perhaps the Shah was warry of appointing such politicians for the~' 
would be independent of the Court. Mansur did not submit the Supplementary 
Agreement for a vote. Instead, in April 1950, he pursued the failed negotiations for 
the advance of 6,000,000 pounds. The oil company agreed and the loan was paid. 
In June 1950, Mansur submitted the bill to the 16th Majles but it immediately 
came under a much fiercer attack by the nationalists as this time they claim that 
the oil company had deprived the country of its full sovereignty as it had interfered 
with government affairs in Khuzestan by bribing Iranian officials. Mansur rather 
decided to take the issue out of the public debate by setting up an oil committee. 
In July, Mosaddegh chaired the 18-member oil committee of which 5 member were 
National Front supporters. 
The setting up of an oil committee under Mansur was an important event. 
This may have been Mansur's idea to take the oil issue out of public debate. An-
other possibility is that Mosaddegh may have managed to persuade Mansur to 
give priority to other bills on the Majles agenda rather than the Supplementary 
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Agreement. Examples of these bills are the Press and Electoral Bill and the bill for 
Constitutional Amendments and the Budget. Mansur may have believed ),Iosad-
degh when Mosaddegh agreed not to oppose the Supplementary Agreement in 
return for setting up an oil committee. Shepherd criticised Mosaddegh by calling 
his political views "essentially unconstructive".81 Mansur was unable to settle the 
oil issue as he neither obtained Majles approval for the Supplementary Agreement. 
nor he managed to get the oil company officials to consent to 50-50 share. In "iE'W 
of his short cabinet, his performance and the fact that he was away from politics 
for 9 years, one might form the opinion that the Shah brought him to power for a 
quick settlement of the oil issue. 
The appointment of the next prime minister has been subject of much debate 
up to this time. The Shah needed a strong prime minister to resolve the problem. 
The public was also tired of indecision and demanded a strong man.82 He turned 
out to be the 47 year old General Razmara, the chief of Staff. In "iew of the Korean 
war and arrival of Ambassador Grady in Tehran, one might form the opinion that 
the appointment of Razmara was a Western plot. However, there is so far no 
evidence of this. He had played an important role in Azarbaijan crisis in 1946. In 
1948, he managed to bring Gendarmerie under the army contro1.83 He had become 
powerful enough to be considered by some Iranian politicians as a threat to the 
Shah himself, but by appointing him as the prime minister, the Shah had actually 
removed him from the army. Although the public was most probably interested in 
a strong man to resolve the oil issue for the benefit of Iran, their expectation was 
81 FO 371/82311,EP1016/41, Shepherd to Foreign Office, 28 April 1950. 
82 The idea of a strong man seems to have been supported, if not initiated, by the West. Articles 
published after Razmara's assassination in March 1951, suggests that in view of the Korean war 
an army man was needed in Iran. See Payne R "Four Shots in Iran" in the L~ N World, ~la\" 1951, 
pp 18, U S News and World Report, 16 March 1951, and The Nation, 17 r.larch 1951. 
83 See page 111. 
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that he would be a politician non-related to the court, like ;\losaddegh as most 
prime ministers of this period were courtiers. That is why Razmara's premiership 
was unprecedented. However, the arrival of Ambassador Grady coincided with 
Razmara's premiership. This may have been a coincidence but the press and the 
opposition made a fuss about it. 84 The nationalists called it a coup by the back 
door, or in Iranian terms kuteda- e khazandeh (creeping coup). 
Razmara introduced his cabinet to the Majles on 27 June 1950 and enCOUIl-
tered unprecedented opposition. On 13 July 1950, rvlosaddegh spoke against the 
idea of a strong military man in Iran. Comparing Korea with Iran, he said in a 
Majles sitting that Washington withdrew troops from South Korea believing that a 
military mission would be enough to support the undemocratic regime of Syngman 
Rhee. He believed that government should have popular support. Mosaddegh was 
comparing Rhee with Razmara. 85 Mosaddegh proved right as \\'ashington, most 
probably in view of the Korean War, supported Razmara by sending shipments 
of military goods which arrived in December 1950. Baghai, the editor of Shahed, 
made his newspaper the most vocal organ of opposition. Whenever its circulation 
was interrupted by police and lumpens, he used his immunity as a Majles deputy 
and distributed the newspaper himself. Makki, Nariman and occasionally Hayeri-
zadeh, helped him with distribution. Baghai was Tehran's second deputy and an 
heir-apparent to Mosaddegh until his split in 1952. His opposition outside the 
Majles was significant. 
Razmara needed help from the oil company to solve the oil issue as he was 
84 For a description of Razmara and opposition to his government see Azimi, pp 226-246. Azimi 
offers a description of the Iranian governments of the 1940's. However, he mainly considers lack of 
democracy in Iran rather than effect of the oil factor on the conduct of the domestic politics and 
political behaviour. 
85 Mozakerateh Majles (Parliamentary Speeches) 16th Majles, 22 Tir 1329 (13 July 1950). 
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known to be pro-Western and willing to collaborate which was incidentally the 
reason for his assassination in March 1951. The American Embassy in Tehran 
recognised the need and recommended to the State Department that he should be 
supported. The State Department was concerned that to win the ~Iajles approyal 
of the Supplementary Agreement, the oil company had to make concessions. The 
American Ambassador to London reported, on 18 July 1950, that Britain did not 
appear to have much desire to satisfy Iranian nationalists. 
Razmara appears to have followed the Ghavam's lead. In 19--17. Ghayam de-
layed sending the Irano-Soviet Oil Concession to the 15th f\Iajles, until he strength-
ened his position. Razmara may have also decided to improve his prestige. On 
25 July, he asked the oil company for a further 25,000,000 pounds advance. He 
guaranteed to have the Supplementary Agreement passed in 6 months. Fraser 
considered this unacceptable as, in his view, the oil company was responsible to 
its shareholders.86 Razmara, however, supported the agreement but since the oil 
company refused to increase royalties, he made non-financial requests such as ac-
cess to company records, lower price of products sold in Iran and an increase in 
the number of Iranian employees.87 The negotiations for a 25,000,000 pound loan 
continued in Tehran but a lower loan of 8,000,000 pounds was agreed upon to be 
paid in stages.88 Nationalists saw this a compromise and demanded 20 percent 
more of undistributed profits. Razmara might have misled the oil company offi-
cials about his ability to obtain a vote for the Supplementary Agreement and that 
is perhaps how he managed to secure financial help. At this time, clergy supported 
the nationalists through Kashani who blamed Britain for all the sorrows of Iran. 
86 PRO FO 371/82383, Wright minutes, 4 August 1950. 
87 PRO FO 371/82343, Shepherd to FO, 2 October 1950. 
88 BP Z 0198, Northcroft to Rice, 4 September 1950. 
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Secretary Acheson warned that the oil dispute had adverse effects on the Seven-
year Plan. To this Bevin replied that Anglo-American aid to Iran had to be so 
coordinated to prevent Iran from using Britain and America against one another. 
Bevin, having first hand experience in the region was most probably referring to 
the Iranian policy of using one power to foil another one! To him Razmara's tactic 
was ... bazar method of negotiation ... ".89 In September. the Foreign Office agreed 
to a loan. 90 Despite repeated requests by the Oil Committee, Razmara refused to 
disclose the details of his negotiations with the oil company until at the request 
of Emami, the leader of the Majles majority and a member of the Oil Committee. 
he supported the agreement in a Senate speech on 18 October 1950.91 He had 
proposed to improve the relationship with America as well as the Soviet Union 
and had Anglo-American backing. 
As explained in the previous chapter the passivit~· of American attitude towards 
Iran had diminished by the late 1940's. This was despite their pre-occupation in 
Israel in 1948. In July, Iran requested 25,000,000 dollar loan from the American-
controlled Export-Import Bank. In view of the Korean war Washington decided, 
in July, that the invasion of Iran would lead to a general war. The defence of Iran 
was considered to be the responsibility of Britain and it was decided that the oil 
issue should be settled.92 Ambassador Grady reminded the oil company officials 
in July 1950 of the fact that they had a duty to stand against communism in 
Iran. 93 The company officials saw this as an obsession and not their business. 94 
89 PRO FO 371/82375, Bevin to Franks, 12 August 1950. 
90 PRO FO 371/Persia, 82342, EP1l19/21/34/18 September 1950. 
91 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 579. 
92 FRUS 1950 Vol 3 pp 1657. 
93 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 576-577n2. 
94 Bamberg, pp 461-462. 
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However, within Iran, at least from 1944 to 1953, the oil company alwa~"s blamed 
the Tudeh Party for its grievances with Iranian employees. The Assistant Secretar~" 
McGhee also met with Richard Seddon in Washington. 95 The stubbornness of the 
company officials was very obvious as early as 1949 when Prime ~Iinister Saed 
secretly visited London. His attempt to resolve the matter was to no m"ail. 96 
The American position in 1950 is of great interest as it appears that the State 
Department officials were trying to act as a mediator to resolve the dispute. They 
reminded both officials of the oil company and the British Government of the fact 
that Iranian demands were reasonable. On his return from Iran, ~dcGhee met with 
Richrad Seddon in Washington. Seddon was the new head of the oil company in 
Iran and McGhee himself was an oilman. Discussing the latest company report, 
McGhee argued that the time had changed and that the oil company would not 
suffer much financially by offering Iran a better deal. 97 
The problem with the oil company was not only financial grievances. The 
Iranian Government accused the oil company of turning Khuzestan into an au-
tonomous province and interfering with the affairs of the Central Government by 
bribing officials and encouraging them to be more loyal to the oil company. In 
Khuzestan, it looked as if the oil company was a government within a government. 
Washington pressurised London for financial assistance to Razmara. The 
idea was first put forward, on 8th July 1950, by Ambassador Grady to George 
Northcroft, chief representative of the Oil Company in Tehran. He also reminded 
the company of the danger of communism in Iran. 98 The company officials, how-
95 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 14. 
96 PRO FO 371/75480 E 12712/1055/34/18 October 1949. 
97 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 14 529. 
98 Ibid, pp 576-577. 
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ever, believed that financial assistance would be followed by other demands. In 
September 1950, McGhee met with British officials in London and urged them 
again to intervene. A meeting with the board of Directors of the Oil Company was 
arranged during which he urged compromise but directors were not satisfied.99 One 
of the directors wrote to Northcroft in Tehran calling T\IcGhee obsessed with com-
munist question and without proper knowledge of the complex issue. lOo This was 
despite the fact that McGhee was an oil geologist with several major oil companies 
and must have had adequate knowledge of the oil industry. 
The impact of the Korean War on the Anglo-American relationship was obYi-
ous. Acheson valued British friendship much and Ambassador Grady knew that he 
would not go against London. Grady had concluded this for himself and was wor-
ried that the loan requested by Iran in July 1950 from the Export-Import Bank was 
too small to resolve the economic problem of Iran. 101 The British government was 
worried that the loans before ratification of the Supplementary Agreement would 
result in later demands. 102 Washington seemed to be worried about the increasing 
Irano-Soviet trade when in July 1950 the State Department asked Department of 
Defence to find a market for Iranian rice in the Far East. 103 In October 1950, Iran 
received 500,000 pounds under Point Four aid program. The 25,000,000 pounds 
loan remained unpaid. 104 
In a press interview early October 1950, Mosaddegh emotionally stated that the 
D'Arcy concession, the 1933 concession and the Supplementary Agreement were 
99 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 581n1 591-602. 
100 Bamberg, pp 461-462. 
101 PRO FO 371/Persia,82342,EP1119/21/34/18 September 1950. 
102 Bamberg, pp 403. 
103 FRUS 1950 Vol 5 pp 608. 
104 Bill J, Mosaddegh ... , pp 216. 
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all worthless pieces of paper. 105 This excited the public. Although \Iosaddegh was 
not the nationalisation movement, the name Mosaddegh carried a lot of weight. 
There was great rivalry between Razmara and his opponents inside and outside 
Majles which helped to strengthen the position of nationalists. On 23 ;\ovember 
1950, National Front deputies asked the Oil Committee to nationalise the oil. The 
Committee declined but agreed to reject the Supplementary Agreement. 106 Only 
5 out of 18 committee members belonged to the National Front but others were 
sympathetic. In London, Bevin appeared to have sided with the oil company and 
Fraser, in response to Max Thornburg call for compromise, said that Razmara had 
his chance. 107 
On 17 December 1950, American petroleum Attache in Cairo visited Tehran 
and confirmed that Aramco's concession would be fundamentally revised. 108 Am-
bassador Shepherd suggested asking the Secretary of State to postpone negotia-
tions with Aramco until Supplementary Agreement was ratified. lo9 In Iran, the 
opposition to the Supplementary Agreement was growing. Razmara withdrew the 
agreement on 26 December 1950. The withdrawal of the Supplementary Agreement 
caused an increase in nationalistic sentiment and took the Britishs by surprise but 
"the fat was in the fire ".110 
5.5 Removing an Obstacle 
After the withdrawal of the Supplementary Agreement, the government was 
105 Bakhtare-Emruz, 13 Mehr 1329 (5 October 1950). 
106 Makki, Ketabeh Siah, pp 250. 
107 PRO FO 371/Persia,82343,EP1119/62/34/15 December 1950, and 91481,EPll02/1/9 January 
1951. 
108 PRO FO 371/Persia,82343,EP1119/64/18 December 1950. 
109 PRO FO 371/Persia, 91521,EP1513/13/21 December 1950. 
110 McGhee, Envoy to ... pp 325. 
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reluctant to pursue it in the Majles and preferred to buy time by referring it to the 
Oil Committee. In December 1950 public demonstrations were frequent. Kashani 
asked the public to press for the oil nationalisation until the ~Iajles majority agreed 
with it. In his parliamentary speech of 26 December 1950, Furuhar, :\Iinister of 
Finance, claimed that the withdrawal was with the agreement of the prime minis-
ter. He was criticised in a Majles debate for mishandling the situation. Although 
supported by the public, nationalists did not succeed in obtaining enough signa-
tures to propose a bill for the nationalisation of the oil. They took their case to 
the street by organising rallies and demonstrations. 
Their first rally on 29 December 1950 drew a crowd larger than any time before. 
This was followed by the news of the 50-50 agreement between the Saudi Arabia 
and Aramco which reached Tehran on 31 December 1950. American politicians 
took an active part in producing the 50-50 agreement. McGhee, some departmen-
tal representatives and American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia had at least two 
meetings with Aramco representatives.Ill The 50-50 agreement was nothing new. 
It was a reasonable way of sharing profits and had been adopted by some oil com-
panies. Moscow offered Iran 50 per sent share of profits in the Northern oil but the 
Majles rejected it. In 1947, Gulf Oil Corporation and the Shell Petroleum Com-
pany reached an agreement to give Gulf 50 per cent of the proceeds of marketing 
oil by Shell. Also Venezuela received 50 per cent in 1943.112 
The Aramco's offer was restricted to operations in Saudi Arabia which suggests 
why British officials were not keen on it. All of the Oil industry had developed 
on the Iranian oil but now in the 1950's the oil company held shares in Iraq and , 
111 Ibid, pp 324. 
112 Yergin, The Prize ... , pp 448. 
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Kuwait and through its subsidiaries in many other countries.1l3 Early 1951. the:" 
offered Razmara in secret 50-50 share but he did not make the offer public. In 
January 1951, the oil company directors decided to pay royalties at a higher rate. 
but Razmara and the Shah asked them not to announce the decision as deputies 
would suspect collusion between Razmara and the oil company.1l4 The British 
Government now appeared to be worried about the situation as the:" suggested 
separation of the oil company operations in Iran from other countries to giYe Iran 
more control. The Labour adviser to the oil company criticised the directors for 
being small-minded and ineffective.115 
The events of January to March 1951 are worth investigating in detail. In Jan-
uary 1951 the opposition was fierce. The Majles Oil Committee received numerous 
proposals to replace the Supplementary Agreement. One suggested annulment of 
the 1933 Oil Concession and restoring the D' Arcy Concession for it would aut 0-
matically expire in 1961 ! The other advocated nationalisation with 1/10th of the 
shares to foreigners. The National Front, through Mosaddegh. proposed nationali-
sation of the oil industry throughout the country. On 11 January 1951, the Majles 
formally rejected the bill containing the Supplementary Agreement but instructed 
the oil committee to make recommendations. On 18 January, 1V1akki accused the 
government as a whole of treason in a heated debate in the Majles but some , , 
ministers objected that the cabinet should not be condemned. The National Front 
was fierce in criticising the government. They accused General Razmara of being 
a dictator in civilian clothes. Razmara arrived in the Majles to reply. He claimed 
that Iran was not technically capable of operating the oil industr~·. He asked for a 
113 SCI' f b 'd' . ee page 164 lor a 1St 0 SU SI lanes. 
114 Bamberg, pp 414. 
115 PRO FO 371/Persia,91521,EP1531/16/3 January 1951. 
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vote of confidence. Mosaddegh was absent through illness. Some deputies left in 
protest and National Front deputies voted against, but Razmara received 91 votes 
out of 103. 
Given the fact that Razmara did not have the support of clergy nor that of 
the Shah or the nationalists, the only reason why conservative deputies would not 
have easily dismissed him was his army support and relationship with three powers. 
This explains why at this time the Shah offered premiership to ?\Iosaddegh three 
times. Mosaddegh refused perhaps believing that in case his government fell. he 
would not be able to return to Majles, or may be premiership would tie him to 
other country problems. The Shah's other candidate for premiership was Se~'~'ed 
Zia. Seyyed Zia had the support of the clergy and Britain but he was unpopular 
with nationalists. The reason why the Shah was interested in ~Iosaddegh was 
perhaps to oust Razmara through Mosaddegh so that he could later on get rid of 
Mosaddegh through Seyyed Zia ! Mosaddegh must have suspected that he would 
have to resign as the prime minister had the deputies not voted in favour of oil 
nationalisation in whose case the National Front would have collapsed. Eventually, 
in April 1951, Mosaddegh accepted the offer of premiership. 
Razmara planned to dismiss the Majles and hold new elections. However, faced 
with the National Front's increasing popularity he changed his mind. He first met 
with non-National Front members of the oil committee saying that nationalisation 
would be possible in the long run. Towards the end of January 1951, Northcroft 
returned to Tehran and offered 5,000,000 pounds immediate payment followed h~' 
ten monthly payments of 2,000,000 pounds. However, only the initial and the 
first monthly payment were made. 116 To the Iranian Government this appeared 
116 BP 29811, oil company's annual report of 1951, pp 8. Also see Fateh, Panjah ... , pp 405-406. 
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to be another manoeuvre for the oil company had rejected the 50-50 agreement 
in 1949. The oil company had offered Razmara in secret 50-50 share but he did 
not make the offer public. One reason for this, if true, was probably because 
on 19 February, Mosaddegh presented the Oil Committee with a resolution for 
the oil nationalisation. National Front launched a public campaign in support of 
Mosaddegh. 
The Oil Committee called upon Razmara to report whether oil nationalisa-
tion was practicable. He referred the matter to a panel of Iranian advisers who 
reported that oil nationalisation was not practicable and expressed doubt O\'er its 
legality. On 3 March, he attended the full committee and said that because of the 
lack of technology the oil nationalisation would be inappropriate for Iran. 117 The 
nationalists accused the experts of having been bribed. ll8 Razmara was not alone 
in believing that Iran was incapable of running its oil industry. Golbenkian, the 
honorary commercial attache at the Iranian Embass~', was asked by the Shah to 
comment on the oil proposals. He had founded the Turkish Petroleum Company 
in 1890's and was well familiar with oil production and marketing. According to 
his son, the 81 year old Golbenkian said "our country is not yet qualified to take 
over the oil industry". Both Golbenkian and his son were sacked from their posts 
at the Embassy when Mosaddegh came to power.1l9 
In Tehran the confrontation between Razmara and nationalists appeared to 
drag on when it was brought to an abrupt end. Razmara was assassinated on 
7 March 1951. The following day the oil committee passed a resolution recom-
mending the oil nationalisation. It was as if the majority felt obliged to support 
117 PRO FO 371/Persia,91523,EP1531/69/ 26 February 1951 to 6 March 1951. 
118 BP Z 0203, Northcroft to Rice, 6 March 1951. 
119 Hewins, pp 234. 
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Razmara for on 15 March the very same deputies who, in January ,"oted 91 out 
of 103 in favour of Razmara,120 ratified the Oil Nationalisation Bill !121 The oil 
nationalisation became law without much thought on how oil was to be marketed. 
The Tudeh Party saw Razmara as a British agent and :"Iosaddegh as an Amer-
ican one !P22 This was most probably because of Razmara's power game of culmi-
nating all three powers. He had American backing as 'Nashington was prepared 
to offer him foreign aid. Britain also appeared to be content with his premiership. 
Tudeh Party accused Washington of having arranged for his assassination because, 
according to them, Razmara was trying to improve Irano-Sm'iet relationship and 
Washington would benefit from destroying him.123 The Tudeh party may have 
taken the view that Razmara wanted to settle the oil issue in favour of Britain 
but Mosaddegh and National Front were attempting to take the oil industr~' out 
of the British hand and place it with Americans, an unintelligent theory evell at 
that time to believe. 
One thing might explain the extent of anger which was directed at Razmara. 
He was a military man and had, on several occasions, made offensiye remarks about 
the people's technical inability. In a private Majles session, he made remarks to the 
effect that "you people who are incapable of running a cement factory, ... how do 
you want to run the oil industry"? In a press interview, he said that Iranians could 
120 See page 193. 
121 On 18 March Pravda accused Washington of being involved in the assassination (Current Digestive 
of the Soviet Press, Vol 3, No 11, 1951, pp7). Razmara had attended a memorial s~rvice for a 
cleric on behalf of the Shah accompanied by Alam, a close confident of the Shah. Pass~ng through 
the crowd a bearded man approached and shot him. His assassin was later on received by ~he 
Speaker of the Majles, Kashani, who called the assassination essential. Two years later the MaJles 
pardoned the assassin but after the fall of Mosaddegh, he was executed for murder. 
122 2) Besui Ayandeh, 29 Tir 1331 (20 July 195 . 
123 Keihan, 28 Esfand 1330 (19 March 1952). 
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not make a clay water pot 1124 Razmara was most probabl~' right. Iran needed 
foreign technicians, expert managers and a tanker fleet to deliver oil producb to 
the buyer, assuming they could find a buyer, but he did not express himself in a 
proper manner. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Looking back at the events of 1950-1951, the British position was clear. After 
decades of superiority in the area, they were not prepared to give concession to a 
group of nationalists who were keen on removing British influence as this would 
have affected British position in the Arab Shaikhdoms. \\'ith regard to the oil 
company officials, the relevant documents containing their comments on the issue 
suggests a colonial frame of mind. People like Fraser could not have convinced 
themselves that the time had changed and that after years of exploitation of a na-
tion's oil resources, it was now time to make reasonable concessions. In particular, 
Fraser was difficult to deal with. He had become the chairman of the oil company 
in 1941. At least since 1945, it appears that British officials had expressed dis-
satisfaction with his chairmanship. He was described by an official as "a complete 
totalitarian. "125 In contrast to the advice given by their American counterparts, 
the company officials behaved in the opposite direction an example of which is the 
way they negotiated Supplementary Agreement. As the Shah's intention in the 
late 1940's was to come to terms with nationalists, negotiations with Mosaddegh 
and a reasonable offer, including back payments, would have probably resolved the 
dispute. 
Some British diplomats may have confused the oil company officials. Amhas-
124 Jami, pp 506-509. 
125 PRO T 273/360, minutes of meeting between Bridges and Gardiner, 18 July 1950. 
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sador Shepherd, for instance, presented an inaccurate assessment of the situation 
when in April 1951 he warned against any major change in the oil company~s pol-
icy as, in his view, the nationalist's fury was subsiding.126 Shepherd accused his 
American counterpart for not being tough enough with Iranians.1:2i British Offi-
cials even accused McGhee of encouraging Iran. 128 Americans were criticised for 
public discussion of what should have been kept a secret. Some British diplomats 
felt that they had paid too much for American support. 129 The American motiya-
tion to resolve the oil issue was easy to understand. By the late 1940's~ \Yashington 
had established an oil industry both in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia. Iranian na-
tionalists were still claiming sovereignty over Bahrain. The~' did not want trouble 
on the other side of the Persian Gulf.130 However, American Embassy had isolated 
itself by not directly meeting with opposition. 
It looked as if British politicians had decided to continue the game of foreign 
intrigue and double-dealing in Iran. Former British Ambassador, Ie Rougetel, told 
MacMillan that the Soviets were using the nationalists. 131 At least since October 
1950, Anglo-American military discussions have been going on over sending troops 
to Khuzestan in case of a Soviet invasion or local communist take over. Com-
monwealth troops were considered to avoid giving Moscow an excuse.132 British 
General Headquarters Middle East Land forces believed that holding the Iranian 
oil installations would be unrealistic because of the strain this would place on 
126 PRO FO 371jPersia,91470,EP1023j22j12 April 1951. 
127 PRO FO 371jPersia,91530,EP1531j260j1 May 1951. 
128 FRUS 1951 Vol 5 pp 309-315. 
129 PRO FO 371jPersia,91470jEp1023j16134j12 April 1951. 
130 Yonha A, pp 104. 
131 MacMillan, pp 343. 
132 PRO FO 371jPersia,82353,EP1l93j15j34j26 October 1950. 
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British forces in other parts of the Middle East. 133 Edwin "·right. intelligence 
adviser on Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State believed that ~~if R'l1S-
sians did attack Iran, an international full scale war could not be avoided... if 
an internal take-over by communists should occur ... the free world certainly could 
not remain inactive".134 Indeed, Britain must have been concerned not to pro-
vide Moscow with any excuse for military intervention as under the Irano-Soyiet 
Treaty of Friendship of 1921 they could send troops to Iran. Also. in yiew of the 
Korean War, the possibility of a general war had to be considered. This is an 
example of how policy of movazeneh worked in Iran. Had treaties such as that of 
1921 or Tri-partite treaty of 1942 not been signed, such eventualities would not be 
considered. 
Despite what one might think, National Front did not initiate the idea of oil 
nationalisation. The annulment of the 1933 Oil Concession had been suggested 
by deputy Rahimian in 1944. The law of 22 October 1947 played an important 
role as it set in motion a chain of events which two years later resulted in the 
oil nationalisation. This law contained a single clause instructing the government 
to negotiate with the oil company for better terms. This clause may have been 
inserted to give the impression that as far as oil was concerned, London was not 
in a better position than Moscow. However, this instruction compounded with 
the Oil Law of 2 December 1944, provided the basis for oil nationalisation in near 
future. 
Another possibility is that monarchists may have taken the opportunity to 
find a way to fund the Plan Organisation. In August 1948, deputy Eskandari laid 
133 PRO FO 371/Persia,91456,EP1015/169/34/1 May 1951. 
134 San Francisco Chronicle, 7 December 1951, pp 5. 
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before the 15th Majles a lengthy interpellation of the government and demanded 
oil nationalisation. The interpellation was rejected by a vote of 98 to 8. Eskandari 
again demanded oil nationalisation when on 20 Januar~' 1949 he began another 
interpellation of the government. Makki and eight other deputies singed his bill 
for the annulment of the 1933 oil concession. Being a close confident of Ghayam. 
one might suspect that Ghavam had encouraged Eskandari hoping that this would 
bring him back to power! The Iranian society was engulfed in a tide of nationalistic 
sentiment over the 16th Majles elections and the opposition to the Supplementar~' 
Agreement. I35 
The National Front made the oil committee a platform to attack the oil nego-
tiations. In public view, the committee was more favourable to the nation that the 
government or the Shah. Mosaddegh had a reputation as a nationalist but one ("an 
see that early 1947, despite arranging for a sit-in in the Shah's palace in objection 
to the rigged 15th Majles elections, he could not attract much public support. In 
1950, it was the chairmanship of the oil committee which paved the wa~' for him to 
become a national hero. The oil committee was vested with more authority in July 
1951 when Majles instructed the committee to make recommendations regarding 
the oil question. 
The 1940's was also a period of political assassinations which began by the 
assassination of Kasravi, a prominent writer, in March 1945. Fadayian Eslam 
were mainly responsible for the murders and it might be true to say that without 
eliminating certain politicians the oil nationalisation would not be possible. The 
first was Hazhir whose murder opened the way for the relatively free election of 
the 16th Majles in the Autumn of 1949. The assassination of Razmara in l\larch 
135 S . 5 2 ee sectIOn . . 
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1951 was quickly followed by the ratification of the Oil :r\ationalisation Bill! On 19 
March, Zangeneh, a minister in Razmara~s cabinet was shot dead by a theological 
student in Tehran. 
Whether majority of Majles deputies were so fearful for their lives. in an at-
mosphere of terror, that they voted in favour of the oil nationalisation, or perhaps 
the popular political demand forced them to do so~ remains to be answered. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
By the late 19th century, the traditional Iranian society was in the process 
of change. Iranian society which was diverse in every aspect of life had been 
influenced by Western way of life for several decades. The urban class way of 
thinking and social life which had been patterned by centuries of tradition had 
changed. Society could be divided into several classes based on occupation and 
status. These were upper class, traditional petite bourgeois tied to bazar, middle 
class of pre-industrial wage-earners, and a lower class of peasants and nomads. 
The upper class was well riddled with corruption mainly because of over a century 
of foreign intrigue. These consisted of the Court, the clergy, the feudal leaders and 
tribal chiefs. The Iranian clergy was in a privileged position. They owned land 
through religious endowments and functioned as judges. They were trusted by 
ordinary people and occasionally voiced people's disapproval to political leaders. 
The feudal leaders and tribal chiefs were influential too as power lay in property 
and family ties. The peasants and nomads were, however, the poorest of all. 1 
A turning point in the recent political history of Iran appeared in the late 19th 
century. The clergy's demand for the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession to the 
British interests in 1891 was astonishingly effective. 2 It was suddenly realised that 
the 46 year old reign of a powerful N aser-eddin Shah could be so easily challenged. 
1 A detailed account of peasant's life in Iran at about 1900 has been given by Lambton in Landlord 
and Peasant in Persia. 
2 Browne, Persian Revolution, pp 52. 
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The move was so effective that all future campaigns for democracy were modelled 
on Tobacco rebellion of 1891. The assassination of the Shah in 1896 and subsequent 
enthronement of a weak Mozafar-eddin Shah, who was surrounded by corrupt 
politicians who all belonged to the same ruling class: 'vas definitely the final blow 
to the traditional ruling system which had ruled over Iran for many centuries. 
The clergy tested his power again in 1903 by forcing the prime minister Aminos-
Soltan into exile. The almost bloodless revolution of 1906 and the establishment of 
the Constitutional Government theoretically granted a freely-elected l\Iajles and a 
government answerable to the parliament. 
The Shah was surrounded by corrupt politicians. The standard of material 
life was very low. Government's treasury was empty and Iran had no place in 
either industrial world or amongst superpowers. The Shah needed immediate cash 
payment3 and saw a reason for offering an oil concession. Oil had been sought 
in Iran since 1878 but not much exportable oil had been found. The prospect of 
finding oil was so bleak that Iranian authorities did not bother to go into much 
details about the concession's future operation. It did not concern them to re-
late oil royalties to the gross profit rather than the net profit, nor to equate the 
20,000 shares offered to Iran against any percentage ownership of the future compa-
nies. Such was their ignorance that the concession was made exempt from Iranian 
taxation and no provision was made to supply fuel to Iran. Theoretically, D' Arcy 
could extract, refine and export oil for 60 years without selling one single barrel 
to Iran! 
Britain and Russia were the main commercial rivals in 1900, but position of 
Britain was much stronger as Britain was controlling Egypt, Sudan, India and 
3 Ibid, pp 99. 
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the entire Persian Gulf. British position became much stronger after the First 
World War when Ottomani and Russia collapsed. Iran became an area of sig-
nificant geostrategic importance within which major European powers fought for 
dominance of Asia and used it as a buffer to contain the advance of their rival ~ 
Hence control of Iran became a goal for the powers involved. Britain supported 
Sheikh Khazal and recognised his autonomy over much of the oil-rich province of 
Khuzestan, in order to support the oil company. 
In 1919 Iran was under the threat of becoming a British protectorate. Ahmad 
Shah surprised his British hosts by his rejection of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 
1919.4 This opposition cost him his throne as Britain arranged for a coup which 
was carried out by Reza Khan in 1921. Reza Khan ousted the Shah and was 
enthroned in 1925. Although a nationalist he had no democratic sentiment and 
removed all the constitutional political establishments. To \veaken the foreign 
power domination, Reza Shah found a rival, Germany, for Britain and Russia in 
Iran. His foreign policy did not payoff as his refusal to cooperate with the Allied 
in 1941 left them no choice except to occupy Iran. A possible German advance 
towards India could be blocked in Iran and the importance of the Iranian oil for 
Britain was too evident. The construction of the Iranian railwa~' provided the basic 
infra-structure for a supply route to the Soviet Union. Moscow invaded the north 
and Britain the south. However, despite intense suppression under Reza Shah, the 
struggle carried on in the mainstream of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. 
The occupation of Iran in August 1941 acted as a catalyst. After the abdication 
of Reza Shah the most popular political demand was free-elected parliamentary 
4 There is still a dispute whether Ahmad Shah was actually against the treaty or he pretended to 
be. See Homayunfar, Reza Shah, in Nimruz Dei 1376 issues (1998). 
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rule which would not be possible without the countris political independence. 
In 1919, the public had defended its independence against the British efforb to 
turn Iran into a British protectorate. But there was no tradition for democracy to 
rely on. According to the constitution a system modelled on Belgian democracy 
had been placed under clergy jurisdiction! The Constitutionalists appear not to 
have foreseen the problem. The structure of power in the early 1940's did not 
change as the 13th Majles election had been rigged under Reza Shah. The Tudeh 
party was quickly formed by the released prisoners. It soon became one of the 
predominant political parties in an Islamic background. In particular communist 
activity was more intense in the Soviet-controlled zone in the North. \Vestern 
journalists were banned from the area and only Tudeh party was allowed to operate 
there. Moscow ignored the Allied's non-interference in Iranian affairs. In response, 
Bullard pressed for the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Tehran. The East-
West tensions developed in Iran. In 1944 Kavtaradze demanded an oil concession. 
This received international attention. In 1946 Iran requested the Security Council 
to intervene over the Azarbaijan crisis. Truman and Byrnes believed that a tough 
policy was needed to oppose Moscow. 5 These were the early stages of the cold war. 
Moscow had sinister plans for the North but events elsewhere may have changed 
their priorities. This was most likely to be Germany's capture of Kiev on 26 
September 1941 and the offensive against Moscow on the 2 October. Stalin signed 
the Tri-partite Treaty of 1942 confirming Iran's sovereignty. He had reasons for 
accepting the terms of the treaty. These were Allied supplies, the need to open a 
second front in Europe to ease the pressure on the Soviet Army, and a powerful 
German offensive which was expected for the Spring of 1942. :l\Ioscow's territorial 
5 Gaddis, pp 312. 
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aspirations had been declared before. In November 1940. a secret protocol to the 
draft of the Molotov-Hitler agreement stated Moscow·s territorial aspirations to be 
"in the direction of the Indian Ocean".6 In Moscow, ),lolotoy informed the German 
Ambassador that the protocol was acceptable if it provided that the area ··south 
of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognised as 
the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union".7 
Stalin's concern over the north of Iran may be justified in several aspects. One 
was most probably British overwhelming position in the Persian Gulf and their 
grip on the oil rich Khuzestan. An example was Abadan refinery~ the largest of its 
kind in the world at the time. Stalin had other concerns most probably what he 
saw as Western design for the Caucasus. In June 1940, for instance, Moscow was 
alerted by the British and French plans to attack Baku oil fields from Turkish and 
Iranian territory. Moscow was allied with axis powers, but after switching sides, 
they learned about a German plan for a revolt of Armenians and Azarbaijanis 
in the Caucasus. 8 After the battle of Stalingrad in November 19--12, Moscow was 
determined to entrench themselves in the north of Iran. Apart from Azarbaijan's 
agricultural importance, it would have positioned Moscow's forces only 100 miles 
from the Iraqi Kirkuk and Mosul oil fields. However, American activities in Iran 
also increased after the attack on Pearle Harbour. The control of the Iranian 
railway was given to American service troops. 
The role played by Iran in exploiting the Anglo-Soviet-American relationship 
was of importance. Iran was a stage but Iranian politicians did not only react 
to a situation controlled by super powers. There are several examples of this. 
6 Hurewitz, pp 228. 
7 Ibid, pp 228-230. 
8 Hirschfeld, pp 220. 
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Taking advantage of the situation, monarchists applied the old st~'le Qajar policy 
of movazeneh or using one super power to foil another. This. compounded with 
American concern over Soviet activities in the I\orth. dragged Americans into the 
politics of Iran. The Iranian Government's efforts resulted in the Tri-partite Agree-
ment of January 1942 guaranteeing troop withdrawal six months after the end of 
the war. On 1 December 1943, the Allied guaranteed Iranian sovereignty in a dec-
laration and recognised the need to strengthen the Iranian economy. \ Vashington 's 
position in Iran had now changed. This did not have much to do with the involve-
ment of American service troops in Iran, but more because of t he American oil 
developments in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The change of the American attitude 
from passivity of the 1920's to full engagement in the 1940's was most remarkable. 
The Middle East became a centre of oil exploration in the 1940's as the fear 
of oil depletion dragged American oilmen into the oil competition in the Middle 
East. Premier Soheily took the opportunity and requested American assistance 
to explore oil outside the area covered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. His 
efforts were rewarded later on. The Soviet's concern over the American activities 
in Iran and their mistrust of the West was the dispatch of Kavtaradze to Tehran in 
September 1944. This resulted in a battle between Washington and Moscow before 
the war ended in Europe. In July, Washington had considered Iran a testing ground 
for the Atlantic Charter. The stage for the cold war was set in Iran. 9 
Moscow refused to leave Iran in 1946. The problem received massive interna-
tional attention. Perhaps noticing that Stalin wanted a face-saving excuse, Pre-
mier Ghavam seized the opportunity, offered Stalin an oil concession in the north 
and secured the withdrawal. The puppet regimes that Moscow established in the 
9 See page 132. 
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north did not last long. Moscow was unable to destroy Tehran's authorit~· in the 
North because other powers were present. In Poland~ for instance. Russo-German 
pact of 1939 allowed the Germans, and following the end of the war. the Sm'iet 
Union, to destroy the entire Polish political system. Besides. the wartime desire 
in cooperation between allieds had restricted Stalin's greed. The Iranian officials 
appointed by Tehran continued to function in Azarbaijan and Kurdestan. l~nable 
to obliterate Tehran's authority in the North, l\1oscow used the Tudeh Party as an 
instrument to influence internal politics. 
After puppet regimes fell in December 1946, Iran seemed to be a safe and 
peaceful place. Some 20 years had gone by since the last free election. The time 
had come for the nation to assert national dignity. Moscow, however. menaced Iran 
again. In 1947, they pressed for the ratification of the oil concession agreed with 
Ghavam. This started another crisis and created considerable public sentiment 
which adversely affected Moscow's position in Iran. Their aggressive interven-
tions such as their blatant activities during the oil crisis of 19~~ and separatist 
movements of 1945-46, cost their agent, the Tudeh Part~' heayil~'. Mosaddegh was 
brave enough to pass his Oil Bill of 2 December 1944 whilst Kaytaradze was still 
in Tehran. Premier Saed resigned because of mounting unrest in the occupied 
north. There are other examples of Moscow's threats. During the occupation, 
they referred more to the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with Iran than to the Tri-
partite Treaty of 1942! It was because the 1921 treaty provided for the Soviet 
troops to move into Iran, Molotov refused to reaffirm Tehran Declaration at Yalt a 
Conference early 1945. Saed's successor Bayat had to offer greater freedom to the 
, Tudeh to appease Kavtaradze. 
The year 1947 witnessed an important political event which had significant 
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consequences for the following years as it set in motion a chain of events which 
eventually resulted in the oil nationalisation. ~IoscO\y exerted great pressure 011 
Ghavam for the ratification of the Irano-Soviet Oil Agreement. :\oticing that 
Moscow was under immense pressure by the \\~est to leaye Iran. Ghayam had 
masterfully fooled Stalin and Molotov by offering them an oil concession contingent 
on Majles approval! As he had no intention of offering such a concession. he kept 
delaying new Majles elections, and later on, Majles debates, until time was right 
for the rejection of the oil agreement ! The 15th lvIajles rejected the agreement 
on 22 October 1947, but instructed the government to negotiate with the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company to gain Iran's rights. Perhaps the idea was to tell ~1oscow 
that the West was not in a better position than Moscow when oil was concerned, 
but monarchists embarked on the idea which led to the proposals to supplement 
the 1933 Oil Concession. 
The year 1948 appeared to be free of major events as far as public was con-
cerned. However, following Majles instructions, government negotiated with the 
oil company for better terms. The monarchists favoured the idea as it would gen-
erate foreign currency. The oil revenues were an important source of finances for 
Iran. The Shah desired expansion of the army and social reforms needed to be 
funded through the newly established Plan Organisation. 
Whilst the negotiations with the oil company was in progress, the attempt 
on the Shah's life in February 1949 brought a drastic political change. Suddelll~' 
the political scene established after 1941 changed. Martial law was declared and 
Tudeh party was outlawed. Monarchists used the opportunit~· to send Kashani to 
exile in Beirut but he remained defiant. In May 1949, a constitutional assembl~· 
was called and the Shah was given the power to dismiss the parliament. Kashani 
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condemned the constitutional amendment from Beirut. Ghavam did the same in 
Europe. The demise of the Tudeh was to be filled by the :\ ational Front. Later on. 
rising American involvement between 1951 and 1953 resulted in total destruction 
of Moscow's influence in Iran. 
The negotiations with the oil company officials continued and resulted in the 
Supplementary Agreement whose ratification caused a major domestic crisis and 
brought the oil issue once more to the public attention. The 15 :\Iajles expired in 
July 1949 and the Shah, in pursuance of monarchist's idea for economic aid, decided 
to visit the West. Perhaps to present a better view of Iran, monarchists decided to 
hold a relatively free election restricted to Tehran, as police chief of Tehran helped 
maintaining a free election. The Shah returned unsuccessful. Now monarchists 
were faced with a fierce opposition in the Majles, and a popular National Front 
headed by Mosaddegh. This may explain why the Shah appointed Mansur as prime 
minister despite the fact that Mansur had no cabinet post for 9 years. Mansur was 
a royalist and had served under Reza Shah. He was in favour of Supplementary 
Agreement. He set up the Oil Committee perhaps hoping that it would take the oil 
issue out of the public debate. His failure, however, coincided with developments 
in Korea which justified the idea of a strong military man, General Razmara, to 
resolve the oil issue. 
His appointment as prime minister in June 1950 coincided with the arrival of 
the American Ambassador Grady. As expected, the opposition made a fuss about 
it. The press called him an agent of the West and his premiership was described as 
a coup by the backdoor.lO This indicates that the public was fearfull of a military 
man in charge of the government. However, public awareness and fierce Majles 
10 See pages 183-184. 
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opposition went against Razmara. By the end of 1950 the Oil Committee mem-
bers had divided into two groups. The Gass-Golshayian Agreement was given a 
popular name, Supplementary Agreement, to supplement the 1933 oil concession. 
The Majles opposition saw it differently. As it was shown that the 1933 oil con-
cession was null and void, then there was no justification to supplement it. But 
why did it take so long to nationalise the oil industry,? The answer is in the 
Razmara's performance; his power game and double dealings with super powers. 
Perhaps motivated by Ghavam's tactics he delayed addressing the oil committee 
when invited to do so. He may have also misled the oil compan~' officials about his 
ability to ratify the Supplementary Agreement. In view of his army connections, 
he was considered a threat to the Shah and had been accused of being involved in 
the attempt on the Shah's life. However, the findings of the Oil Committee w('1'(' 
reported and its conclusion justified nationalisation of the oil industry. The only 
obstacle on the way to nationalisation was Razmara. He was assassinated earl.\' 
March 1951. 
The Majles deputies now felt free to pass the Oil Nationalisation Bill. Why did 
the majority voted in favour of the oil nationalisation still remains a question. It 
might have been the fact that Razmara had gone and there was now no threat of a 
coup. There were most definitely other reasons. One was the tremendous pressure 
the public put on the authorities through their gatherings and street demonstra-
tions. The other was efforts made by Mosaddegh and National Front and the 
fact that oil had become a matter of national prestige. Iranian nationalism of the 
1940's was different from nationalism of 1890's. In 1891, the Tobacco Concession 
was rejected with full public support. The nationalism of those da~'s was anti-
foreign fuelled by religious emotions. In the 1940's, the political assassinations h~' 
229 
religious extremists associated with Kashani stirred up religious emotions. How-
ever, the social discontent of the new urban middle class agitated by inroads made 
by Tudeh Party, was most probably an important social force which shaped r he 
events of the late 1940's. However, in the tense political atmosphere of Tehran 
the way seemed to be prepared for the premiership of Seyed Zia. an anglophile. to 
annul the Nationalisation Law but deputies voted for tviosaddegh. 
The reason why Mosaddegh enjoyed such a universal support at this time is 
easy to understand. He was the unifying figure with a reputation for honest~· 
and opposition to foreign influence. Mosaddegh's popularity had spread into {'v-
ery walk of Iranian life including the religious section. The clerg~' was associated 
with the bazar and had connections with Fadayian Eslam. Political assassina-
tions had excited the public. Perhaps remembering Reza Shah's atrocities, a large 
portion of the society including some members of the upper class, also preferred 
Mosaddegh. Oil nationalisation had become a matter of national prestige. The 
support for Mosaddegh, therefore, covered far-right to the far-left as Tudeh Party 
also supported the movement although it had been banned. The premiership of 
Mosaddegh was the consequence of such a support. 
The oil nationalisation would not have been possible without public gatherings, 
strong criticisms made by the press and fierce Majles opposition. But how did the 
oil issue become a matter for public debate? There were several factors involved. 
One was Moscow's aggression towards Iran. Moscow menaced Iran seriously in t hl' 
1940's but their activities directed public attention to Iranian problems such as the 
oil issue. This happened once in 1944 when Kavtaradze arrived in Tehran. The 
second occasion was in 1946 when Iran took Moscow before the United :\atioIlS 
over their refusal to withdraw from the north. The third time, Iran's integrity 
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became a matter of public debate when Iranian army moved into Azarbaijan in 
December 1946. In 1947, Sadchikov's pressing Ghavam for the ratification of the 
Irano-Soviet Oil Concession caused a great deal of public anxiety. 
Perhaps the most important factor which helped the public understand the oil 
issue was the rejection of the Supplementary Agreement by the nationalist deputies 
in the 15th Majles in July 1949 and the heated debates and discussions relating to 
it both before and after the rejection. The 15th Majles had also required an inves-
tigation into the Anglo-Iranain oil concession which resulted in the Supplementar~' 
Agreement. The foundation for the oil nationalisation was established in the oil 
law of 1944 and the rejection of the Irano-Soviet oil concession in October 1947 
by a vote of 102 to 2. It is important to notice that public support which was. 
by Autumn 1949, a vital factor in Iranian politics, was not always available. An 
example is Mosaddeg's objection to the 15th Majles election rigging in the early 
1947 which did not draw much public attention. 
Another important factor was the electoral campaign for the 16th ~1ajles in 
Autumn 1949 and the formation of the National Front in October 1949. A large 
crowd accompanied nationalists to the Shah's palace in objection to the election 
rigging. Mosaddegh went back to his village of Ahmad-abad. As mentioned earlier, 
Mosaddegh did the same in 1947 but this did not attract much public attention. 
The assassination of the Court Minister, Hazhir, in November 1949, must have 
caused public excitement. One can see the reason why public was passive over 
election rigging in 1947. The Azarbaijan crisis had just ended. The public was 
jubilant and oil had not become a moral issue yet. 
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One might tend to see Mosaddegh backed by the nation on one side and t h{' 
oil company backed by the British Government on the other side. The scene was. 
however, much more complicated than this as such a bitter dispute was rooted in 
the exploitation, by an industrial power, of the raw material of a developing country 
and the problem of re-adjusting the relationship between the two countries. All 
the concessions granted by the late 19th century had their own social and political 
implications. One such example was that of Tobbaco and Lottery. Just as the~' 
did in 1891, the public exerted pressure on the authorities to cancel the concession. 
In the period January to March 1951, many demonstrations in support of the oil 
nationalisation were held. The public put tremendous pressure on the ~Iajles to 
ratify the N ationalisation Bill which proved that the crisis was not an emotional 
response to foreign domination or protest against an unjust deal, but a question 
of national prestige. 
Contrary to what nationalists thought, Washington would have been unwill-
ing to go against London. Given the decline of the British influence in the area, 
Washington was the only power to block Moscow in Iran. Moscow's plans for 
Greece, Turkey and Iran failed as a result of the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 
1947. Even before the Korean War, Washington judged governments on the basis 
of the cold war. In the case of Iran it should have been obvious that in view of 
their cooperation with London in the Far East, Middle East and Eastern Europe, 
they would not be prepared to back Iranian nationalists to the detriment of their 
ally. Washington also had to consider its interest in Bahrain and Saudi Arabian oil 
industry. Even if Mosaddegh was prepared to allow an American oil company like 
Aramco to operate the Iranian oil industry, the offer would be rejected. \\"ashing-
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ton did not trust Mosaddegh. 11 After the coup of 1953, Eisenhoyer granted Iran 
60,000,000 dollars, twice American economic aid in the previous decade. ~los('ow 
also returned 11 tons of gold owed to Iran for borrowing local currency from Iranain 
banks during the war. 12 
The British Foreign Office failed to recognise the possibilit~· of oil nationalisa-
tion despite warnings by the American Embassy. They considered the oil company 
a private commercial enterprise and believed that Supplementary Agreement would 
be ratified when Iran needed money p3 There was division in British Government.. 
The lower-level officials at the Foreign Office were in favour of more control over 
the oil company. Most treasury officials and some key officers at. Foreign Office 
favoured using pressure tactics. After oil nationalisation, the hard-liners gained 
control over policy making in parliament after conservative victory in October 
It appears that even by the early 1951 British authorities had failed to un-
derstand the situation with regard to public sentiment. British politicians were 
involved with political considerations and British oilmen did not concern them-
selves with public mood. The Iranian public looked at foreign intervention with 
pessimism and suspicion and saw the behaviour of the company officials as nothing 
but doom for the future. Most accounts given in Iranian writings are those of dis-
appointment. Had any of the British officials been able to read Farsi publications. 
they would have realised that the reason why the Iranian public glorified their 
remote past was to ease the pressure of such a difficult time. At least as early as 
11 McGhee, Envoy to ... , pp 79. 
12 Nimruz, 22 Dei 1374 (12 January 1996). 
13 Grady H, What Went Wrong in Iran, Saturday Evening Post, 5 January 1952, pp 58. 
14 FRUS 1951 Vol 5 pp 295. 
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December 1948 such attitudes had been brought to the attention of British officials. 
Hazhir, for instance, warned Ambassador Le Rougetel that public understanding 
was that "Persia was being swindled". and had to act firml~' to gain his rightsY' 
The British view was contemptuous. After the oil nationalisation the~' classed 
Iranian oil as stolen goods! In their view under the international law the 1933 oil 
concession was legal. Iran had seized British oil industry so Iranian oil was stolen 
goods. 16 British Ambassador Shepherd regarded Mosaddegh with great contempt. 
He commented on Mosaddegh as being "cunning and slippery and completely un-
scrupulous ". He went on to say " He looks rather like a cab horse and is slightly 
deaf ... conducts the conversation at a distance of about 6 inches at which range he 
diffuses a slight reek of opium" /17 It was as if humiliation was inadequate when 
he wrote again to the Foreign Office reminding them that l\losaddegh's daughtpl' 
was in a mental institution in Switzerland and that Mosaddegh himself was not 
quite normal either p8 
This negative view of Mosaddegh is reflected in a sympathetic portrait of him 
given by an expert on Iranian affairs, Elwell-Sutton, who wrote " to most people in 
the West he was a puzzling figure of far funny because of his tears, ... conducting 
public business in grey woollen pyjamas and a plain iron bed". Elwell-Sutton even 
saw something drastically wrong with Iranians too ,. The Persians, it seemed. had 
suddenly gone mad; following the lead of a crazy old man, they had thrown out a 
sound and honest commercial concern... the bald-headed hawked-nosed old doctor's 
15 PRO FO 371/68732, Le Rougetel to Bevin, 21 December 1948. . 
16 CAB, 134/1145, Persian Committee" Measures to Discourage or Prevent the Disposal of Persian 
Oil", 13 December 1951. 
17 PRO FO 371/91459, Shepherd to Furlonge, 6 May 1951. 
18 PRO FO 371/Persia,91457,EP1015/ 162/34, 28 April 1951,91458,EP1015/197/34, 14 ~lay 1951. 
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antics were even troubling the Serene waters of British politics ... ".19 
It was perhaps lack of understanding of the Iranian culture which made the 
Britishs see Mosaddegh this way as American yiew was similar too. Loy Henderson 
wrote "We are confronted by a desperate, a dangerous situation and a llwdrl/uTi 
who would ally himself with Russians".20 Despite their good reputation in Iran. 
American diplomats had failed to maintain connection with opposition in the late 
1940's. Grady, for instance, met with Mosaddegh on 2 1\Iay 1951, ten months after 
he arrived in Iran! This was most probably because of their policy of containment 
which prompted support for the Shah for over 25 years. 
The Iranians did not behave much better than foreigners. There were numerous 
examples of domestic feuding and misbehaviour. Ghayam. for instance, attended 
the 14th Majles to report on the Soviet withdrawal only one hour before the 1\Iajles 
expired. Ghavam did very well to serve Iran by misleading Stalin. He reached an 
agreement with tribal chiefs in return for political support, rigged the 15th Majles 
elections and arranged for the rejection of the Soviet oil proposals by a vote of 102 
out of 104. Contrary to the fact that he was the most independent prime minister 
of the 1940's, and rendered a great service to Iran over the Azarbaijan crisis, III 
December 1947, the very same deputies voted against him. 
The Iranian communists in the Tudeh party served as 1\loscow's agents. They 
called Mosaddegh an American agent and Razmara a British one. The ordinary 
Iranians adopted the same attitude. To them some deputies were state lackeys, 
others were American or British lackeys. Political strife was so strong that it 
appeared to justify anything as political parties relied on knife-stabbers. ~la-
19 Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, pp 7-8 193-194. 
20 Roosevelt K, pp 18. 
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jles deputies did not behave better. To prevent a quorum. deputies spat OIl one 
another! Ridiculing opponents was common. In 1906. some deputies ousted 
Mosaddegh from the Majles by proving that he was under t he minimum age re-
quirement of 30 by referring to his mother's second marriage. In 1949. opponents 
tried to oust him again by claiming that he was over 70 ! 
Filibustering methods were common. In response to monarchists's attempt to 
rush Supplementary Agreement through the Majles, deputy ~Iakki made a lengthy 
speech until the 15th Majles actually expired at 1 am! Double dealing was a feature 
of Iranian politics. The Western-supported Razmara shifted between powers in the 
middle of the Korean War! In a tense political atmosphere, he directed unnecessar~' 
public anger towards himself by making offensive remarks about Iranian people's 
technical inability. Monarchy was supposed to be politically passiye. The Shah and 
Ashraf, however, intrigued against governments. The ends seemed to justified the 
means. Clergy became involved in political assassinations. Razmara was suspected 
of being involved in the attempt on the Shah's life. The Shah was. later on, accused 
of arranging Razmara's assassination! A nationalist deputy. Baghai. was arrested 
late 1949 for sedition amongst the army. Although a fierce supporter of Mosaddegh, 
Baghai turned against him later on and was involved in the abduction and murder 
of brigadier Afshar-Toos, Mosaddegh's police chief. A better example is that of 
the Speaker of the Majles who supported Razmara's assassination by calling the 
assassin the saviour of the nation. 21 
However, despite feud and conflict amongst the Iranians, the Iranian natioIl-
alism and strong anti-British sentiment did not go unnoticed b~' their Arab neigh-
bours. The major Arab defeat in 1948 brought to the fore extreme elements. The 
21 Nimruz, 23 Khordad 1376 (13 June 1997) pp 16. 
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Syrian government was overthrown in 1949. In July 195L King Abdolla of Jor-
dan who was as in favour of a peace treaty with Israel was assassinated. :\ asser 
took over Egypt in July 1952. The atmosphere in many Arab countries \\'a~ near-
revolution. The Arab nationalism was originally a response to the Ottoman Empire 
which was in charge of many Arab countries. \\'ith the growth of the British in-
fluence in Arab countries and in particular after the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire, the nationalistic sentiment was directed towards Britain. Unlike Arab 
countries of the Middle East, Iran has been a sovereign state during much of its 
long history. Arabs of the Middle East appear to haye been affected b~' t he na-
tionalistic developments in Iran. Some British officials had foreseen t he problem of 
spreading Iranian nationalism to Arab countries. Frances PeIly. British Resident in 
Kuwait wrote" In the Persian Gulf, 1951 is likely to be remembered as the year of 
Abadan. On the Arab littoral this is particularly true of Kuwait. The town is only 
half an hour's flight from Abadan and the Kuwait Oil Company is half owned by 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ... Singapore might fall and India be relinquished 
but these are far away places to the concrete Arab mind. The Abadan refinery was 
almost within smelling range of Kuwait".22 Sir Rupert Hay in Bahrain expressed 
similar concern over "catastrophe at Abadan" which "undermined our whole indus-
tries in the Gulf. ,,23 
These concerns were justified when one realises that Mosaddegh's nationalism 
was parallel to some nationalist phenomena in the Middle East. This includes 
comparable stages of development of nationalism too. Rashid Ali in Iraq in 194.1, 
Quwalti Government in Syria in 1954, Jordanian government of Kabulsi in l~Fij 
and Suez Crisis of 1956 are examples. These are reminders that liberal nationalism 
:22 PRO FO 371/98378, Kuwait Administration Report for 1951. 
23 PRO FO 371/98378, Hay to Eden, 31 October 1952. 
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at the early stage of development risked failure even without foreign pressure.~4 
The collapse of Mosaddegh in only few days in 1953 is an example. 
The Arab nationalist community was willing to incorporate the Iranian na-
tionalistic demands. Suspecting that Egyptian government might reach an agree-
ment with Britain, the organ of the Moslem Brotherhood, Al-dawa. called on the 
Wafdists to follow the example of the Iranian people who nationalised the oil in-
dustry.25 On the way back from New York, Mosaddegh stopped at Cairo where 
he was received by nationalist premier Nahas Pasha amidst violent anti-British 
riots. Several days later, they signed a pact of friendship to "demolish British 
imperialism".26 Just as Iranians did, the Egyptians ma~' have viewed the British 
officials as clever manipulators who had smilingly planted seeds of decay for over 
a century. 
One question remains in the mind of the Iranian reader. It is true that Britain 
exploited Iranian oil reserves, perhaps exported oil illegally, used profits to ('X-
pand subsidiaries outside Iran, and paid more in taxes to the British Treasury 
than to Iran', but what about the Iranian feudals who exploited Iranian peasaIlts 
for centuries? Why was it that nationalists wanted to nationalise the oil in-
dustry and referred with great anger to the company's unfair employment policy 
but land reforms had to be initiated by Kennedy administration some 10 y<'ars 
later ?27 Why did Mosaddegh, who had first-hand experience of peasant abuse, 
not encourage reform ? 
24 For a description of Arab nationalism in the early 1950's see Marlowe, Chapter 4, 
25 Hall, pp 70. 
26 New York Times, 15 November 1951. 
27 Dorman, pp 80, 82, 128. Also see page 96. 
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Some examples of material examined have been given in the following pages: 
page 265 : a copy of an Iranian newspaper accusing Mosaddegh of treason. 
page 266 : a short biography of Mosaddegh prepared by British officials in Tehran. 
page 267 : a report by British officials in Tehran describing some Iranian personalities. 
page 269 : a telegraph confirming bribing some Iranian statesmen. 
page 270 : a report on the Shah and Ghavam's position. 
page 271 : British Embassy reporting on Saed's political position 
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Appendix A 
D'Arcy's Concession and Relevant Events 
1900 Proposals by Ketabchi Khan to sell the oil concession of 1896. 
28 May 1901 Concession granted by the Shah, Russian ambassador on holiday. 
Bribes paid to influential individuals. Five northern provinces along Russian border 
including Semnan excluded. 
1902 First well sunk in Chiah Sorkh near Qasre-Shirin 
21 May 1903 First Exploitation Company formed in London. Capital 500,000 
pounds. Started drilling 100 miles North of Baghdad. Oil found in small quantities. 
1903 Admiralty asks Burmah Oil Company to supply long-term fuel oil. 
1904 D' Arcy has two producing oil wells but far from the sea. 
21 Oct 1904 Admiral Fisher appointed an oil committee. 
1905 D' Arcy short of money. Admiralty asks Burmah to intervene. 
5 May 1905 Burmah formed Concessions Syndicate ltd to assist D' Arcy. Syndicate 
took over the First Exploitation Co. 
Nov 1905 Agreement with Bakhtiari khans by British Consul-General in Esfehan. 
3000 pounds yearly salary for guards. 3 per cent shares in any company in their area. 
5 Aug 1906 Constitutional Government granted by the Shah. 
31 Aug 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement ended 10-year quarrel. 
1907 Indian government sends Wilson to protect drillers. 
26 May 1908 Oil was struck in Meidan-Naftun at 1180 ft depth. 
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13 Apr 1909 Bakhtiari Oil Company formed. Capital 400,O()() one-pound shares. 
12,000 shares to local khans. 
14 Apr 1909 Anglo-Persian Oil Company registered in London. Concession was 
transferred to this company. Capital 2,000,000 pounds. D' Arcy became the Director. 
Oil company held 97 per cent of Bakhtiari and 87.95 per cent of First Exploitation Co. 
The rest with Iranians. 
May 1909 Sir Percy Cox negotiating with Khazal on behalf of the oil company. 
American financial adviser, Morgan Shuster arrives in Iran. 
1911 First pipeline completed. 
1912 Abadan Refmery constructed. Land rented from Khazal. Khazal agreed 
to protect staff and property. 
1912 Oil in commercial quantities flowing to Abadan. 
6 Apr 1914 Admiralty concluded that Iranian oil would satisfy large portions of 
British requirements. 
1914 British Government approved agreement between Admiralty, Treasury 
and Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 
20 May 1914 British government acquired 51 per cent stock in the oil company. 
Company held 50 per cent share in Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). TPC had 
rights in Ottomani. 
1914 Americans produce 68 per cent of world oil demand 
1915 German and Ottomani troops in Iran. Pipelines damaged in Bakhtiari 
area by resented Khans. 
9 Mar 1916 Khoshtaria's concession granted for 70 years. North of Iran only. 
Nullified two years later. 
1917 Bolshevik Revolution changed Russian attitude towards Iran. 
09 Aug 1919 Anglo-Iranian Agreement to tum Iran into a British Protectorate. 
Cancelled later on. 
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10 Feb 1920 North Venezuela Petroleum Company registered in London. An~lo-
Persian Oil Company had a stake. --
8 May 1920 Anglo-Persian Oil Company bought from Khoshtaria his concession for 
100,000 pounds. North Persian Oil Company formed as a subsidiary. Capital 
3,000,000 pounds. 
12 Aug 1920 US Dept of State confrrmed American companies seek concessions in 
North of Iran. Standard Oil of New Jersey and Sinclair. 
1920 Concession to Standard Oil Company for 50 years, royalty of 10 per 
cent of crude oil. Concession dropped. 
22 Dec 1920 Armitage-Smith Agreement. 
1921 Coup d'eta. Reza Khan comes to power. Dissatisfaction of Iranian 
government over payments. 
26 Feb 1921 Russia renounced all treaties signed by Czarist Regime against Iranian 
people. 
1921 Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement signed. Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
encouraged to buy oil from Baku. 
1922 Sinclair Concession for 40 to 50 years. North of Iran only. Concession 
dropped. 
1922 American missions to Iran. 
1925 Millspaugh in charge of Finance Ministry began to fmd a sol~tion. 
Agreement signed with company to double royalties. Efforts to re-draft conceSSIOn as 
it would expire in 1961. 
1927 Iranian Government demanded invalidation of 1920 Armitage-Smith 
Agreement. 
1927 French Concession. North of Iran only. Concession Dropped. 
1929 Negotiations over Kavir-Khoorian Concession. 
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27 Nov 1932 Iranian government cancelled the concession. British £!oyemment 
decided to take matter to Hague. Eventually agreed to bring it before ~ League of 
Nations. 
1933 Iranian government alleged that Indian workers had been employed in 
place of Iranian subjects. 
Aug 1933 Beginning of Iranian Independent Oil Policy. 
1935 New concession approved by Majles. Agreement with the company not 
with British government. New concession valid for 60 years until 31 Dec 1993. Area 
reduced to 100,000 sq. miles at company' descretion. Minimum royalty 750,000 
pounds a year. 
1935 Company was re-named Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
1937 Amiranian Oil Company. North of Iran for 60 years. A subsidiary of 
Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware. Company relinquished. 
1939 Dutch Concession. Central plateau. Nullified 1944 because of non-
performance. 
1941 Invasion of Iran by Russia and Britain. No American troops. 
American reputation in Iran still good. 
Sept 1944 Arrival of Kavtaradze. 
02 Dec 1944 Oil Law forbidding grant of new oil concessions. 
1946 American financial mission to Iran by Millspaugh. 
1946 Confrontation of Soviet Union and United States over Azarbaijan. 
1946 Irano-Soviet Oil concession agreed. 
22 Oct 1947 Irano-Soviet Oil Concession rejected by the Majles. Government 
instructed to negotiate with Anglo-Iranian oil company for better terms. 
1949 Gass-Golshaian agreement signed between Irani~ Govern~en~ ~d the 
company. American companies offered 50 per cent share of profits to SaudI ArabIa. 
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July 1949 Small group of nationalist deputies fiercely opposed the agreement. 
Heated Majles debates over oil. 
Oct 1949 National Front formed. New election for the 16th Mailes announced. 
April 1950 Mansur appointed prime minister. Oil committee established. 
27 June 1950 General Razmara appointed prime minister. 
1950 Production 240,000,000 barrels a year. 
Mar 1951 The Maj1es and Senate approved nationalisation. 
01 May 1951 The Shah assented. The Iranian Nationalisation Act became law. The 
1933 agreement was cancelled. Assets of the company were transferred to Iranian 
National Oil Company. 
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Iranian Prime Ministers of 1940's 
Aug 1941 - Mar 1942 
Mar 1942 - Jul 1942 
Aug 1942 - Feb 1943 
Furughi 
Soheily 
Ghavam 
Soheily 
Saed 
Feb 1943 - Mar 1944 (second cabinet) 
Mar 1944 - Nov 1944 
Nov 1944 - Apr 1945 
May 1945 - Jun 1945 
Jun 1945 - Oct 1945 
Bayat 
Hakimi 
Sadr 
Hakimi 
Ghavam 
Hakimi 
Hazhir 
Saed 
Mansur 
Razmara 
Ala 
Mosaddegh 
Oct 1945 - Jan 1946 (second cabinet) 
Jan 1946 - Dec 1947 (second cabinet) 
Dec 1947 - Jun 1948 (third cabinet) 
Jun 1948 - Nov 1948 
Nov 1948 - Apr 1950 
Apr 1950 - Jun 1950 
Jun 1950 - Mar 1951 
Mar 1951 - Apr 1951 
Apr 1951 - Aug 1953 
American Ambassadors of 1940's 
Louis Dreyfus 
Lelland Morris 
Wallace Murray 
George Allen 
John Wiley 
Henry Grady 
- 1944 
1944 - 1945 
1945 - 1946 
1946 - 1948 
1948 - 1950 
1950 - 1953 
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Short Biographies 
Acheson Dean (1893-1971) 
Assistant Secretary of State 1941 
Under Secretary 1947 
Secretary of State 1949-1953 
Attlee, Clement Richard (1883-1967) 
Deputy Prime Minister 1942-1945 
Prime Minister 1945-1951 
Bayat, Morteza Gholi (b 1887) 
Iranian Prime Minister 1944-1945 
Bevin, Ernest (1881-1951) 
British Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 
Bullard, Reader William (1885-1976) 
British Ambassador in Tehran 1939-1946 
Cadman, John (1877-1941) 
Chairman of the Oil Company 1927-1941 
Churchill Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965) 
First Load of Admiralty 1939-1940 
Prime Minister 1940-1945 
Leader of Opposition 1945-1951 
Eden, Robert Anthony (1897-1977) 
Foreign Secretary 1940-1945 
Deputy leader of opposition 1945-1951 
Fraser, William Milligan (1888-1970) 
Deputy Chairman of the Oil Company 1928-1941 
Chairman 1941-1956 
Furughi, Mohamad Ali (1873-1942) 
Iranian Prime Minister 1941-1942 
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Gass, Neville Archibald (1893-1965) 
Managing Director of the Oil Company 1939 
Grady, Henry Francis (1882-1957) 
Assistant Secretary of State 1939-1941 
Ambassador to Iran 1950-1951 
Golshayian, Abbas Gholi (b 1902) 
Iranian Finance Minister 1949 
Jernegan, John D 
most experienced officer on Iran, 
worked closely with Iranian affairs between 1941 and 1950 
served in Tehran from 1943 to 1946 
Le Rougetel, John Helier (1894-1975) 
British Ambassador to Iran 1946-1950 
McGhee, George Crews (b 1912) 
Oil Geologist 
Co-ordinator of aid to Greece and Turkey 1947-1949 
Assistant Secretary of State 1949-1951 
Northcroft, Ernest (1896-1976) 
Chief Representative of the Oil Company 
in Tehran 1945-1951 
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Crude Oil 
Crude oil is the residue of organic waste, rich in carbon and hydrogen atoms, that 
accumulated under the coastal areas. Pressurised by succeeding levels of sediment. it 
was converted into hydrocarbons, oil and natural gases. The droplets of oil were 
rapped by permeable rock. In this reservoir, salt water occupied the bottom and a gas 
ap was formed at the top. When the drill hits the reservoir, the gas cap forces the oil to 
flow into the well bore and on to the surface to form a gusher. Oil production results 
in a reduction of the underground pressure which has to be compensated by a gas lift, 
that is injecting gas back into the reservoir. 
The crude oil has to be refmed as it is of very little direct use. It is a mixture of 
petroleum liquids and gases whose components have to be isolated by way of thermal 
distillation. The early refineries acted like a still in which crude oil was boiled and then 
condensed at different temperatures to yield gasoline, kerosene, jet fuel, etc. 
In early days, crude oil, was transported in various sizes of barrels. In 1866, 
Pennsylvania oil producers chose the 42-gallon barrel as their standard size. This was 
the standard size barrel in England for herring since 1482. Today, crude oil is 
transported by pipe lines and tankers in metric tons but barrel is still used worldwide. 
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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT 
ARCHIVES April12.193~ PERSIA. 
CONFIDENTIAL. f::)EC'fION 4, 
[E i972/~7a2/a4] Copy No. 
(No. 112.) 
JIll r. Seymour to JIll r. Eden.-(Received April 12.) 
Sir, Tehran, Ma7'ch 26, 1937. 
WITH reference to Sir John Simon's circular despatch of the 28th May, 
1035, I }~n:ve ~he honour to transmit to·you herewith a revised report on leading 
personalItIes 1ll Iran. 
2: I al~ in~ebted fo~ the prepa~ation of this report to the oriental secretary 
to l.lls MaJesty s LegatlOn. It wIll be observed that the report has been 
cOllsl<lerably expanded, from seventy to 208 personalities. Its compilation has 
involved much labour, and Mr. Trott is, I think, to be congratulated on the 
producti?~ of.a report wh~ch will preserve somcthing of that wide l~nowledge of 
personailtles 1ll Iran, whICh has been so valuable an asset to H1s Majesty's 
Legation during his tenure of the post of oriental secretary. 
I have, &c. 
H. J. SEYMOUR. 
Enclosure. 
Report on (,eading Pe1'sonalities in Persia" 1937. 
1. Aalnlll, Dr. Amir (Amir-i-A'nlnm). 
2. Anl:un, MU7.nfTnr. 
3. Adl, or A(lIe, Mostnfn (Mnn~u\".us-
Snllnneh). 
4. Aflchnllli (or Afl,hll1\l-Jbrohimi), Ah,lnl-
HczII. 
Ii. AlsoI'. lI[ohnmmnd Hashim (Shoi\(h-er-
TInis). 
6. A fshnr, Rezu. 
7. A~hcvel1i, Farojlllloh. 
R. Ah'y, IIInjid. 
O. Aim1\l (or Ayrom), Geneml Mohammad 
H1Issein. 
10. Alchnr, Fntlt 111111 h (Sipnhdnr-i-A'znm), 
ICC.M.G. 
11. Aln, HnsHein, C.M.G. (MIl'in-ul-Vizoreh). 
1~. Allunir, Ahbas (A'zam-es-Sn\t.oneh). 
13. Amcri, .Tovnd. 
1<1. Amcri, Sull-an Mohn1\lmad. 
15. Amin, lInhibul\l\h (Amin-et-Tlljjar). 
16. Amin, Hussein (onen called Amin 
IV[ uhnndi~). 
17. Amini, Dr. Ali. 
18. Amini, lIfohsen (Amin-ed·Donloh). 
Hl. Amirllhmeeli, or Ahmedi. Ahmed Agha. 
20. A mir- Bnglnri, .T nnfnr Quli. 
~1. A mir-Fnzli, Ismnil. 
22. AmiI' I{hosl"Ovi, Rezn Quli. 
~3. A Hsari. A Ii Quli (Mushnvir-1l1-Momnlik). 
24. Ansnd, IIInhmoud Agh (Amir Iqtidur). 
!lli. l\lIsnrie, Ahelnl Hussein Mnssoucl-. 
26. Arnstch, No.clir. 
27. Ardelnn, Amnnullnh (Izz-ul-Mnma\il(). 
28. Arclelan, Nnsh' Quli. 
29. Ardclnn, Oholn111 Ali. 
30. Ad", Hnssn'1' 
31. Adn, Hew (Prinoe Arlo-ed-Douleh). 
32. ASlld (Associ, renlly As'nd), Mohommad 
Quli (Snrd[\\" Dnhndm). 
33. Asndi, Snhllnn. 
84. Asnf, Ali Nnqi (Asaf-i-A'zam). 
35. Assnd-Dnhndu\", Assnd. 
9208 [151431 
36. ALnheld, Alnnnd (Mnshir A'znm). 
37. A tnheld, Mohsen. 
38. A 'znm-Znngnneh, Ali (Amir-i-l{ull). 
3f1. A7.imi, Dngher (Nn7.m-ul-Mulk). 
40. Azncli, Yndnllnh (Ami!' A'znm). 
41. nncler. Ahdnl Wuhhnb. 
42. nader, Mnhmond. 
43. Bndie (or Bndi'), Hassnn. 
44. Bllhnr (?IInlil(-nsh-Shunrn). 
45. Bnhmnn, Ali Allbnr. 
46. Bnhmmi, Abdullnh. 
47. Dnhmllli, Fnrnjullllh (Dnbir-i-A'zom). 
4.8. Dnhrnmi, Dr. Hussein (Ahyo-es-Snltnneh). 
49. Bnl,ht.inri, Mmtezn Quli. 
50. Bn.yl\t, l\Iurtezn Quli (Sahnm-es-Sllltnn). 
51. Dnynt, l'vlllslnrn Quli (Samsnrn-ul-Mulk). 
52. Drnghon, Fnrruldl. 
53. Dnshiri-Dehdnshti, Agha Javad (Amir 
HUllln.Yun). . 
54.. Dnshiri-Dehdoshti, Aghn Rezo. 
55. Duz\lrjmehri, Geneml Kerim Agha. 
56. Dndgl\l', Mirzn Hussein Khan (Adl-ul-
Mull(). 
57. Dnclvnr, Mehdi (Vussugh-es-Soll.nneh). 
58. Dnrgnhi, Mohammod. 
59. Dnsllti, Ali. 
60. Dnulntshnhi, Abul-Fnth. 
61. Dibl\, Ab'ul Fnth (Hishmnt-nd.Douleh). 
62. Dihn, Abul Hnsson (Siqat-ecl-Douleh). 
63. Dibn, Seyyid Abdul Ali (Seyyid-ul-
Mllhnqqiqin). 
64. Divllnbegi, Aghn. 
65. Ebtehnj, Abol-Hnsson. 
66. Ebtehoj, Ghulnl\1 Hussein. 
67. Enteznm, Nnsrullnh_ 
68. Entcznm, Abdnllnh. 
69. Esfnnclinri, Colonel Abbns Qllli. 
70. Esfnndiory, Abdul Hussein (Sadiq-ul-
Mulk). 
71. EsCnndinri, Asuclnlloh Ynl1lni- (Yamin·ul-
Momnlik). 
72. Esflmdinry, Fathullah Noury-. 
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• (ThiS Document Is the Property of His Britannic MaJesty's GovGrnment, and should 
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PERSIA. 
Cypher telegr2.111 to lIr. Norman (Teheran) 
, 
.. 
POI.ITICAL, 
Foreign Office, Decauoer 1st 1920. 9.0 p.m. 
No. 578. 
URGENT t - ,- .- ," .- .- ','" .- .- .- .- .... ,-
. Your telegram Nb. 766 (of 25th November) • 
Voussough-ed-Dowleh has received from Sipahdar a 
telegram accusing him of having received £250,000 on 
conclusion of Agreement, and has replied that any Buch surn 
could .nly have been in connection with arms etc. 
HiB HiGhness hae. however, requested that you should 
be informed that _sum paid by Sir p. Cox on conclusion of 
AR;reell1ent was advanced at instigation of Sarem-ed-Dowleh 
and Prince liirouz who each reccivec..; ~OO,OOO tomens: the 
remainder was placed at His Hlghnetls' own disposal by Surem-
ed-Dowleh but was not touched as Vossou8h was opposed to 
the pro cedure • 
Subsequently HiD Highness used the remaining Burn of 
tomans 200,000 to help Tomanianz but firm never the less 
became bankrupt. His Highness received from firm title 
deeds of lands in North Persia ~~ security and is prepared 
, 
to hand these over to you or a qui de droit or to repay that 
sum on his return. 
~ 
In any case he \'Iishe8 Sipahdar to be enli';htened that 
it was never question of £250,000. Soe your telegrrun No. 
751 of November 17th and your correction in 754 of 18th 
Novemb er • 
': .,. 
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FOR 'l'HF~ PERIOD 13th NOVm,'lBEH '1'0 19th NOVEMBER 1944. 
PERSIAN AF1"AIRS. 
Poll tical. 
1. Porsia is still without a government. The Persians 
take a childish delight in any such 'Igrown up" disease E'3 a 
political crIsis. Being indivlduali~ts without loyalty, dis-
c ip11ne or cohes ion they are loth to Birll~ their differonces, 
f1x upon a con~on policy and Glect leaders to carry out that 
policy. The Majlis has met in secret or o~cn session almost 
daily. A Bill to except Dr. Mucadd1q (if elected nn l'rime 
Minister) from the provisions of the constitutional laws and 
to preserve his parliarolEJntary seat against the tIme when he 
might resign from the premio~ship was defdsted by 64 votes out 
of 91 cast. At subsequent meetings of the Uajlis gl~OUpS on 
15th November HUBsein 3a.mii, AdIb-us-Saltanoh (F.0.199; M.A.254) 
was nominated by the Mihan group; Murteza Quli J2ayat, (Saham-
us-Sultan) - F.0.47j lLA.65 by tho Ittehad i IUl11 group, ond 
Sadiq Sadlqi, '(Mushta~hS?ud-Dowleh) - ;:;'.C. 193; M.A.218 u:' the 
Azadi group. 'l'he Independents, after some diJcussion with tile 
other groups finally advanced three n~mes a~ pandidatcs for 
tLs ~rellliorship, Hassan I~fandiari (Muhtashim-u3-Sa1taneb) 
1".0.90; l':1.A.125; Sadiq Sadiql and Sami! (Adib-us-3altaneh). 
TIley wert) subsequently aeli:ed to reduce tho number ol' their can-
llldattis to two. Nothing original in tho 1j.:a.y of a policy or 
vigour in carl'ying it out cnn be expected from p.ny of the above 
anu the idea.s 1n tho mLIG:::: of the majcrHy of deputies are 
probably that after tl:e recent d&l;.:- ... ioratlG!l Ii! l!erso-SoviGt 
relations it is essential to choos0 a rrLn~ IHn.if;tor 1I'!ho, 
thout:;h he will not give the Russ 1.°U5 thei'_' C(';uCElSI:: lei., wIll 
at least not irritate them further .a0l' be a target for their 
peraondl animosity as Sated was, and that as long as the war 
lasts and foreign troops on Pers ian soil prevent tho ;P':lrSiaIlS 
from being complete masters of their own hOU:le nc ::;t,rongly 
natio~£\J.i3tic policy c]~ vlgorous Prime !Hnister is indicated 
or indo0d advisable. 
2. The Russian sponsored newapapers and U.d L'-rC'juom 
Front Press have kept up tl':c1.,:, attacl:s on 8n.' Jd, blaming his 
policy for embittering Perso-Sovl3t relations, his "L"af'ci;Jt" 
govOri:1'uat f0;;' suppressing CBl't!li'l of tlla TuG.oh group of news-
papal'S and fei' opprossive action agaim:t 'l'uJeL C_')~oJnstt'atortl. 
T::l'J 'P,J,:,s ian hnbit of kicking a rn~n whGn l10 h GO'fTl. r::~' con-
tinuing to rovile him afte]' ~1e has rcs 19ned office a uito ti.e 
I:u::l!Ji':1.J :~oolc f:lS they hope to obscure their recent doft.n.t over 
the oil concession by a more COllcantr.:..+:.:;J :1Ltacl;: 011 Sated l'or 
his r.1LJ talcen policy and pust mi3do13ds 'lIllich, they claim, ard 
leading the country to ruin. 
3. A further 'l'uc1ch domons tra t 10;1 on 1'7 th l-rovemLElr 
on !! emaIl scale and unoneorted b~T Hussian trocp3, was stopped 
and/ 
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opini?ns freely, ~nd nobody, not even. the S~ah, esc.aped his criticisms. An appa~entl;y orgamsed attempt to assassmate hIm was made in October 1926 one 
mormng.m t~e ~treet, but, although wounded in three places, he managed to ~scape wIth hIS hfe. F?r an old-fashioned cleric he is cute and far-sighted, but 
IS a d~ma~ogue and obstmate. Speaks no. E?ropean language. 
I ersls.tent. rumours say that Mudarns IS dead, but as no official announce-
ment to t~lls effect has ever appeared, it must be presumed that he is still in exile 
at Kelat m Khorasan. 
128. Muhsin, Suleiman.-Born about 1875. An obscure Qajar Prince, 
probablr des<;end.ed from ~he ~umerous progeny of Fath Ali Shah. In the early 
years of the I erSlan Const~tutIOn .h.e was one of the leaders of the Democrat party. 
~Iected a Deputy to the thu'd MaJh.s, and left Tehran with the pro-German clique 
lO 11)15 for na~dad an? Constantmople, On the capture by the British forces 
of Bagdad, Sulelman MIrza took refuge with th.e Sinjabi tribe on the Perso-Iraq 
frontIer, ~h.en~e he co~ducted a system of espIOnage against the British army. 
On ~he SlOJ.alHs refusmg to surrender him, they were attacked in 1918, and 
Sulelman 1hrza was captured and sent to India. He returned to Persia in 1921 
and. was again elected to the Majlis, w~e~e he led a small Socialist group. Was 
agalll.elected ~o. the fifth term <;>f t~e MaJhs and .was leader of the minority party. 
Appomte~ 1:l1Dlste~ of ~ducat~o~ m 1~23, but ,?Id nothing beyond filling the posts 
of that MUllstry WIth hIS SocIalIst fnends. 8mce the establishment of a Soviet 
rel?res~ntatioll in .this country, Suleiman Mirza has been on terms of close friend-
ShIp WIth the SOVIets, but he has lost any popularity he ever had, and his Socialist 
party has broken down badly, In October 1927 he went to Moscow to be present 
at the tenth anniversary of the Soviet regime, and afterwards he visited Berlin 
ann. Paris, returning to Persia in the winter of 1930. 
lIe is a demagogue and time-serving politician, for whom modern Persia has 
little use. 
Speaks no European language. 
Hetired completely from the political arena in 1931, and is said to run a 
grocer's shop now in Tehran. 
129. 1I1uhsini, D,'. Ahmad (,lmad-ul-Mulk).-'Born about 1885. Native of 
h.uorasan. Came to Tehran in his youth and studied medicine. 
Went to England before the war, where he made the acquaintance of 
Professor Browne, who helped him in many ways. Studied medicine in England, 
but failed to qualify as a doctor. Lost mterest in medicine and then studied 
pedagogy. 
Heturned to Persia in (1) 1918. 
Employed under the Mmistry of Education and made head of the department 
of the Ministry of Education in Azerbaijan, where he was at the time of the 
Shah's visit in (1) 1932. On the resignation or dismissal of Mirza Yahya Khan 
Gharagozlou from the post of Minister of Education in June 1933, Dr. Muhsini 
became acting Minister of Education. 
In this post he was not a success, being old-fashioned and conservative in his 
methods. The Cabinet resigned in September 1933; and Dr. Muhsini was 
relegated to the comparatively unimportant post of Governor of Kermanshah in 
the following November. Relieved of his duties at Kermanshah July 1935, since 
when he has been in retirement at Tehran. 
Dr. Mnhsini is rather a wind-bag with a great sense of his own importance. 
@ lI1usaddi D,·. Muhammad Musaddi -us-Saltaneh .-.B?rn about 188;5. 
b 11 nep ew 0 Farman 'armayan.. as stu Ie aw m Pans to a certam 
extent and poses as a jurist. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 19~O. 
Appomted Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authOrity 
from Parliament to pmge and reform that Ministry. However, dming his six 
months' tenure of that portfolio he destroyed indiscriminately the good with the 
bad, and at the end the orga.nisation was worse than before, as he proved himself 
entirely incapable of ,making reform~ .. Appointed. Govern.or-General . of 
Azerbaijan in 1922, and m 1923 became MInIster for ForeIgn AffaIrS for a perIOd 
of four months. Elected as a Deputy to the fourth, fifth, and sixth terms of the 
Majlis from Tehran .. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the sixth 
tenn, steps were taken to prevent h.im from being elected to later terms of the 
Majlis. lIe is a demagogue and a wmdbag. 
Speaks l·'reneh fluently. 
Is now living in retirement in Tehran. 
, 
131. MuSkar, llassa1~ (i 
ca~e~r in the ¥inistry of F 
MinIster of FInance in 19] 
H.assnn Khan Vossuq, subset 
WIthout portfolio until Jun. 
Zia-ed-Dm in 1921. Elect 
in 1921, but, being suspect, 
Minister of War, he was obI 
Persia in 1924, his innocenc 
Minis.ter for ~~reign Affair 
AppOinted MinIster of Fina 
having found that the int 
administration rendered his 
He is a man of commo 
Affairs, he showed himself \,1 
best endeavours for the settl 
with many of his com pat;· 
character and outspokenness 
In 1931 he was appoin 
post which appears to have 
to hand over the whole of hi 
at the end of the year he WfIf 
132. Muzaflari, lluss. 
Born 1894. Fifth and Jl fa\ 
he was taken to Europe on t 
the Imperial family. Educ 
was a classmate of his nepl 
and who had a greater aO'cel 
Appointed Governor-GI 
whence he was recalled. ( 
February 1918. Accompani 
of lfis Majesty King Ueor 
Geneml of Fars in :March1! 
dishnndment of the South J 
l'etirement, living for the ntl 
development of his estatcs i 
the late Nizam-us-Saltaneh 
Din Mirza) and one daught 
When in Fars he kept {.! 
to the dignity of his Iml 
cultivated, speaking French 
on good terms with membl 
sistently shown hospitality 
do so. 
In November' 1933, as 
the Qajar family, a press 
press, and Nusrat-us-Salta 
to the prcss stating that t 
Persia, were completely sa I 
by the household of the prc 
13:1. Nabavi, Tnfllti ( 
the 'Ministry for FOI'eJgn . 
Aghlmhnd ]910. Kargnzlll 
I1 as served as conglll-gcn(' 
months in Seyyid Zin's Cal 
in Iraq ]931-32. Appoint 
Company, 1935. 
A corpulent little mal 
!TI with Teymolll'tnche, III 
Irregular \lse of customs pI 
person, though not cxceedi' 
134. Naficy, Dr. A I, 
Dr. A/oadeb Naficy).-Eld 
[16143] 
J( ,. , 
r,\,·,", · '~ 
/ [TAi~ telegrlJl is ot particular seQrecy and should b~ retained 
by the autaorlsed recipient ana not passed on] 
[CYPHER] WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION 
FROM TEHRAN 'TO FOREIGN OFFICE 
Sir R. Bw.llard, 
~~i18; . ebrul.ry 1944 D. 6. 52 1..lk""oofi.:-lf=-'p:-9.9-1~h.'hrua.ry 19-« R. 9.57 I.. 27ta Pe rul.l7 1944: 
Repeated to Governaeni otIndll. 
M.E. MIn .. ' Saving.' 
Baldad. Saving. 
\ 
••• • •• 
IMPORTANT 
~~1g?6 
.2 ~ fEB 194f_ 
Poll tioil. sl tua tien .n evo ot opening ot the llajlis whioa ia 
to take place February 26tn is as tollows. . 
; '. 
~ 2. Prtiae Uinis ter 1's sha)cy btl t now that KI.TIlI 1.1 Sal t ..... 
I presumably has been e11rdn.l.ted by our opposi tlon there '-!"!x0nly ", I 
two serious a.l tomtlTe., ,thq 1l1ill'st,er ter Foreign Attairs ·an. )cU.A( • 
Persiaa Ambassador at ~oso.wr .The Prime Minister would neraa11yt~ 
resign wben credentials ot all .eputies have been verified i.e. I I 
after two or three weeks but he JU.Y resign at once t. show hil ~ ). readiness to Bubmit_~ ParlilJlentary c'ontrol, 'lbo Ministlr ot  ,,~ Commerce and IndUstrY?did not .~to tace the Yajlis an_ baa il .... ,uf 
presente. ais resignati,n so trequontly that it has beea aoc~pte. ~ 
at last. He still denies haTing killed a workman an. giTes as 
grounis for his resignation that noetor Millspaugh will not proTii. 
tunis for uanitien taot.riea whioh are making arms ter Soviet 
Government Millspaugh in an interview witi Press alludes to 
faetories {partioularly thGSC makini munitionl) whick alway. hl.TI 
I. ieticit an. expeot Treasury to aake it up: these he said BUst bl 
made selt-supporting. 
B. The Sh1 has oda further .ITement towards clntrol ot 
ar-r by issuing or era thr~gh his nominee in plaoe or Minister or 
War, ani wi thwt knowledge ot Chiet at General Staff for transfer ot 
Unier Seoretary ter War and several other ehanges iesigne. to 
isolate Cbief of General St~ft who in c~nsequeno~ feels more an_ 
mere helpless since an inoreasing.number of officers in key positions 
are now henchllen of the Slulh ani Razm.ara ani hlstiIe t. Amerioan 
Aivisers. There is good evidenoe that the Sh has reoently 
talke« violently against Ri.le an_ Mills au ecause they will 
net support his Bohe.es" ger a.nay. 
, 
Foreign Offioe please pass to Government If India as my 
telegrUl No.57. . 
~,., 
OTP. 
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Postscript 
Perhaps it was by fortune that the last well G B Reynolds, D' Arcy' s engineer. sunk in 
Maidan-Naftun in 1908 hit oil. The gusher brought fortune for Britain but a bitter 
dispute and sorrow for Iran. The hydrocarbon substance, so vital for Western 
industry, changed the south-west of Iran beyond recognition. The small fishing 
mudbank village of Abadan was turned into the world's largest oil refmery. The remote 
unknown Meidan-Naftun was renamed Masjed-i-Soleiman and universally known by 
its English abbreviation, MIS. 
Iranians have always appreciated the role Mosaddegh played in removing foreign 
influence from Iran. D'Arcy, however, never had the recognition he deserved. One 
refmery near Swansea was named Llandarcy, in honour of the English fmancier who -
worked the oil concession to the point of bankruptcy although he was actually stripped 
off his fortune ! 
Reynolds is in no better position. The Iranian authorities may have preserved, on the 
site where oil was fIrst struck, his original set up and puffing Billy that produced 
steam to work the hammer. He has, however, no memorial. 
Today, there is no mention of Llandarcy either, let alone that of Reynolds who spent 
several years of his life in the harsh rugged terrains of Iran searching for oil. 
Whether driven by the lure of financial gain, prestige, power or love of adventure, 
made no difference to the capitalist system. Once you have done your job you get paid 
and that is it. 
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